There is no question about the stature and influence of both Stephen Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan and Jaime L. Cardinal Sin in their respective nations as well as the Asian and global landscapes. During their tenure as archbishops in their country’s capitals and at the time of their demise in February 16, 2009 and June 21, 2005, respectively, both were hailed as exceptional leaders in their own right, whose contributions toward the democratization of their countries transcended religious and national boundaries.

We conjure the figure of Cardinal Kim speaking to workers, students and many others on the grounds of the Myeongdung Cathedral in Seoul. We hear the voice of Cardinal Sin over Radio Veritas calling all listeners to surround two military camps in EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) to protect defecting officers and soldiers against the onslaught of troops loyal to the Marcos regime. These remind us of

*An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the conference “Church Leadership in Asia in memory of Stephen Cardinal Kim” sponsored by the Graduate School of Theology, Sogang University in Seoul, Korea on September 17-18, 2009.
the critical role each played in dismantling authoritarian rule in 1986 in the Philippines and 1987 in Korea.

Because of their singular roles, one is tempted to see them as prominent figures isolated from their own contexts. This essay proposes to look at both as profoundly imbedded in their contexts, in the hope of not only demonstrating their full significance but also of showing how their contexts shaped their very contributions. Though it does not undertake a theological critique of their views, it offers a broad analysis of their actions and some of their important writings during this period, albeit limited to those available in English. This analysis points to some similarities and differences between Cardinals Kim and Sin, and illustrates how our theological view of what constitutes pastoral leadership is historically mediated in the concrete context in which it takes place. Hence, it suggests a general hermeneutic for conceiving pastoral leadership in context.

There are three main parts to this essay: (a) their task as “heirs” in the post-Varican II era, (b) their location in the social context and (c) their pastoral response as leaders in context.

**Their Task as “Heirs” in the post-Vatican II Era**

One could rightly characterize the leadership of Cardinals Kim and Sin in terms of the mission to implement the spirit and the letter of the historic Second Vatican Council, especially in the light of subsequent synodal and papal documents. For instance, both often quoted from conciliar documents and papal writings such as *Evangelii Nuntiandi* [1975] and *Redemptor Hominis* [1979]. Though products of and already church leaders in the preconciliar period, both devoted their

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1Since most these were spoken at particular occasions, references to them include the year of delivery followed by their location in published anthologies or other sources.
subsequent leadership to a serious commitment to the *aggiornamento* movement that inspired, convened and implemented the council.

However, Cardinal Kim’s ascendancy to episcopal leadership in Seoul almost immediately after the council in 1968 left a profound mark on his person and views. Moreover, his involvement as one of the bishops who conceived the formation of what would eventually become the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC) strengthened his own commitment to the council. In the light of this involvement, documented in many published accounts, his later reflection truly captures his own understanding of the FABC’s task and his own mission as episcopal leader within it:

I thought then that for the future and evangelization of Asia in a rapidly developing world the bishops’ conferences needed cooperation among themselves. Such mutual help would not only contribute greatly to the development of the Catholic Church in Asia, but it would have the potential of making a major contribution to human development, advancing justice and creating a human being-centered society, all of which were badly needed in many countries.²

Thus Jesuit theologian C. G. Arevalo, awarded by the just-concluded Ninth FABC General Assembly in Manila for his involvement and service since its inception, appropriately refers to the post-conciliar period in Asia as “the time of the heirs.”³ From this perspective, he rightly calls Cardinal Kim as one of FABC’s “founding fathers”: “It was his initiative which convened the organizing meeting in Manila during Pope Paul IV’s 1970 visit.”⁴

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²“Founding Father reflects on FABC’s origin and development,” *Asia Focus* (Jan 6, 1995), 3.


Furthermore, Cardinal Kim’s words about the need for the FABC allude to some of the major themes of the council—evangelization and its concomitant involvement in human development and justice—all of which appear in many of his addresses as well as in those of Cardinal Sin who only became archbishop nine years after the close of the council.

The theme of the mission of evangelization shared by all Christians was a constant refrain for both Cardinals Kim and Sin in their speeches. Whether speaking to Irish Columban missionaries to Korea [1971] or Asian Catholics [1988], to a gathering of catechists [1970] or even to those about to be confirmed [1975], Cardinal Kim never failed to challenge all to take up the mission to evangelize.

Cardinal Sin, too, emphasized this importance of the mission of evangelization. In the 1977 conference on mission in Mexico, he enjoined all in the following words: “It is not enough, according to Vatican II, for the Church to be present and to organize within a nation, nor is it also sufficient to carry on an apostolate of good example. For the goal of its presence and organization is to announce Christ, in word and in deed, to non-Christians and to help them receive Christ in the plenitude” [1977].

Perhaps their insistence on evangelization came from their keen awareness of the small number of Christians in Asia and thus of what appears to be the seeming failure of Christianity in Asia. Cardinal Kim could only count 300,000 Catholics out of the seven million population

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in his diocese [1971]. Similar figures are not lost on Cardinal Sin who frequently reminded Filipino Christians of their “special missionary vocation” on account of their “providential history” as the only Christian nation in Asia then:

But to be a chosen people is always, in the plans of God, to receive a responsibility in service to him .... Pope Paul IV enjoined us to thank our heavenly Father for ‘four hundred years of grace.’ But such gratitude, for so much given, for so much received, can only open up to a mission shaped for us by that same loving goodness. ‘To proclaim His truth, His love, His justice and salvation before [our] neighbors, the peoples of Asia’ [1981].

Both Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin were thus aware of the reality of religious pluralism in Asia. As in his address at the East Asian Pastoral Institute after being conferred an honorary degree by the Ateneo de Manila University, Cardinal Kim echoed the Vatican Council’s Nostra Aetate on the Church’s recognition of what is true and holy in these religions. On another occasion, he spoke of how Confucianism, Buddhism and Hinduism “reveal the depths of human existence, and facilitate virtuous living” [1992].

But Cardinal Sin added another dimension to “the sad fact of a ‘not-yet-Catholic Asia,’ and a hope, the hope of a ‘Catholic-Asia’—or at least an Asia where the Catholic faith will feel at home and thrive as in its own motherland” [1978]. Here he indicated a possible reason for Christianity’s apparent failure in Asia:

If Catholicism in the Asian continent enters by the paths of ‘authentic inculturation,’ if it follows the clear directives of Vatican II in the Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity and the Declaration on non-Christian Religions, if the Church in Asia generously endeavours

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11 Dumol, A Cry … A Song, 104.


13 Dumol, A Cry … A Song, 76.
to integrate Christianity into the Asian life and the Asian people while preserving its universal character—as the 1974 Synod on Evangelization so forcefully proposed—then ‘yes.’ Catholicism will be a living reality in Asia, it will permeate the lives of many Asians, it will be at home in Asia: it will be—if you allow me to put it this way—it will be ‘again’ (not simply become) an Asian religion [1978].

Given this need for an “Asian Christianity”—perhaps more emphasized by Cardinal Sin than Cardinal Kim—both still agreed on the fundamental reason for the seeming failure of mission in terms of the minority of Christians in Asia. Cardinal Kim “came to the conclusion that the answer to this painful ‘WHY?’ lay in the lack of love such as described in Paul’s 1st Corinthians chapter 13,” of “the radical love demanded of us” [1980]. He repeated similar words at another occasion many years later: “I am convinced in my heart that only an awareness of the love of Jesus can bring people to believe in him. Only an experience of this love can attract those, who live in a materialistic world, to Jesus” [1997]. He elaborated on this importance of love for mission and its relation to Christianity’s “failure in Asia”: “One is that we have not experienced love. We have not loved Christ and we have not loved people. The other is that we have brought Christ to others in world only, but we have not truly followed him, we have not become like Him” [1997]. Not surprisingly then, Mother Teresa of Calcutta is referred to as the paragon of this love [1997] and Mahatma Gandhi’s comment about “Christians not being Christ-like” cited often [1997].

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14 Dumol, A Cry … A Song, 79.
This emphasis on love as the way of evangelization is similarly found in Cardinal Sin’s writings. At his installation as bishop in the Jaro Diocese during the turbulent 1970s, he told the gathered faithful: “The next time you are tempted to wave a placard saying, ‘down with this, down with that,’ shout instead, ‘UP WITH BROTHERHOOD, UP WITH UNITY, UP WITH LOVE!’ … The crying need today is for a revolution—a revolution of love, of Christian love” [1972]. He even repeated this call at his 1974 installation as Archbishop of Manila, two years after President Marcos’ declaration of martial law:

I issued the call at a time when activists rule[d] the streets, when, in an orgy of violence against the Establishment, they raised their arms in defiance and their voices in a hymn of hate. Their voices today are no longer heard, but the need for that revolution of love remains [1974].

These words of Cardinal Sin on love as well as his trademark closing line, “I love you all very dearly,” were not sentimental piety addressed to an equally sentimental people. They were deeply rooted in his understanding of evangelization not only in the Philippines but in all of Asia. In a 1981 Vienna Convention on Missions, he said,

the Christian faith and the Christian Gospel are not about statistic[s], even about human ‘religious’ statistics. Rather it is about a life which God shares with hearts which open themselves to His love, with people [who] receive His mercy into their lives [1981].

These words from Cardinal Sin speak of the task that he and Cardinal Kim shared as “heirs of the Faith” in a post Vatican II era. Both took it upon themselves to preach the Gospel of Christ in and through love to Asia. How they accomplished this can only become clear when they are seen in their respective contexts.

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Their Location in the Social Context

The social contexts within which Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin envisioned the evangelizing mission of the Church in love could not have been more different, save for the brutal reality of the authoritarian governments that ruled both Korea and the Philippines during the most significant period of their episcopal leadership. Park Chung-Hee came to power through a military coup in 1961 and ruled until his assassination in 1979, only to be replaced by Chun Doo-Hwan whose presidency until 1987 proved to be more repressive. Ferdinand Marcos extended his presidential term by proclaiming martial law in 1972 and remained in power until the 1986 People Power Revolution.

The authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-Hee and his successor and that of Ferdinand Marcos had much in common in terms of their broad political, social and economic outlines. First, both regimes were essentially military. Park and Chun were military generals; Marcos was a World War II soldier and an elected President with military support. Their regimes were established through military force. Park and Chun came to power through the 1961 and 1980 coups, while Marcos dissolved the existing civilian government and set up another under his control through martial law. Thus the military in both countries assumed a crucial political role. It promoted compliance with directives from their leaders and investigated, and meted out punishment for, non-compliance. Thus the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) became infamous for their brutality. McCoy writes that “under Marcos … military murder was the apex of a pyramid of terror—3,257 killed, 35,000 tortured, and 70,000 incarcerated … some 2,520, or 77 percent of all victims, were ‘salvaged’—that is, tortured, mutilated, and dumped on a roadside for public display.”

At the same time, both Park and Marcos were keen to camouflage the military nature of their rule and thus devised similar ways to cover it with civilian legitimacy. Park resigned from the military and formed the Democratic Republican Party to run as President. After his victory, he declared martial law, dissolved the National Assembly and called a referendum to ratify his *Yushin-Constitution* [Vitalization Reform Constitution]. Marcos’ strategies were just as elaborate. Upon declaring martial law, he appointed all local officials and manipulated ratification of a new Constitution suited to legitimate his rule. In the face of rising civil unrest and opposition, he replaced martial law with “constitutional authoritarianism” in 1981 when Pope John Paul II visited, and oversaw elections for a rubber-stamp unicameral legislative in 1984. But despite all these changes, the military character of governance prevailed in both Korea and the Philippines.

Second, fundamental rights and freedoms were curtailed, if not entirely suppressed. This was initially justified by both Park and Marcos through the specter of Communism. Communist North Korea cast a long shadow in the South. Though revitalized, the Communist Party of the Philippines could not have wrested power then. What in fact occurred through outright force or psychological intimidation was the practical disappearance of any space in civil society for independent discussion and critique, be it from organized opposition or ordinary citizens. Prominent opposition leaders were arrested and imprisoned. Kim Dae-Jung, who narrowly lost to Park in 1971 and later became president in 1997, was abducted in Tokyo and imprisoned in Korea in 1973. During Chun’s regime, he was again imprisoned in the aftermath of the 1980 Kwangju massacre of students and condemned to death. Senator Benigno Aquino, Marcos’ nemesis, was arrested with the declaration of martial law and remained in solitary confinement and later exile in the U.S.A. until his 1983 assassination. Countless people were harrassed, detained and even executed by government

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instrumentalities or allied “private groups” on mere suspicion of opposing those in power.

All forms of media were closely monitored and often taken over by the state or its collaborators. In his story of the Park regime, Janelli shows “how the state intervened in the media not so much by forbidding news but by limiting the size and placement of stories, regulating the wording of headlines, and shaping the general slant of reports, all to make its economic policy choices more palatable.”\(^\text{25}\) An atmosphere characterized by possible spying and thus distrust permeated educational institutions, civic organizations and even neighborhood or family groups. In Korea, the KCIA as “an arm of the executive … penetrated nearly every arena of Korean life, with agents in factories, central and local government offices, and university classrooms.”\(^\text{26}\)

Third, the general economic policies and activities of the Park, Chun and Marcos regimes were similar too, perhaps because both accepted the prevailing paradigm for development then and maintained strong economic links with both Japan and the West, particularly the U.S.A.\(^\text{27}\) After assuming power in 1961, Park

remov[ed] a number of other hindrances to the operation of free markets while providing public goods to foster market operation. Specific measures included promoting exports through various economic incentives, encouraging manufacturing industries that would allow South Korean enterprises to take advantage of their low-cost

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labor through international trade, and opening access to international credit markets by guaranteeing loans for major enterprises.”

With Park's assassination, Chun’s new strategy, constituting a second outward turn, was also based on an attempt to upgrade the industrial structure as a whole by moving into more technology- and skill-intensive niches. A key component of this technological upgrading was the liberalization of foreign investment rules.

Many of these measures, especially export-oriented industrialization and investment-liberalization, were, similarly, keystones in Marcos’ economic development plan. Philippine economist Miranda enumerates these as active government intervention in all sectors of the economy, opening of the national economy to foreign investments with multiple incentives, an export-oriented industrialization strategy, industrial peace through tripartite (management-labor-government) consultations and arrangements, agricultural development which also emphasized government intervention, and income policy which cheapened the price of labor.

However, these similar development strategies produced different outcomes in the two countries. Korean economist Myung Soo Cha writes that

in the decade following the shift to [export promotion], per capita output doubled, and South Korea became an industrialized country: from 1960/62 to 1973/75 the share of agriculture in GDP [general

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28 Janelli, Making Capitalism, 59.

29 Janelli, Making Capitalism, 125.


With such growth except for the period following Park’s assassination, Peter Drucker reportedly said “that Korea has compressed into thirty years what it took the Europeans and the United States almost 200 years, and the Japanese 100 years, to achieve.”\footnote{Byung-Nak Song, *The Rise of the Korean Economy* 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 300.}

The apparent success of these policies came at a steep social cost, especially for the lower classes:

This one-sided emphasis on economic and industrial development, was, however, accompanied by a sharp increase of social tensions within the Korean population, because the social rights of the labourers, the farmers and the small merchants were curtailed, while the members of the upper classes were able to increase their wealth and their possessions. The narrow working together of politics with the huge economic conglomerate (*chaebol*) proved very propitious for the economic growth of the country, but disastrous for the quality of life for the majority of the population who were deprived of their fundamental rights. Thus, the influence of the trade unions was curbed and the opposition of farmers and the fishermen against the deterioration of their life situation was crushed.\footnote{Georg Evers, *The Churches in Asia* (Delhi: ISPCK, 2005), 53–54.}

In contrast, Marcos’ economic policies and strategies failed on two counts: they did not promote real economic development nor improve the life situation of the overwhelming majority. Miranda writes: “If political economy has, as its core consideration, the distribution of costs, as well as benefits attending any economic process, the vast majority of Filipinos can be seen as having the worst of possible worlds
during the time Marcos and his cronies were in power” (95–100).  
This dire situation included economic recession, huge foreign debt and increased capital flight as well as increase in the number of the poor and decrease in their quality of life.

These contrasting results of similar economic policies were brought about by many complex reasons such as differences in the fundamentals and infrastructures of the Korean and Philippine economies at that time. But corruption bred by authoritarian politics must be one of them, and though it was present in Korea under Park and Chun, the impact of “the politics of plunder” under Marcos and his cronies placed an unconscionable burden on the Philippines which “had been bled of billions of dollars and had become the ‘basket case of Asia’ by the late 1970s.”

This national situation characterized by authoritarian governance and its concomitant social and economic costs was the singular experience that both Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin faced as archbishops of the seat of the Church in Korea and the Philippines. Their response to it and their leadership within and beyond the Church were integral to their mission to preach the Gospel in word and deed during the post-Vatican II era, but these were inevitably shaped by differences in the Church’s place in their nation’s historical experience and contemporary situation then.

Comparative statistics point to the broad outlines of these crucial differences. According to the landmark study *Korean Catholicism in the 1970s* undertaken by the Social Research Institute of Sogang University and commissioned by the Korean bishops and major religious superiors, the Catholic Church in Korea at that time “consists of a small body of about 800,000 Christians organized into fourteen dioceses and

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approximately four hundred thousand parishes, served by slightly under one thousand priests. Catholics make up less than 2.5% of the total South Korean population.\textsuperscript{36} But this was soon to change. Some thirteen years later, according to Cardinal Kim himself, “the increase in numbers, the growth of churches all over the country, the constant influx of students into our seminaries and the enthusiasm and active involvement of so many lay people” lead many in the Christian world to see Korea as a ‘success story.’” \textsuperscript{[1988]}\textsuperscript{37} This change “from 800,000 to 2.5 million “ was reported to have taken place “under his leadership.”\textsuperscript{38}

Such growth notwithstanding, Catholicism remains a minority religion in Korea with Buddhists totaling 4.9M, Confucians 4.4M and Protestants 3.1M in 1969.\textsuperscript{39} Given these religious demographics and despite some negative perceptions about those of other religions, the Sogang survey concludes:

Korea’s society is religiously pluralistic to such a degree that every religion in the country is clearly a minority religion. This situation contributes to an equality among the major religions—at least in terms of social and political power—which gives their members and leaders a certain sense of security and confidence in dealing with each other. This secure atmosphere, in turn, makes possible the generally friendly relations which prevail among the major religions in Korea.\textsuperscript{40}

This atmosphere has made possible cooperation between the Catholic Church and others from different persuasions, religious or otherwise:


\textsuperscript{37}Kim, \textit{The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim} I, 232.

\textsuperscript{38}“In Memoriam Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan,” \textit{Chosun Ilbo} (Feb. 18, 2009), 1.

\textsuperscript{39}Biernatzki, \textit{Korean Catholicism}, Table 7-1, page 104.

\textsuperscript{40}Biernatzki, \textit{Korean Catholicism}, 89.
It [Catholicism] has areas of mutual understanding with Buddhism and Protestantism and is not strongly disliked by many among the non-religious population or many traditional Confucians. This pivotal position gives the Church a potential for encouraging interfaith cooperation which is probably unique among Korean religious bodies.\footnote{Biernatzki, \textit{Korean Catholicism}, 89–90.}

In contrast to its minority status in Korea, Catholicism has been and remains an overwhelming majority religion in the Philippines—often identified, despite Timor Leste’s 2002 independence, as “the only Catholic country in Asia” with the third largest Catholic Church in the world. According to Moreno, “it is estimated that the percentage of Catholics relative to the total population in the Philippines ranged from 82 to 84 percent in the years from 1985 to 1995.”\footnote{Antonio Moreno, \textit{Church, State and Civil Society in Postauthoritarian Philippines: Narratives of Engaged Citizenship} (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2006), 33.}

In the 2000 National Statistics Office report, Islam accounts for 5.06% of the population, more than any other Christian group, mainline or not.

Even with the entry of Protestant evangelical, fundamentalist and charismatic groups in the 1980s as well as with the exposure of Filipinos to religious groups other than Catholicism through media and migration, most Filipinos indicate their religion as Catholic despite the considerable range in religious practice and involvement among them.\footnote{Christl Kessler and Jürgen Rüland, \textit{Give Jesus a Hand! Charismatic Christians: Populist Religion and Politics in the Philippines} (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008), 91.} A preparatory document for the 1991 Second Plenary Council of the Philippines (PCP II) “notes that only 20 percent of the Catholic population are catechized, 10 percent are regular churchgoers and recipients of the sacraments, while a mere ‘2% belong to Church-related affairs’.”\footnote{Moreno, \textit{Church, State and Civil Society}, 34.}
However, the social influence of Christianity in the Philippines extends beyond these numbers. Its 16th century entry into the archipelago’s scattered native settlements except those already Muslim, its involvement with Spanish colonial governance and its historical role in the 19th nationalist and revolutionary movements have all contributed to an enduring national polity and ethos shaped by Christianity. Hence, though most Catholics are “unchurched, uninvolved, and untouched by the parish,” they have been socialized and remain familiar with Christian stories and symbols. Signs of these religious stories and symbols are often found in public, communal, familial and personal domains, and their symbolic power unleashed during times of an extraordinary nature or “liminality” such as the 1986 People Power Revolution.

Because of Christianity’s historic role in the construction of the Philippine nation-state and of local culture as well as its overwhelming majority in contemporary society, Filipino Christianity as a whole continues to be a potent social presence and force. Though certainly not monolithic in many respects, the Catholic Church, its primary institutional form, acts like and is seen as “the church of the majority” in the Philippine social landscape even with emerging signs of religious pluralism.

In contrast, the Catholic Church in Korea has remained the “little flock” with “little prospect of major increases … in the near future.” This affects not only its strategy for evangelizing mission but also its location in society. As in the case of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, this situation of the Korean Catholic Church is linked to its earlier history marked by persecutions during the 19th century. As the Sogang study states, “modern Catholicism, too, cannot

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45Moreno, *Church, State and Civil Society*, 34.


avoid the continuing influence, however subtle, of the persecutions which wracked its first hundred years,” and one of the “enduring characteristics stamped upon the Korean Catholic community during the persecutions” is “the rural and ‘catacomb’ nature of community—perhaps ‘ghetto’ might better describe the continuation of this trait in post-persecution times ….”

From within this “little flock” on the Korean social landscape, Cardinal Kim carried on the mission of evangelization in post-Vatican II times, just as Cardinal Sin fulfilled the same task from within “the church of the majority” in the Philippines. They each exercised their decisive leadership against authoritarian regimes within the respective stature and ethos of the Catholic Church in their nations.

**Their Pastoral Response as Leaders in Context**

One does not diminish the decisive contributions of Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin towards democratization in their countries by pointing out two external factors that facilitated these contributions and magnified their impact within and beyond the Catholic Church.

First, the theological and juridical foundations of clerical leadership in the Catholic Church, as well as the dominant status of traditional leaders in both Korean and Philippine cultures, provide fertile ground for the emergence of the kind of strong leadership exercised by both cardinal-archbishops. Because of the centrality of ordained hierarchy in the Catholic understanding of Church and its juridical expression in church governance, the position of archbishop assumes *de facto* dominance, notwithstanding post-Vatican II reforms in theological understanding and canon law. Moreover, Kim and Sin were archbishops of Seoul and Manila—the seat of the Catholic Church as well as the capital city in both countries. Upon their installation as cardinal, they took on an additional honorific title bestowed by the Pope. Thus

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even without the presidency in the Catholic bishops’ conference in their countries, they were often perceived to be the Church’s highest local prelate. In the light of all these then and regardless of their own leadership styles, whatever they said or did was bound to be received with considerable authority.

This authority from their position as cardinal-archbishop in the most prominent episcopal seats in their respective countries is further reinforced by traditional Korean and Philippine history and culture. The Sogang study hypothesized the influence of Confucian and monarchical tradition thus:

[Korean Catholics] could be expected to have inherited a tradition which sacralized hierarchy and authority in social relationships. When applied to the clergy, this authoritarian tendency would be reinforced by the central role played by the priest in the Catholic communities during the persecutions. The clergy could be expected to respond to the community’s expectation of authoritarianism by interpreting their role according to the only type-pattern of non-kinship authority readily available for imitation in nineteenth-century Korea: that of the yangban official.49

The study appears to confirm such a hypothesis. The surveyed Korean Catholics considered relations between bishops and priests as well as authoritarian attitudes among the clergy as tension areas (138),50 but the study concludes that “if the Korean church moves forward, therefore, it will do so at the initiative of the bishops or it will not move at all” (172).51

49Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 22.

50The study appears to confirm such a hypothesis. The surveyed Korean Catholics considered relations between bishops and priests as well as authoritarian attitudes among the clergy as tension areas (Biernatzki, Korean Catholicism, 138).

51But the study concludes that “if the Korean church moves forward, therefore, it will do so at the initiative of the bishops or it will not move at all” (Biernatzki, Korean Catholicism, 172).
Traditional Philippine culture similarly supports such authoritarian and leader-centered governance in social and religious affairs. In his study of pre-Hispanic native settlements, Scott states that their leader, called datu, “was expected to govern his people, lead them in war, protect them from their enemies, settle their disputes, and—as good administrator Dr. Morga said—succor them in their struggles and needs.” With the coming of Christianity, the parish priest practically took on many of these roles:

Given the inadequate number of colonial personnel to administer newly gathered territories, he represented de facto church as well as colonial authority, and took on multiple tasks such building roads or teaching new techniques in agriculture. He also played a crucial role in the colony’s social organization: first, by enticing local leaders to teach catechism and lead prayers for the dying in barrios too remote for the priest to attend to and second, by organizing them into sodalities and confraternities like those in Europe and the New World.

This conjuncture of clerical and cultural forces provided the stage for the decisive and strong leadership of both Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin. Even without regard for their personal styles, both proved to be strong and effective leaders despite the spirit of anti-authoritarianism and democratization current within and beyond the Church then.

Second, emerging changes in the Catholic Church at large and in both countries then coincided with the episcopacies of both and thus made possible their leadership. These changes within the Church—iconically symbolized by Vatican II—were part of and, at the same time, a response to great, at times turbulent, global changes. Cries for freedom and equality, for justice and human development as well as denunciations against individuals and institutions allied with the status quo rang throughout the world. These cries and denunciations found

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their target in the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun in Korea and of Marcos in the Philippines. This new political reality and its social and economic consequences could not but demand a response from the Catholic Church, whatever it might be, and in the process, changes within it.

The response of “the little flock” of Korean Catholics and its effects on the Catholic Church were shaped by its relations to those in power and to opposition groups in civil society. In part due to Christianity’s minority status, the Catholic Church and even the Protestant Churches did not have many and deep ties to those in the Park and Chun governments, and thus the possibility of being coopted was less likely. Park considered himself a Buddhist, and thus “renovated Buddhist temples” and also managed to control Buddhist organizations, and forced declarations of allegiance from believers, drafted monks into the military services, and disciplined dissenting monks. Probably due to South Korea’s dependence on security support from the United States and to the strongly conservative (viz., anticommunist) bent of Korean Christians, the regime did not attempt to manipulate the churches as it did Buddhist temples.54

Despite this, Catholic leaders and laity had varying reactions to the state. Such division within the Church is not surprising in the light of the Sogang survey results: “the impression that emerges—both from the data and from observations of the behavior of Koreans as they try to meet the challenges of the new, dynamic world culture—is of a basic conservatism” but “relieved to some degree by a willingness to undertake moderate changes slowly and by a scattering of resourceful adaptations to particular new situations.”55 Thus


55 Biernatzki, Korean Catholicism, 66.
no group surveyed showed any tendency towards what could be termed a ‘revolutionary’ attitude towards social change. Priests and seminarians were perhaps the most ‘liberal’ groups polled, as well as being the groups most open to new options in the Church’s response to the social needs of the times …. This individualistic, somewhat conservative attitude towards social change among Korean Catholics may have been changed somewhat by the various public protests against injustice in Korean society issued by the bishops since the survey was taken.\textsuperscript{56}

These differences, however, did not prevent the rise of what Korean sociologist Im classifies as “resisters” rather than ”adapters” or “conformists.”\textsuperscript{57} Though the conservative Bishops’ Conference and the progressive Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (CPAJ) exchanged denunciations from mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Catholic activists, though a minority within the Church, acquired hegemony. Aside from the Church’s high premium on unity, in fact or at least in appearance, informal interaction and communication between the activists and others in the Catholic Church continued. Moreover, the increasing repression of the authoritarian regime, especially arrests of clergy such as Wonju Bishop Chi Hak-sun in 1974 and Fr. Ch’oi Ki-sik in 1982,\textsuperscript{58} made it more difficult even for church conservatives not to support resistance to the state which “came to believe that their [the activists’s] progressive stance reflected the position held by the

\textsuperscript{56}Thus “no group surveyed showed ay tendency towards what could be termed a ‘revolutionary’ attitude towards social change. Priests and seminarians were perhaps the most ‘liberal’ groups polled, as well as being the groups most open to new options in the Church’s response to the social needs of the times…This individualistic, somewhat conservative attitude towards social change among Korean Catholics may have been changed somewhat by the various public protests against injustice in Korean society issued by the bishops since the survey was taken” (Biernatzski, \textit{Korean Catholicism}, 161).

\textsuperscript{57}Cheng and Brown, “The Roles of Religious Organizations,” 33.

entire Korean Catholic Church.” This show of solidarity, in contrast to the fragmentation within the Protestant Churches, “led Korean people to perceive that Catholics had contributed more to Korean democratization than Protestants.”

The relations of the Korean Catholic Church to other groups during this period also shaped its response to authoritarian rule. According to the Sogang survey, all groups questioned supported ecumenical cooperation, and “a huge majority of 90.65% of the sample [lay Catholics] agreed with the statement, ‘Catholics should work together with non-Catholics to build up a good social order.’” Given this, the Catholics were disposed to work with Protestants in facing authoritarian regimes.

The Korean Catholic Church collaborated with groups in civil society to the mutual benefit of both parties. As Im puts it, on the one hand, “Korean Christian churches not only were actively involved in democratization to seek legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies, but also they passively accepted the invitation from social movements to join the struggle for democratization.” On the other, “antigovernment social movements needed churches because they believed that churches could lend moral authority to their movements and provide shelter to them from the harsh repression of authoritarian officials.”

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60 Im, “Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea,” 151.

61 According to the Sogang survey, all groups questioned supported ecumenical cooperation, and “a huge majority of 90.65 of the sample [lay Catholics] agreed with the statement, ‘Catholics should work together with non-Catholics to build up a good social order’” (Biernatzki, Korean Catholicism, 88).

62 Im, “Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea,” 142.

63 Im, “Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea,” 142.
These two factors—the traditional Korean and Catholic ethos of leadership as well as the emergent changes in the Korean Catholic Church—put the Church in an unique position during the period of authoritarian rule, one that even Park himself identified as “the Catholic problem.”

Perhaps not surprisingly, social dynamics similar to those in the Korean Catholic Church were undergone by the Catholic Church in the Philippines, only writ large because of its long tradition and majority population. During Marcos’ authoritarian rule, hierarchy and laity were similarly divided into what Im categorized in the Korean case as “adaptors,” “conformists” and “resisters.” Youngblood estimates that “in 1979, forty-six bishops were classified as conservatives, eighteen moderates, and fifteen progressives.” At the Church’s lower levels, however, many organizations like the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), church instrumentalities like the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) and religious communities engaged in direct work with the poor and marginalized were already critical of Marcos’ regime. Still many causes of these divisions in the Korean Catholic Church were similarly operative among Filipino Catholics; among them would be splits between pre- and post-Vatican II mentalities, between rural and urban populations, and even between generations.

In the Philippine case, however, these divisions are complicated by two distinct factors. First, many prominent Catholics—whether bishop, clergy or lay—had strong social bonds with those in power, most of whom, like Marcos and his family, were Catholic. These bonds came from traditional sources of alliances in Philippine society—kinship by blood or affinity, regional origin, links brought about by religious rites like being godparents, membership in voluntary organizations like school fraternities, and “belonging to the same circles” or, in

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64 Hanson, *Catholic Politics in China and Korea*, 4.

65 Moreno, *Church, State and Civil Society*, 42.
other words, class origin. Moreover, the Marcos regime, especially in
the person of Imelda Marcos, cultivated bonds with Church officials
through financial contributions to church projects or socializing with
them at social occasions. Photographs of Mrs. Marcos dining with
bishops like Cardinal Sin were widely circulated. These personal links
therefore made it more difficult for the Catholic Church to disentangle
itself from the establishment. Mrs. Marcos was known to have asked
Papal Nuncio Archbishop Bruno Torpigliani to pressure the CBCP not
to issue their 1986 statement about the regime’s lack of legitimacy.66

Second, divisions within the Philippine Catholic Church were
further complicated because ideological cleavages in Philippine society
were at play within the Church. Aside from the right wing, many
of whom were associated with the regime, there were independent
liberals and liberal democrats. But the ideological division that made
the Church’s response to the regime more difficult was between the
so-called “natdems” and “socdems” in the Church. The first “aligned
themselves with the Communist Party of the Philippines-National
Democratic Front-New People’s Army (CPP-NDF-NPA)” and “offered
a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist framework for social transformation.”67
Christians for National Liberation (CNL) “became the church sector
in the underground Left that was engaged in the mobilization of
church personnel and resources in aid of the armed revolution waged
by the revolutionary Left, and in the transformation of churches
around national democratic principles.”68 The second—advocates of
social democracy and initially open to an armed component—“were
vigorously anticommunist, but committed to social justice and political
transformation.”69 Theirs was an intense rivalry: “Both groups subtly
vied with one another in occupying key establishments and positions

66Moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 49.

67Moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 42.

68Moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 43.

69Moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 43.
of influence within the church. Both competed in recruiting members and sympathizers within the church.”

Though this ideological cleavage within the Church as well as the Church’s entanglement with those in power made the Church’s response to the Marcos regime more complex, what proved helpful were the links of the Church with professional groups like FLAG (Free Legal Assistance Group) or community organizing networks like COPE (Community Organization of Philippine Enterprises) as well as with local people’s organizations. As in Korea, their association with the Church offered legitimacy and protection to these groups against the instrumentalities of authoritarian government. Though these groups were not formally connected to the Church, these links were forged because many of their members were Catholic, and some even had long-standing personal relations with clergy, religious and lay active in church affairs. This was similarly applied to opposition groups such as traditional political parties and human rights advocates.

Given the Church’s ideological divisions as well as its intricate relations with those in power and those without, its protests against authoritarianism were not stifled. This occurred, as in Korea, when the Philippine Catholic Church became increasingly aware of the growing repression and brutality of the Marcos regime, let alone the worsening plight of the vast majority of the population. Church people—at the beginning, many vulnerable laity, but later, also some religious and priests—were harassed, arrested and even “salvaged.” Raids were conducted on religious houses, the most dramatic being the 1976 military raid with helicopters and armored vehicles on the Jesuit Sacred Heart Novitiate, the venue then of an international meeting of religious sisters. This drew an equally dramatic response—a Mass in protest at the Manila Cathedral presided over by Cardinal Sin. With this and many other events leading to the brutal climax in Ninoy Aquino’s assassination, witnessed on international television, the

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70 Moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 44.
Catholic Church became the *de facto* voice of the vast majority suffering at the hands of the regime.

Within these new contours of the Catholic Church in Korea and the Philippines emerging in the face of authoritarian rule, one must place the strong and decisive leadership of Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin. Though they certainly contributed much to the emergence of these contours, their words and deeds as leaders were equally shaped by these contours.

Listening to their words through an almost random sampling of their published texts during the authoritarian periods in their countries offers some insights into their contribution to democratization. Their words on development and justice in general and against authoritarian rule in particular came, as expected, from their focus on the evangelizing mission of the Church in love. Both were also critical of the promises of Communism as well as of the ills of capitalist ideology.

However, their different locations—Cardinal Kim within “the little flock” and Cardinal Sin within “the church of the majority”—influence the volume and nuances of their words. Because of the numerous opportunities in the Philippines for a prominent prelate to speak on urgent social issues, Cardinal Sin’s talks and homilies on these issues were numerous. They were addressed to audiences almost as wide and diverse as Philippine society. These included those in church groups like the CBCP, clergy, religious communities and lay associations as well as those in the wider society such as a Rotary Club or the Ambassadors’ Association of the Philippines. Though many appeared in church publications including *Ichthys*, the AMRSP’s mimeographed antidote to censored mainstream media, some came out in local publications like *Impact* or *The Fookien Times Philippines Yearbook* or in international magazines such as *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Some were open letters on particular issues addressed to government.

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officials like Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile [August 27, 1974], General Fidel Ramos [December 28, 1974] and even President Marcos [November 12, 1975].

Beneath this diversity of audience and volume of output lies an underlying concern for the rightful place of Christian involvement in society. Whoever the audience were and whatever the occasion, Cardinal Sin appeared bent on clearing obstacles to Christian social involvement whether in the form of “pseudo-spiritual verticalism” or of “a radical horizontalism.” [1973]

For more formal occasions, he resorted to technical language as in the 1973 biannual CBCP meeting:

> Although the Church, as religious community is by her nature and purpose, above, or better, beyond any political system, it is also her task and part of her mission to cast the light of her faith on the entire temporal, and therefore, on the political order, because ‘her religious mission is by the same token a human one, and she has to serve the welfare of all men.’ [1973]

To the 1983 Bishops-Businessmen’s Conference (BBC), he used Jesuit John Courtney Murray’s thought—also reflected on the Vatican II document on religious liberty—to stress that “the Church believes that integral human development requires a political order that can guarantee stability, security and freedom to its citizenry. Here is a tradition of order and rationality in civic affairs, not of chaos or anarchy.”

But in situations directly pastoral and urgent, such as the funeral Mass for Ninoy Aquino, Cardinal Sin’s words could not have been more direct in stressing the dire need for Christian involvement:

> With the Supreme Pontiff, the Church in the Philippines renews her pledge to bring about—and I quote—‘a truly human society where all men, women and children receive what is due to them to live in dignity: where especially the poor and the underprivileged are made the priority

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72 Dumol, *A Cry … A Song*, 34.


74 Dumol, *A Cry … A Song*, 130.
Concern of all.’ And I need not tell you, my friends, that Pope John Paul II uttered those words right in Malacañang in February 1981. [1983]75

Along with other groups within the Church like the CBCP, this shift toward more direct criticism in Cardinal Sin’s words was due to the increasingly oppressive nature of the Marcos regime not only to political opponents or leftist activists but also the poor majority and the middle class, not to mention Catholic institutions and communities. In 1973, he said “Praising, assenting, and encouraging, or criticizing, dissenting and protesting? These are all different forms of the ‘wholesome cooperation’ we must offer to the political community.”76 But from 1978 onward, he has shifted to “critical collaboration”—a phrase adopted too by the CBCP:

it holds that the Church will support all governmental actions that promote the common good and are consistent with Christian values and principles …. On the other hand, the Church will not hesitate to denounce any act or decree contrary to Christian teaching, that diminishes, if not actually suppresses individual rights, where torture, illegal detentions, corruption in office are enforced. [1983/1984]77

Though too many government acts and decrees had to be denounced in the 1980s and hence emphasis had clearly shifted to “critical,” Cardinal Sin had never ceased to speak of reconciliation. At that same 1983 BBC meeting with Prime Minister Cesar Virata present, he dared to offer an alternative political structure

… why don’t we form some sort of council made up of three members in the government led by you, Mr. Prime Minister, and two other cabinet ministers, three members from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines led by the incumbent President—hopefully, Archbishop Mabutas will make me one of the members—two members of the opposition and two members from the private sector …. This council will invite suggestions from the people on a broad range of subjects.

75 Dumol, A Cry … A Song, 135.

76 Dumol, A Cry … A Song, 38.

77 Kroeger, Human Promotion, 350.
It will then discuss this and, drawing from its manifold resources and expertise, refine them or discard them, as the case may be. And then, after it has arrived at a consensus, the council can present this to the President for implementation.\textsuperscript{78}

This offer could arguably be construed as his crossing the line into the strictly political but could also be an indication of the lengths that he was willing to go to for the sake of some form of reconciliation and peace. With his offer neither publicly addressed nor accepted, his voice calling all to go to EDSA on February 25, 1986 was simply a matter of time. This act of Cardinal Sin became his iconic gesture against authoritarianism and toward democratization in the Philippines.

In contrast to this dramatic act of Cardinal Sin, Cardinal Kim’s contribution to Korea’s democratization was a long series of words and deeds of solidarity with the suffering poor under authoritarian regimes. These words and deeds were consistent, indicating no major shifts in attitude as in the case of Cardinal Sin. As Hanson points out,

\begin{quote}
\textit{as early as the 1972 Christmas Midnight Mass in Myongdong cathedral, Cardinal Kim issued a warning to President Park; ‘Your action [the new Constitution] will help widen the already existent gap between the people and the government, and will eventually lead to a government without people and a people without a leader’ (101).}\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

What he said and did was more than sufficient for him to be called “Korea’s spiritual president” or \textit{\textit{kun orun} [the great elder].”}

In many instances, this leader of “the little flock” spoke with many others, especially Protestants and groups of workers and students, as at the 1976 ecumenical prayer meeting protesting the arrest of those who issued the “Declaration for Democratic National Salvation.”\textsuperscript{80}

When he spoke in his voice, his words were straightforward and

\textsuperscript{78} Dumol, \textit{A Cry \ldots A Song}, 133–4.

\textsuperscript{79} Hanson, \textit{Catholic Politics in China and Korea}, 101.

\textsuperscript{80} Hanson, \textit{Catholic Politics in China and Korea}, 99.
simple, concerned with direct pastoral response rather than any reasoned justification for Christian involvement in society. According to reports, “when President Chun Doo-hwan visited him shortly after taking power in a military coup in 1979, the cardinal chastised him, comparing his illegal seizure of the government to ‘an outlaw gunfight in a Western movie.’”\textsuperscript{81}

Cardinal Kim’s strong critique of authoritarianism derived from the profound belief of the core of democracy. In “When comes the Dawn of Democracy?”, his Christmas homily soon after the 1987 presidential elections, he said

the democracy we seek is humanization itself, rather than just a mere democratic system. It is to construct a society in which men can live as dignified human beings whom God created and the Messiah saved through the shedding of His blood.\textsuperscript{82}

These words could only come from the heart of one truly in solidarity with the suffering poor. His talks and homilies referred to “the poor, to those who weep, to those who are alienated and marginalized.” [1997]\textsuperscript{83} He wrote in his essay for Gustavo Gutierrez’ 60\textsuperscript{th} birthday that “the Anawim of Scripture, the marginales of Latin America, the Minjoong of Korea, the poor and oppressed ‘little’ ones of the whole world are clearly the salt of the earth.” [1988]\textsuperscript{84} Because of this privileged place of the suffering in his heart, he was attentive to them, wherever and whoever they were. Deeply pained by the situation of North Korean Catholics who legally belonged to his archdiocese, he

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\item \textsuperscript{83}Kim, \textit{The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim} I, 279–80.
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believe[d] there must be existing the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ. And there is the priesthood of Christ, even though there is no ministerial priesthood. Why? Because our Lord Jesus Christ, who Himself is priest, must be with them and among them, sharing their suffering with them, and carrying them also the Cross of Redemption. [no date] 85

Without condoning the suffering of women, he recognized that

women, because of their past experience, can bring to bear a unique vision of the relationship between family and the Church, which, in turn, embraces all of society: the man in the street, the child in the home, the deprived, the helpless, minorities, and the marginal and forgotten women. [1985] 86

To all these suffering, “Jesus reveals to us the wonder of the Compassion of God. The word ‘Compassion’ comes from Latin. It means ‘to share the suffering of one who suffers.’” [1992] 87 Moreover, the God Jesus reveals is “a Poor God” whose evangelizing “was a process of total giving, of complete emptying of Himself.” [1979] 88 Thus Cardinal Kim emphatically insisted that after “seek[ing] out Jesus and ask[ing] for His healing,” the Church “must know poverty experientially and existentially. Not by researching poverty, not by studying the poor, not by interviews or statistics, but by being poor.” 89

All these words of solidarity with the poor Cardinal Kim sought to live, and though he was certainly not extravagant in lifestyle, he put himself down too harshly by saying that “My dream to live with

89Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim VI, 446.
the poor couldn’t be realised, not because of my post as cardinal but because of my lack of courage.”

His most significant deed for the suffering poor, however, was to offer them hospitality. Columban Donal O’Keeffe recalls how in 1986 when Seoul city evicted people to make room for a new development in preparation for the 1988 Olympics the cardinal invited the families to live in the cathedral grounds. He set up two huge tents and there, in the heart of the business and tourist centre of Seoul, those families lived with meals being cooked in the church yard and children playing around the entrance to the cathedral.

The following year “students took refuge in the grounds after a rally for democracy and the police threatened to come in and arrest them. But the cardinal told the government: ‘If you come in you will first have to trample over me, then the priests, then the sisters and only then will you take the students.’”

His act of opening up the Myungdong Cathedral made it “the Catholic center for sit-in protests among the democratic opposition, striking workers, and the urban poor.” Brother Anthony of Taize recalls witnessing these occasions:

“I shall never forget listening to his sermons in Myongdong Cathedral at certain moments of great crisis and tension, standing in the packed church. I could feel how carefully he was choosing his words in order to indicate clearly the challenging message of the Gospel, never proposing some easy kind of emotion that would have no effect. It was clear that

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92 O’Keeffe, “Stephen Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan RIP.”

93 Im, “Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea,” 143.
he knew no compromises, that he spoke with same voice to the simplest believers and to the most powerful leaders.”

His motivation was never political, as he himself puts it: “it was an era of oppression, a dark era. We had no other choice but to wait for the truth to free us. How could a priest, as a delegate of Christ, remain silent at such a time?”

As a result of such acts of solidarity which spoke even louder than his words, Cardinal Kim became the conscience of the nation and Myungdong Cathedral the “holy place of democratization” since the 1970s:

“It was the Myungdong Cathedral where the mass was held in protest against the arrest of Bishop Chi in 1974, the joint Catholic-Protestant declaration demanding restoration of democracy was announced in 1976, and the cover-up of the torture and death of Park Chong Chui was revealed by the priest, Kim Seung Hun, in 1987, leading to the nationwide demonstrations for the restoration of democracy in June that year. Beside democratic opposition forces, workers, farmers, urban poor, and people of the ghettos took refuge at the Myungdong Cathedral to avoid arrest by the police.”

This image of Cardinal Kim welcoming the suffering to Myungdong Cathedral time and time again appropriately symbolizes his leadership of “the little flock” against authoritarianism. The voice of Cardinal Sin calling “God’s people” to EDSA at around 9 PM, February 22, 1986 clearly speaks too of his leadership of the “church of the majority” toward democratization. “Into the sanctuary” and “out to the streets” are not contradictory pastoral responses but two sides of the same evangelizing mission in different contexts.

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96Hanson, Catholic Politics in China and Korea, 147–48.
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