theory: the positive elements in other religions are brought to fulfillment in Christianity.\textsuperscript{72} Hence, Christianity is taken as a “cultural catalyst and crystallization point” for other religions.\textsuperscript{73} Without Christ’s revelation the other religions cannot really understand and appropriate the salvation at work within them. For this reason Jesus Christ must be preached “that God may not remain to the unknown God.”\textsuperscript{74}

Küng admits Christ as normative for other religions, but would not admit Christ as constitutive of salvation for the world. This view depends on his christology, especially on his ideas of the incarnation. Küng understands talk of the incarnation as originally mythical language. By taking it in its literal meaning and turning it into a central dogma, the Church detracts from the real centre of the Christian message which is the cross.\textsuperscript{75} This was accomplished through a process of Hellenization with the consequence of the simplistic identification of Jesus with God.\textsuperscript{76} What is required is a “remythologization” of the doctrine of the incarnation. A functional christology from below should replace the ontological christology from above.\textsuperscript{77} A functional interpretation should also be given to the title “Son of God” which is used to express the disciples’ experience of Jesus as the “representative” of God.\textsuperscript{78} Likewise, a functional interpretation of the incarnation would mean that “God himself as man’s friend was present, at work, speaking, acting, and definitively revealing himself in Jesus who came among men as God’s advocate and deputy, representative and delegate and was confirmed by God as the crucified raised to life.”\textsuperscript{79} Indeed, all the titles formulated by Küng, such as, God’s advocate, deputy, delegate, spokesman, plenipotentiary ... all denote the special function of Jesus, without saying anything about his ontological status.\textsuperscript{80} The dogmatic formula that Jesus is “truly man and truly God” is interpreted by Küng to mean: “The true man Jesus of Nazareth is for faith the real revelation of the one true

\textsuperscript{72} Cf. ibid 113.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. 121.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. 447.
\textsuperscript{75} Cf. ibid. 436.
\textsuperscript{76} Cf. ibid. 391.
\textsuperscript{77} Cf. ibid. 436-50.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. 390-91.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. 449.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. 440, 449.
3. "re-mythologizing" the mystery of the incarnation Küng has effectively challenged the traditional foundation for the Church's to the uniqueness of Christ. If the incarnation does not a pre-existent Logos entering once and for all into history to transform it from within, but is simply the mythical expression of Jesus as "God's representative," then the question arises inevitably: are not other founders of religions carried out essentially the same role? Are there not other "incarnations" in this sense? With the ethical interpretation of the incarnation one may at most to the recognition of a difference of degree but cannot uniqueness and definitiveness for Jesus. Even this difference of degree cannot be simply claimed but is to be established the basis of a comparative study. Küng offers a number of arguments for his claim that the revelation of God in Jesus surpasses definitively and normatively, all the other founders of ones. But these arguments are not as convincing as he thinks are often challenged by other theologians, especially the more ones. There is such a close connection between belief in the incarnation and claim to uniqueness, that, if the incarnation is not, then the uniqueness of Jesus also becomes a myth.

John Cobb. A normative christology is also held by a number of Process theologians. They avoid any talk of salvation being constituted by Jesus Christ. Still, Christ remains the ultimate norm for the process of transformation of history and the world. John Cobb, representative of Process theologians, holds the incarnation seriously. But he makes a clear distinction between Jesus and Christ. Cobb admits the universal presence of revelation and redemptive grace. The Logos is understood as "the principle of creative transformation" pervading the world. It is "the cosmic princi-
ple of order, the ground of meaning and the source of purpose." 86
Christ is the designation for this Logos inasmuch as it actually incarnates itself in concrete historical forms. 87 Cobb finds Christ (not Jesus) present in all religions. 88

As the Logos is incarnate in all human beings in varying degrees, Jesus is the "paradigm case of incarnation," the fullest incarnation of the Logos, "because his very selfhood was constituted by the Logos." 89 Hence it is not simply the intensification of the presence of the Logos in all people, but it implies "a distinctive structure of existence in which Jesus' selfhood was co-constituted by the incarnation of the Logos." 90 In this sense Jesus was Christ, although Christ as the embodiment of the Logos in the world is wider than Jesus. By maintaining the full incarnation of the Logos in Jesus, this Whiteheadian christology is able to defend the unique normativity of Jesus. But its separation of Jesus from the Christ is problematic and will be dealt with in the third part of the article.

D. THEOCENTRIC VIEW: NON-NORMATIVE CHRISTOLOGY

This fourth view presents nothing less than a radical change of paradigm. The mediation of Jesus Christ is considered neither as constitutive nor as normative for salvation. This new paradigm is theocentric as opposed to christocentric, inasmuch as it holds that salvation ultimately comes from God who has manifested and offered himself in different ways and in different religious traditions. Jesus Christ is simply one among many mediators of salvation. Judgments about claims to uniqueness or normativeness are unverifiable and therefore lacking basis. Negatively, this position betrays an epistemological relativism or scepticism. But in a positive way, it reminds us of the incomprehensibility of God in his dealings with humanity. One should avoid judging God and his ways by human standards. Jesus is the historical mediator of a special experience of God which need not be accepted as a universa mediation. Moreover, according to the exponents of this view:

86. Cobb, Christ in a Pluralistic Age, 71.
87. Cf. ibid.
88. Cf. ibid. 20-21.
89. Ibid. 138-39.
90. Ibid. 257.
There can be an intense loyalty to Jesus Christ without placing him in a unique or normative position.\textsuperscript{91}

Is this fourth position of a theocentric pluralism a legitimate tenable Christian position? In the Roman Catholic Church’s reaction against certain movements of the nineteenth century, it is clearly disallowed.\textsuperscript{92} This view can well explain one of the two Christian beliefs, namely, the universal salvific will of God. But it can hardly explain the second basic statement that Jesus Christ is the one mediator between God and humanity.\textsuperscript{93} Actually these two fundamental articles of Christian faith are stated together in one Pauline text: “. . . God our Saviour, who desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the Christ Jesus” (1 Tim 2: 4-5).

John Hick. One of the most distinctive representatives of this religious pluralism is certainly J. Hick. He accuses the recent attempts by theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, to readjust the relationship of Christianity to other religions as so many “epistles” added to the Ptolemaic view of the universe in order to save it from collapsing. He advocates a “Copernican revolution in theology,” namely, a paradigm shift from a Christianity-centred Jesus-centred to a God-centred model of the universe of faiths. The world religions, including Christianity, are so many different responses to the one divine Reality.\textsuperscript{94} Religions have grown in isolation from one another, but there is only one Spirit, one Reality behind all the religions. Their different interpretations and expressions are but historical and cultural adaptations.\textsuperscript{95}

The basic criterion for evaluating a religious tradition is to be found in its soteriological effectiveness, whether it is capable of offering a better quality of human existence, and a transformation of human experience from self-centredness to Reality-centredness.\textsuperscript{96} In this common soteriological structure, differences in religions should be seen as complementary rather than contradictory.

\textsuperscript{92} Pius IX, Syllabus of Condemned Errors (1864); cf. Schineller, “Christ and God,” 561.
\textsuperscript{93} Cf. D’Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, 25.
\textsuperscript{95} Cf. Hick, God and the Universe, 139; Hick, God has Many Names, 6.
As is expected, this Copernican revolution involves a new christology. The Christian claim to uniqueness and normativeness is based on the doctrine of the incarnation which, according to Hick, is mythical and needs re-interpretation.\(^97\) There is a shift of meaning in the title “Son of God” in early Christian tradition. In its original Jewish context, the title bears a functional meaning and is often used for the Messiah. When it comes to the Greco-Roman culture, the title generates the idea of incarnation and unique deification.\(^98\) This process of deification was evident already in John, but especially during the controversies of the early Councils. The mythical images of “Son of God” and “incarnation” were ontologized into absolute categories with the result that the metaphorical “Son of God” became “God the Son” in the metaphysical sense. Consequently Jesus became the only Saviour and only final norm for God’s salvific actions with humankind.\(^99\) Christianity must overcome this “theological fundamentalism.” The language of incarnation is not meant to be “factual statement” about “empirical, metaphysical” realities; it “lacks any non-metaphorical meaning.” In other words, the real point of “the incarnational doctrine is not indicative but expressive, not to assert a metaphysical fact but to express a valuation and evoke an attitude.”\(^100\) The statement that “Jesus was God the Son incarnate” is not literally true. Rather, it is the application of a “mythical concept” which gives definitive expression to Jesus’ efficacy as Saviour from sin and ignorance; it declares that “he is our sufficient model of true humanity in a perfect relationship to God.”\(^101\) With the title Son of God Christians intend to express their personal adherence to Christ as their Lord and unique Saviour, without claiming his being unique or normative for others.

Both Küng and Hick judge the incarnation as mythical. The difference between them lies in that, while Küng still maintains the uniqueness and normativeness of Jesus, Hick is more coherent in rejecting any talk about Jesus as being unique or normative. Christ should be considered simply one among many if he is reduced to

\(^98\) Cf. ibid. 174.
\(^99\) Cf. ibid. 179-80.
\(^100\) Ibid. 177-78.
\(^101\) Ibid. 178-79.
being a mere man. As Amaladoss says, "for those to whom christian 
uniqueness is a myth, the God-incarnate is also a myth."\(^{102}\) As has 
been pointed out above, the reverse of this statement is equally 
true. Amaladoss also regards the pluralists in general as not taking 
the various religions seriously. The real differences among religions 
are played down. The problem is not to find a point of agreement 
among religions, for they claim to be different ways to the same 
goal. This specificity of faith commitments is not considered by 
the pluralist view. By reducing the meaning of religion to the lower-
common denominator like liberation, or a common soteriologi-
structure, one may better designate this religious pluralism as 
terioro-centric, rather than theocentric.\(^{103}\)

The pluralist position of Hick has met serious critiques from 
serious quarters. J. J. Lipner, among others, accuses Hick of "in-
genious relativism" and "ahistorical idealism."\(^{104}\) In spite of Hick's 
statement for a Copernican revolution, G. D'Costa sees him as a 
covert Ptolemaic theologian."\(^{105}\) D'Costa is of the opinion that 
Hick's christian theocentricism cannot be severed from christology. 
The Copernican revolution requires an all-loving God as its fund-
mental axiom, the ground for Hick's theocentric claim is actually 
the christian view of God. His idea and experience of God as all-
thing is obtained through Jesus Christ who, in a more positive 
statement of Hick, is the agape of God operating in a finite mode: 
the eternal divine Agape made flesh, unhistorized."\(^{106}\) In this sense 
Hick is still "decisive" or "normative" for Hick.\(^{107}\) For this reason 
Costa comes to the conclusion that "the Copernican revolution 
seeks rather like yet another ingenious Ptolemaic epicycle!"\(^{108}\) My 
question is whether it is necessary, or even possible, to make an 
dilemma? I agree with J. Dupuis, that christian theology

\(^\text{102}\) Cf. Amaladoss, "The Plurality of Religions," 403; as an example the author 
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\(^\text{104}\) Cf. ibid.

\(^\text{105}\) J. J. Lipner, "Does Copernicus Help?", in R. W. Rousseau, ed., Inter-Religious 
\(^\text{106}\) P. Knitter, eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness. Toward a Pluralistic 
\(^\text{107}\) Is. Dupuis, "The Plurality of Religions," 403; as an example the author 
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\(^\text{109}\) 46: 47.

\(^\text{110}\) Cf. D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, 32.
is theocentric inasmuch as it is christocentric, and vice versa. For Christians the only adequate knowledge of God is "God the Father of Jesus Christ."

Raimundo Panikkar. Owing to his evolving positions it is not easy to classify R. Panikkar. In view of his earlier fulfilment theory D'Costa considers him an inclusivist, while Knitter places him among the theocentric pluralists, on account of his recent development. I think they are both right. It depends on how one looks from where one looks at him. I shall present some salient points from the two editions of his major work *The Unknown Christ: Hinduism*, hoping that it will give an idea about his development position. The first edition of the book clearly represents a fulfilment theory regarding the relationship of Christianity with other religions, especially with Hinduism. Christianity is presented as the "catholic" or "universal" religion. God's will has so shaped the nature of Christianity that it "prevents us from considering it as one religion among others, or even as a *prima inter pares*. Christianity is the fullness of religion and thus the real perfection of every religion." While he finds inadequate those analogies which express the relationship between Hinduism and Christianity in terms of falsehood-truth, natural-supernatural, he sees Hinduism as a kind of Christianity in potency, a vestibule of Christianity, inasmuch as there is a dynamism from the former to the latter. The Christian attitude to other religions is not one of bringing Christ in, but of bringing him forth. Whereas the presence of Christ is hidden in all religions, Christianity is "the place where Christ is fully revealed, the end and plenitude of every religi..."
Panikkar also held that a full Christian faith demands to accept the identity between Christ and "Jesus the Son of Mary." However, Panikkar has changed his position in his more recent writings, and especially in the second and completely revised edition of his book *The Unknown Christ*. In this new edition not the relationship between Christianity and Hinduism in terms of polar opposites is found inadequate. Various "fulfilment" theories which present Christianity as the completion of Hinduism are equally deemed unsatisfactory. In the long introduction to the new edition, Panikkar advocates a universal christology. For Christ is more than an historical figure. As a universal principle Christ is the most powerful living symbol of the total reality which he calls the "Mystery." This symbol may assume other names, such as: Rama, Krishna, Isvara . . . etc. Each name expresses the same mystery, each dealing with an unknown dimension of Christ.

Much earlier than this second edition of his major work, Panikkar had been formulating this universal christology. There is universal salvation, but the Saviour (Christ) is not an individual, not merely an historical figure. There are more saviours embodying saving power which Christians believe to be the Spirit of Jesus. For Panikkar, the universal Christ stands for the cosmotheandric principle which finds concrete expressions or embodiments in various religions, Jesus being the ultimate form for Christians.

Therefore, the statement "Jesus is Christ" cannot be identical to the statement "Christ is Jesus." Jesus is a concrete historical name: the "Supersname" — Christ, which can go by many historical names: Rama, Krishna, Isvara . . . etc. Jesus is only one of the names of the cosmotheandric principle (Christ) which finds an historically *sui-generis* epiphany in Jesus of Nazareth.

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119 Ibid. 145.
120 Ibid.
122 Cf. ibid. 90-93.
123 Cf. ibid. 23, 26 f.
124 Cf. ibid. 27-30.
126 Cf. ibid. 64.
Thus Panikkar has moved from a christocentric into a theocentric universe making the name Christ stand for the universal saving power of God. He does not only distinguish between Jesus and Christ but actually separates the two when he affirms that the universal saving principle (Christ) is equally embodied in other religious figures. This universal christology of a Christ without Jesus creates serious problems and will be dealt with in the next part of the article.

3. UNIVERSAL PRESENCE OF CHRIST: TOWARDS A PNEUMATOLOGICAL CHRISTOCENTRISM

The spectrum of views on the relationship of Christianity to other religions shows four basic paradigms: ecclesiocentric view with an exclusive christology; christocentric view either with an inclusive (constitutive) or with a normative christology; theocentric view joined to a non-normative christology. I consider the second position, namely an inclusive christocentrism, as the adequate paradigm to indicate the universal presence of Christ in the world, and hence in all religions. It is the only paradigm which is sufficient to explain the two basic statements of the Christian faith, namely, God desires to save all human persons and that Jesus Christ is the one mediator between God and humanity (1 Tim 2:4-5). In order to establish this inclusive christocentric paradigm, some crucial issues still need to be clarified. The following are the three major ones: first, the relation between finality and causality or between the normative and the constitutive significance of the Christ event; second, the relation between the historical Jesus and the transhistorical, cosmic Christ; third, the relation between the universal presence of the Spirit and the particular event of Jesus Christ. In view of the special role played by the Holy Spirit in mediating between the particular event of Christ and its universal significance, the inclusive christocentric model can be called a pneumatological christocentrism. The adequacy of this model will be made clear from what follows.

A. UNITY BETWEEN "CONSTITUTIVE" AND "NORMATIVE": SACRAMENTAL SIGN CAUSALITY

Instead of four paradigms in the spectrum of views presented
above, some writers distinguish only three major positions: exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. D'Costa considers both "constitutive" and "normative" christologies as belonging to a christocentric inclusivism. Schineller, however, presents normative christology as a real option between a constitutive christology and a non-normative christology. To highlight the difference between constitutive and normative christology he even joins the latter to a theocentric, rather than christocentric, perspective. The exponents of a normative christology, as we have seen, admit that Jesus Christ is the norm of religions or the criterion for judging authentic salvation, but they deny that he is also the cause constituting salvation or humankind. However, the central message of the New Testament does not tell us that Jesus has merely come to reveal the meaning of salvation, and thus to be the norm or ideal type of salvation; rather, it teaches that he is the Saviour who has brought salvation to the world through his death and resurrection. The frequently repeated "for us" formula of the New Testament has found its way into the creed: "For us human beings and for our salvation." My thesis is that if one holds seriously the normativeness of Christ, one must also admit Christ's constitutive significance for salvation, for finality implies causality in this case. In other words, a coherent normative christology should merge with a constitutive christology.

The claim to normativeness implies a claim to uniqueness and finality. If Jesus were not unique and unsurpassable, he would not be the supreme norm and criterion for religion and salvation. But the ideas of uniqueness and finality already imply the idea of a certain causality. To understand this statement it is necessary to explain the kind of causality involved. In relation to the saving will of God, according to K. Rahner, the Christ event is its effect rather than its cause, understood as efficient cause. It would be unchristian to imagine that the cross of Christ has transformed an angry God into a merciful one. On the contrary, it is the merciful love of God which has effected the Christ event. However, one
must admit that the Christ event also exercised a certain causality on our salvation. The incarnation and cross of Christ should be understood as the “final cause” of God’s universal self-communication to the world.\textsuperscript{132} The idea of the finality of Christ means that God’s saving will is tending towards a goal and a fulfilment of the whole of salvation history. God’s self-communication to humanity is driving towards an irreversible climax with a visible manifestation in history in which the ambivalence of the divine-human encounter, owing to the freedom on both sides, will be resolved by God’s eschatological commitment and humanity’s total response.\textsuperscript{133} This climax takes place in the Christ event. As the final cause of God’s self-communication, this goal draws the whole process of salvation history forward with an inner dynamism. In this sense the Christ event is both the effect and the cause of God’s offer of salvation to the world.

The normativeness of Christ can also be expressed in terms of sign. He is the supreme model or ideal type of the relationship between God and humanity as well as among human beings themselves, and as such the sign of salvation. Rahner also designates the causality of the Christ event as a “sacramental sign causality.” The cross, together with the resurrection of Jesus, has a “primary sacramental causality” for the salvation of humankind.\textsuperscript{134} From the beginning grace is already universally operative in the world and is tending towards a full expression of itself. The cross then is the sign of “its victorious and irreversible activity in the world,” i.e. a sign of the definitiveness of God’s self-communication through grace. Now a sacramental sign is a real cause of grace: “Sacramenta causant gratiam, quia et prout significant gratiam”.\textsuperscript{135} It is the historical and social embodiment of grace, where grace achieves its own fullness of being and becomes a real gift. There is a mutual inter-dependence between grace and its sign: the sign is produced by grace but at the same time it belongs to the essential actualization of this grace which finds a concrete historical expression in the sign.\textsuperscript{136} Rahner explains the mutual relationship between grace

\textsuperscript{132} Cf. Rahner, “Jesus Christ in the Non-Christian Religions,” TI, 17: 46; hereafter as “Jesus Christ.”


\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. 212.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid. 213.

\textsuperscript{136} Cf. ibid.
its sign in terms of “real symbol.” The signified reality (grace) produces its “real symbol” (sacramental sign) in order to achieve its own realization in it. Similarly, the Christ event is both effect and cause of God’s salvific will inasmuch as it is effected by God’s offer of grace as its “real symbol” so that this grace may become a concrete reality and is fully actualized in it.\textsuperscript{137}

In view of the unity and solidarity of humankind, the Christ event has a universal significance for all humanity. One may distinguish between objective and subjective redemption. Through his death and resurrection Christ has accomplished a real situation of salvation for all, in terms of a proper relationship with God. This may be called the objective redemption. Each individual human being is invited to appropriate freely this objective state of salvation so that it may become his own subjective redemption.\textsuperscript{138} The Church is called “sacrament of salvation” inasmuch as it is the formal channel mediating the objective salvation accomplished by Christ. Rahner is of the opinion, as has been shown, that the extra-Christian religions also have a positive role in mediating the objective redemption of Christ to the followers of these religions.\textsuperscript{139}

The idea of sign causality also manifests the unity of revelation and salvation. To claim that Jesus is the final norm or ideal type of salvation for the world means to say that he is the definitive revelation of God’s salvific relationship with humankind. But, how can Jesus Christ be the definitive revelation of God’s offer of grace to the world if this definitive offer of grace did not really take place in the Christ event? A revelation without the corresponding salvation being offered would be the manifestation through an ordinary sign, but not a sacramental sign. If God’s offer of grace to the world did not become a reality in Jesus, neither could he be the universal norm of salvation for all generations. Hence, under the idea of sacramental symbol, revelation and salvation, sign and reality, norm and constituting cause all become one in Jesus Christ. Christ is the universal norm of salvation precisely because he is constitutive cause of it, and vice versa. Moreover, the dichotomy between theocentric and christocentric views is a false dilemma. God’s salvific love finds its sacramental sign precisely in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Cf. ibid. 213-14.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Cf. ibid. 207.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Cf. Rahner, “Jesus Christ,” T1, 17: 41.
\end{itemize}
Christ event in which this love is fully given and manifested to the world, then theocentric and christocentric views finally coincide with each other. The universal theocentric structure of salvation becomes christocentric according to the eternal design of God and through its concrete realization in history.

B. UNITY BETWEEN THE HISTORICAL JESUS AND THE COSMIC CHRIST: PRE-INCARNATIONAL AND POST-RESURRECTIONAL EXISTENCE

The old debate on the relationship between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith entered into a new phase with the famous lecture of E. Käsemann pronounced in the fall of 1953.\textsuperscript{140} Since then, the basic continuity between the pre-easter Jesus and the glorified Christ has been affirmed by the majority of exegetes and theologians. Recently, the discussion has reappeared with a change of perspective on the relationship between the historical Jesus and the cosmic Christ. As has been shown, J. Cobb, the process theologian, designates the Logos as transforming principle and Christ as its concrete incarnation in the world, with Jesus as the highest paradigm of incarnation. From a different approach, Panikkar presents Christ as the “cosmotheandric principle” or symbol of the “Mystery.” This universal Christ is embodied in different religions under different names and has found a \textit{sui-generis} expression in Jesus of Nazareth. For Panikkar, Jesus is the Christ, but Christ is more than Jesus. In this section of the article I shall enter into dialogue with the “universal christology” of Panikkar and attempt to clarify the relationship between Jesus and Christ.\textsuperscript{141}

Let us begin by examining the different connotations of the title Christ as based on the New Testament writings. It is first of all the title given to the historical Jesus who is called the Christ. Then the title cosmic Christ may indicate the risen Jesus in his transhistorical existence. Paul also uses the title Christ for the pre-existent Son of God who has been active since the beginning of creation and was destined to become Jesus Christ in history. Hence, the idea cosmic Christ can mean the Logos, second Person of the Trinity, prior to the incarnation, or the resurrected, transhistorical Christ. In both


\textsuperscript{141} Hopefully the difficulty with J. Cobb will also be dealt with indirectly.
as will be shown, the title is inseparably linked with the historical Jesus.

The idea of cosmic Christ is not something new. It was already found among the early Fathers of the Church. Justin the apologist applies this title in his Logos theology. The title Christ is given to the Son of God, the Word, with his cosmological function during creation. Christ is the Word of God of whom all humankind partakes. Hence, those who have lived by the Word are Christians, even though they have been considered atheists. The cosmological function of the Logos is the basis for his role of revelation. The Greek philosophers have discovered some true doctrines which have their origin from Christ the Logos. For Justin, Greek philosophy derives both from human reason and from the direct inspiration of the Logos himself. Human reason is represented as a "seed" or particle of the divine Logos (sperma tou logou), for it partakes and is an imitation of the Logos. While all people are endowed with reason, the Logos imparts doctrines to the mind of the Greek philosophers. The expression "logos spermatikos" should be interpreted in an active sense: the Logos in the act of "sowing" philosophical doctrines, with the Greek philosophers as the object of his activity. However, Justin envisages a strict unity between the revelational activity of the cosmic Christ and the mystery of the incarnation. While the philosophers enjoyed only "some part" (meta meros) of the Logos, they did not know the "whole Logos" as Christ. Justin is convinced that, in the incarnate Christ, "... because Christ, who appeared for our sakes, became the whole of the Logos, both body and reason, and soul."

The Logos theology of Justin was further developed by Clement of Alexandria. Central to his teaching is the conviction that all per-
personal manifestation of the Father takes place through the Logos. Clement ascribes to philosophers a divine mission among the nations. \(^{148}\) Philosophy constitutes for the Greek world a divine economy parallel to the Jewish economy of the law. They are both given with the purpose of preparing people for the Christian message. \(^{149}\) As in Justin, knowledge of truth is possible on account of a rational principle in human beings which is an imitation of the divine Logos. \(^{150}\) But in order to acquire philosophical knowledge the special action, i.e. divine inspiration, of the Logos is necessary. \(^{151}\) Moreover, for Clement, the Logos acts both as a metaphysical principle and as an historical person. \(^{152}\) He presents Christ, the Word made man, as the teacher who taught the "true philosophy" \(^{153}\) and revealed the "true gnosis" to a few select people by explaining to them the exact way of interpreting the Scriptures. \(^{154}\)

Hence when the title Christ is applied to the Word of God at work during the creation and in the old dispensation both within and without the chosen people, it designates the Son of God inasmuch as he is destined to become incarnate and be called Jesus Christ. \(^{155}\) This cosmic Christ prior to the incarnation is distinct from but inseparably connected with the historical Jesus. The cosmic Christ actually received this name from the Christ event in concrete history without which Paul could not possibly call this pre-existent person Christ. The connection between the pre-incarnational Christ and the historical Jesus can be expressed in terms of "final causality" which is to be taken seriously. As the final goal of God's self-communication to the world, Jesus Christ is present from the beginning in the mind of God. This goal, as the hidden entelechy, activates and draws the whole process of God's

\(^{148}\) Cf. Strom., VI, 17 (ANF II, 516).

\(^{149}\) Cf. Strom., I, 5 (ANF II, 305); VI, 6 (ANF II, 490): "But as the proclamation of the Gospel has come now at the fit time, so also at the fit time were the Law and the Prophets given to the Barbarians (non-Greeks), and Philosophy to the Greeks, to fit their ears for the Gospel."

\(^{150}\) Cf. Strom., V, 14 (ANF II, 466).

\(^{151}\) Cf. Strom., I, 4 (ANF II, 305); I, 17 (ANF II, 320); VI, 17 (ANF II, 516). Clement uses the expression "spirit of perception" (pneuma aisthesos), quoting Ex 28:3.

\(^{152}\) Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 56 f.; 113-17; 158-63. This idea is emphasized by Lilla.

\(^{153}\) Cf. Strom., VI, 8 (ANF II, 495); VI, 17 (ANF II, 515 f.).

\(^{154}\) Cf. Strom., VI, 8 (ANF II, 496).