— in a book published eight years later in 1994! The relation of women, scripture, christology, and Filipino spirituality to the “theology of struggle” receives no adequate treatment. Ecclesiology, which the author holds is a pillar of the “theology of struggle,” is weak; interpreting the church as a “Prophetico-Critical Movement” (pp. 148 ff.) betrays an ideological bias. The section on the “method” for this type of theology does not satisfy (pp. 158-187).

This volume needs a serious “reality check” with other Filipino authors. The genuine material on the “theology of struggle” presented here is probably sufficient for one modest journal article; it is thinly stretched into a generally disappointing book.

James H. Kroeger, M.M.


This review aims at reminding theological readers of Lonergan’s two contrasting horizons of human experience as heuristic tools for understanding meanings in the natural sciences insofar as these interact with theology. The first horizon is concerned with empirical data from the physical and biological sciences that methodologically prescind from data that cannot be analyzed in their calculability, predictability and legitimacy of their causal inter-relations. The second is broader and is concerned with empirical data derived not only from the outer senses but also from inner consciousness. Contrast is not necessarily conflict.

However, the title of this book suggests conflict. Holton pointedly devotes large portions of his sixth and final chapter to “creationism” as proposed in Texas by biblical fundamentalists who robustly maintain that evolutionary thinking is satanic and anti-Christian. Holton’s preceding five chapters convincingly establish his indisputable mastery of physics and its achievements in relativity and quantum mechanics, and a fair grasp of their social implications in American culture. He is impressed with Einstein’s scientific achievements which he sees (on p. 138) as in harmony with religious worship in “one who is in love.”

But he also sees “anti-science” as a “reminder of the Beast below” who will undoubtedly awaken some day to “make its true power known.” This last sentence sounds like pseudo-biblical animism not systematically included within the horizon of physics. Even if this is merely metaphorical, it may indicate one reason why Holton fails to appreciate Einstein’s personal concept of a “thought experiment.” This
concept shows that Einstein’s horizon systematically included empirical data observed in his inner consciousness, namely, the dynamisms experienced in his cognitional processes. (An analysis of these processes in scientific minds is given by Lonergan in his first five chapters of Insight, but this is not in Holton’s otherwise impressive bibliography.)

Einstein’s dedication to a systematic understanding of nature suggests an intellect in love with truth — embracing all empirical reality without restriction, whether as exteriorly observed or as interiorly experienced. Such dedication included a mastery of powerful mathematical tools that are now emerging in the evolution of human consciousness — an evolution that far transcends the biological evolution that evoked it and greatly increases the probability of human survival.

For the present, this seems to be beyond the reach of the Texas fundamentalists, who thus feel forced to cling insecurely to their literal interpretations of the bible. For them, the alternative basis of security in scientific achievements is horribly shaky with techniques of genocide.

If Holton is afraid of “anti-science,” fundamentalists are also afraid of “scientism.” An alternative title for this book may well be “Science, Scientism and Anti-Scientism.”

Vicente Marasigan, S.J.


This book is reviewed here as an exercise in dialectics. This is not necessarily the best way to review a book. But at least this is one way in which this particular reviewer may discover answers to questions that have spontaneously arisen while trying to read the five abstruse and important essays of this book.

In particular, chapter 4 entitled “Intentionality Versus Intuition” discusses the Kantian approach in contrast to the cognitional theory proposed by Lonergan as the basis for his theological method. I have long accepted this method and have lost interest in any alternative cognitional theory, Kantian or whatever. Editor Doran points out that Sala’s 1976 article, exposing the weaknesses in Kant’s theory, has become “famous” and well deserves to be reproduced in this book as its chapter 1.

While struggling to understand this and the other chapters, now impatiently, now eagerly, I wondered about the remarks of Sala