Undoubtedly, Nietzsche influenced the thought of Michel Foucault. Numerous commentators have drawn attention to the affinities between them, and Foucault himself unashamedly affirms the impact upon his thought of reading Nietzsche. Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche, according to an interview of 1982, first stimulated his desire to do his own intellectual work.¹ A year later he revealed that his reading of the works of Maurice Blanchot and Georges Bataille led him to read Nietzsche as early as 1953. While other French thinkers encountered Nietzsche around 1972 as a means to escape Marxism, Foucault studied Nietzsche as early as 1953 in order to displace the constitutive subject of phenomenology.²

Two points need to be made from the start concerning Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault. First, we find no unified self unambiguously designated by the name “Nietzsche,” and perhaps this is more true of Nietzsche than of most. Any discussion of Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault must first address the question Giulio Preti presented to Foucault: “Which Nietzsche do you like?” Foucault’s reply is brief but revealing: “Obviously, not the one of Zarathustra, but the one of The Birth of Tragedy, of the Genealogy of Morals.”³ It is not Nietzsche, herald of the Overman and Eternal Return, but Nietzsche, of the “geneses,” who most ap-


peals to Foucault. The Nietzsche who is important to Foucault is the genealogist who problematized truth as intimately entwined with relations of power, who sought a multiplicity of relations of forces at the origin of our taken-for-granted values, concepts, and things of our experience. Foucault’s Nietzsche is the one who revealed our prized and apparently given subjectivity as a historical construct, molded by the falsifying structure of our language. Nietzsche is important for Foucault for his “questioning of the primacy, or if you prefer, of the privilege of the subject in Descartes’ and Kant’s sense, of the subject as consciousness” (F-P, 77). Foucault’s Nietzsche is the one who disassociated who we are and must become from our inherited concepts of who we are, from the truth about ourselves, our nature, our essence. Foucault’s Nietzsche is the genealogist, the one who reveals the contingent, practical and historical conditions of our existence.

Secondly, although Foucault claims to have read Nietzsche as early as 1953, quite a while before Nietzsche became popular in France, their relationship is not that of disciple and master. Rather, the problematic Foucault reveals in his early historical studies paves the way for his strategic interest in Nietzschean approaches to his future work. In his Archaeology of Knowledge of 1969, Foucault reflects upon the direction of his own previous work. The Order of Things reveals man as the historically and discursively constituted, precarious obstacle to thought, and Foucault wants to continue to pursue the erasure of man in all his guises. The Birth of the Clinic dismantles the Enlightenment’s own narrative accounts of its progress in knowledge by turning away from theory to the perception of pre-existing objects; in that spirit Foucault seeks in Nietzsche means to continue revealing the historical and discursive

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constitution of objects, concepts, and intellectual strategies. *History of Madness* discloses the historical constitution of *homo psychologicus* by means of confinement practices; in 1969 Foucault seeks to continue to pursue relentlessly the systems of exclusion which govern our discourse. Nietzsche, then, emerges as a comrade in his continuing endeavor: “to define a method of historical analysis freed from the anthropological theme, ... to define a method of analysis purged of all anthropologism” (AK, 16).

The present essay has four parts. Part one is a reflection on the first sentence of Foucault’s landmark methodological manifesto, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” : “Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary.”5 What is the significance, according to Foucault, of Nietzsche’s attempt to distance his own “gray” genealogy from the “blue” genealogy of Paul Rée and the English psychologists? Secondly, Nietzsche, according to Foucault, seeks to separate his genealogical project from the quest for origins. How does Nietzschean genealogy differ from such a quest? Thirdly, Nietzsche’s peculiar brand of genealogy effects a break from the Western philosophical tradition, and our third section explores this rupture. Finally, Nietzschean genealogy, according to Foucault, promises the realization of the project of the critique of reason, and our fourth part attempts to elucidate this promise.

*Gray, Meticulous, and Patently Documentary.*

Paul Rée’s *The Origin of Moral Sentiments* first stimulated Nietzsche to publish his own thoughts on the genealogy of morals. Rée wrote *The Origin of Moral Sentiments* during the winter of 1876-1877, while sharing a house in Sorrento with Nietzsche, who at the same time composed *Human, All Too Human*. Nietzsche found Rée’s work so wrongheaded that he felt compelled to formulate and explore his own hypotheses on the origin of morals: “Perhaps I have never read anything to which I would have said to myself No, proposition by proposition, conclusion

by conclusion, to the extent that I did to this book ...” 6 Having previously appreciated Rée as a colleague exploring common turf, Nietzsche condemned Rée for having failed to adopt the “better method” indicated by his own subject matter (GM, P, 7). Nietzsche honors Rée’s work by referring to it as “genealogical,” but he dismisses it as an “upside-down and perverse” brand of genealogy. Authentic genealogy is gray; “English genealogy,” the genealogy of Paul Rée, is blue. The English genealogist seeks the origin of morals by looking about haphazardly, without direction, staring “into the blue.” Nietzschean genealogy is documentary gray, rigorously focussed on “what is documented, what can actually be confirmed and has actually existed, in short the entire long hieroglyphic record, so hard to decipher, of the moral past of mankind” (GM, P, 7). Rée’s blue, English genealogy warrants Nietzsche’s criticism because it lacks historical sense and psychological sense; that is, Rée’s genealogy ignores the documentary evidence from history and instead explores human interiority for the origin of morals.

Both blue and gray genealogy search for the origin of morals, but the blue genealogist errs by exploring human interiority to locate this origin rather than combing through documented historical evidence, particularly that evidence which presents itself to the philologist. Blue genealogists are essentially psychologists; they look to the “inner world” for the origin of morals. They seek the origin in “the partie honteuse of human beings,” “in the vis inertiae of habit, for example, or in forgetfulness ..., creeping around men and into men” (GM, 1, 1). Blue genealogists-psychologists, moreover, are poor psychologists. Because they lack psychological sense, they fail to distinguish reactive ressentiment from noble, creative activity.” Originally,” the blue genealogist tells us, “one approved unegoistic actions and called them good from the point of view of those to whom they were done, that is to say, those to whom they were useful; later one forgot how this approval originated and, simply because unegoistic actions were always habitually praised as good, one also felt them to be good — as if they were something good in themselves” (GM, 1, 2). The blue genealogist’s analysis depends upon the

passive notions of utility, forgetting, habit, and error, all from the point of view of the passive one to whom the actions were done, the one to whom they were useful.

In Nietzsche's discussion of how the principle of utility functions for the blue genealogist he asserts his "major point of historical method" (GM, 2, 12). Contrasting his gray genealogical approach to the history of punishment with that of the blue genealogist, Nietzsche claims that once the blue genealogist believes he has found a purpose for punishment he believes he has found its origin and an adequate explanation. According to the gray genealogist, however, "the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart" (GM, 2, 12). Any phenomenon, punishment for example, is interpreted and reinterpreted at the various stages of its history: "whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous 'meaning' and 'purpose' are necessarily obscured or even obliterated" (GM, 2, 12). The principle of utility, according to the gray genealogist, has no explanatory power.

In his famous discussion of master morality and slave morality Nietzsche establishes another major point of historical method, the most revolutionary element in his gray approach to genealogy. By revealing the paralogism at the heart of slave morality Nietzsche undermines the notion of the substratum in all those forms on which philosophy has been so dependent — the notions of substance, the subject, the thing-in-itself. The master judges "good and bad," in contrast, the slave evaluates in terms of "good and evil," overwhelmed by the spirit of ressentiment. Gilles Deleuze formulates this spirit in the formula "You are evil therefore I am good." You are evil, and by compensation (because I am the opposite of you), I am good. The person of ressentiment, the slave, however, believes "You" are a force, a cause, which could refrain from having effects and are evil because of your effects. A cause is

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thus understood as a neutral entity independent of its effects and activity. For Nietzsche, however, there is no such thing as a force separated from its expression: “A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect — more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a ‘subject,’ can it appear otherwise” (GM, 1, 13).

**Genealogy and the Quest for Origins**

Foucault provisionally defined genealogy as “the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today.”

Without recourse to teleology or utility, genealogy studies events in their singularity focussing especially on what we cherish as ahistorical, self-evident, and substantial, in order to reveal its rootedness in history. Two years later he employs the term “eventalisation” to capture what he wishes to do; i.e., “making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all.”

Genealogy as eventalisation breaches the self-evidences and underlines the apparent necessity which undergirds our knowledge and practices. Instead of finding the causes of events self-evident, genealogy remains open to a “causal multiplication” (QM, 104). Genealogy “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” (NGH, 147).

Foucault’s most important and most interesting contribution to the specification of genealogy is in his discussion of Nietzsche’s own texts.

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We commonly understand "genealogy" to refer to a quest for origins, but according to Foucault’s painstaking analysis, Nietzschean genealogy distances itself from such a quest: "A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest for their 'origins,' will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history" (NGH, 144). Foucault illuminated his rejection of a quest for origins in his 1972 conversation with Giulio Preti:

In Nietzsche I find a questioning of the historical type which does not refer in any way to the "original" as do many of the analyses of Western thought. Husserl and Heidegger bring up for discussion again all of our knowledge and its foundations, but they do this by beginning from that which is original. This analysis takes place, however, at the expense of any articulated historical content. Instead, what I liked in Nietzsche is that attempt to bring up for discussion again the fundamental concepts of knowledge, of morals, and of metaphysics by appealing to a historical analysis of the positivistic type, without going back to origins (F-P, 77).

Clearly Foucault is adamant in his refusal of the quest for origins. What disturbs him? Is not the quest for origins of the very essence of genealogy? Why is the quest for origins so fundamentally flawed?

Foucault analyzes Nietzsche’s writings drawing our attention to distinctions among terms typically translated as "origin: "Ursprung, Entstehung, Herkunft, Geburt. In the Preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, according to Foucault’s reading, where Nietzsche forged a distinction between gray and blue genealogy, he also drew a distinction between Ursprung and Herkunft, words which he had previously and would later use interchangeably. Criticizing his own thought at age thirteen, his "first childish literary trifle" (GM, P, 3), and Paul Réé’s The Origin of Moral Sentiments, Nietzsche refers to both as quests for Ursprung. Although he had previously referred to his own work as a quest for Ursprung, Nietzsche now claims that his writings from Human, All Too Human to On the Genealogy of Morals are governed by his Herkunfts-Hypothesen. Whether or not Nietzsche intended such an opposition, the text of his Preface clearly elevates the Herkunfts-Hypothesen and denigrates the quest for Ursprung. What value does Foucault derive from this distinction?
The pursuit of *Ursprung*, according to Foucault, is “an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities, because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession” (NGH, 142). The blue genealogist imagines the *Ursprung* as a primordial truth or original identity beneath historically accumulated masks. The gray genealogist governed by the *Herkunfts-Hypothesen*, in contrast, turns away from metaphysics and “listens to history.” His quest leads him to the discovery that there is no eternal essence behind things; he discovers “the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms” (NGH, 142). Having turned to the history of things, the gray genealogist finds, “not the inviolable identity of their origin,” but rather, “the dissection of other things.” He discovers, not identity, but “disparity” (NGH, 142).

The gray genealogist, then, foregoes the search for an original identity and essence unmasked; instead, he cultivates the disparate details, events, and accidents found at any beginning. He pursues history’s events, “its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats,” for these, not an essence in its pristine purity, account for any beginning. “History is the concrete body of a development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the origin” (NGH, 144-5). Only a metaphysician would expect to find an essence at the beginning.

**Genealogy and the Break From the Philosophical Tradition**

Foucault’s 1973 Rio de Janeiro lectures further illuminate the radical character of the genealogy he finds in Nietzsche’s texts. Nietzsche repeatedly employs the term *Erfindung*, invention, and Foucault argues

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10 *La vérité e as formas juridicas. Dits et écrits*, #139. Foucault delivered these five lectures May 21-25, 1973 at Pontificia Universidade Católica in Rio de Janeiro. Hereafter cited as VFJ. These lectures, ignored by Foucault’s commentators, not only illuminate his relationship with Nietzsche. A lengthy analysis of the tragedy of Oedipus is harshly critical of Freud and psychoanalysis and enriches one’s appreciation of the first volume of Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*. His discussions of panopticism and the disciplinary society similarly illuminate *Discipline and Punish*. 
that Nietzsche uses the word with polemical intent. "When he speaks of 'invention' he has in mind a word which opposes invention, the word 'origin'," according to Foucault. "When he says 'invention' it is in order not to say 'origin,' when he says *Erfindung*, it is in order not to say *Ursprung*" (VFJ, 543). Nietzsche derides Schopenhauer, for example, for seeking the *Ursprung* of religion in a metaphysical need. Instead, religion was invented (GS, 5, 353). By using the term "*Erfindung*," however, Nietzsche is not attributing causal efficacy to an intending subject's free creativity. Instead, according to Foucault, Nietzsche emphasizes the poverty and smallness, even stinginess, involved in the piecemeal fabrication of great things.

In this meditation on Nietzsche's use of *Erfindung* Foucault emphasizes how radically Nietzsche departed from the philosophical tradition and how radically liberating was this departure. In *The Gay Science* (151), for example, Nietzsche reproaches Schopenhauer's discussion of the origin — *Ursprung* — of religion. Schopenhauer errs by seeking religion's origin in a "metaphysical need" universally present in humans, part of the very fabric of our nature. But the metaphysical need is not the origin of religion, according to Nietzsche, and, according to Foucault's reading, Schopenhauer's error was in seeking an origin at all. Religion has no origin; it was invented. *Erfindung*, not *Ursprung*. "There is, then," according to Foucault's reading of Nietzsche, "a fundamental opposition between the grand continuity of the *Ursprung* described by Schopenhauer and the rupture that characterizes the *Erfindung* of Nietzsche." Similarly, people seek the origin of poetry, but it had none. Poetry, too, was invented: "One day, someone had the curious idea to use certain rhythmic or musical properties of language to speak, to inflict his words, in order to establish a certain relation of power over others by means of his words..." (VFJ, 544). Foucault further cites the famous passage on the fabrication of the ideal at the end of the first essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*: "The ideal has no origin, it too was invented, fabricated, produced by a series of small mechanisms" (VFJ, 544). Religion, poetry, and the ideal all were invented because of

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"obscure relations of power" (VFJ, 544). Most importantly for Foucault, Nietzsche maintains that knowledge itself was invented. Like religion, knowledge is not part of the fabric of human nature, which is to say it had no origin.

"Knowledge does not constitute the most ancient instinct of humans, or in other words, there is nothing in human behavior, in the appetites, in human instinct, which resembles a source of knowledge... Knowledge is not instinctive, but counter-instinctive; and equally, it is not natural but counter-natural" (VFJ, 544-545).

Three important consequences concerning the Western philosophical tradition result, according to Foucault, from Nietzsche's assertions about the invention of knowledge. While one might object that, although knowledge is not rooted in human nature, it possesses a link to a world of objects to be known, according to Foucault's reading of Nietzsche, "there is really neither similarity nor affinity between knowledge and those things which would be necessary to know. If we use some more rigorous terms from the Kantian point of view, we would have to say that the conditions of experience and the conditions of the object of experience are totally heterogeneous" (VFJ, 545-546). Against Kant who saw these conditions as identical, Nietzsche maintains an utter lack of resemblance between the two. Instead of an identity of these conditions, Foucault's Nietzsche asserts that "Knowledge must struggle against a world without order, without connections, without forms, without beauty, without wisdom, without harmony, without law" (VFJ, 546).

The second important consequence, according to Foucault: "The rupture between the theory of knowledge and theology begins, strictly speaking, with the analysis of Nietzsche" (VFJ, 547). After all, what in the Western philosophical tradition, particularly as manifest in Descartes, assures us of the continuity between knowledge and the things to be known but God? "Certainly, since Descartes, in order not to go further back, and even in Kant, God is that principle that assures the existence of a harmony between knowledge and the things to know. In order to demonstrate that knowledge was a knowledge truly grounded in the things of the world, Descartes saw himself obliged to affirm the existence of God" (VFJ, 547). Breaking from the tradition of Descartes and Kant, Nietzsche asserts a disharmony between knowledge
and the world, that their relation is one of violent struggle, a relation of power. It would follow, therefore, that God is no longer necessary in our theory of knowledge as the guarantor of harmony. Nietzsche, thus, radically departs from the Western philosophical tradition by uprooting the theory of knowledge from the soil of theology.

The third consequence: “if it is true that between knowledge and the instincts ... there is only rupture, relations of domination and subordination, relations of power, then the one who disappears is not God but the subject in its unity and sovereignty” (VFJ, 547). The coherence of the philosophical subject depends upon the continuity among desire, instinct, and knowledge. By denying any such coherence Foucault’s Nietzsche makes possible the denial of the existence of any unified subject. If in fact desire and instinct are at odds or involved in struggle with the realm of knowledge as Nietzsche maintains, the unity of the human subject is thrown radically into question. From the very start of his Rio de Janeiro lectures Foucault proposes the question to himself of the formation of knowledge domains from social practices and claims that Nietzsche’s work is “the best and most efficacious” model for getting to the heart of this matter” (VFJ, 542). “I believe,” Foucault asserts, “that in Nietzsche is found a type of discourse in which the historical analysis of the formation itself of the subject, the historical analysis of the formation of a certain type of knowledge, is made without ever admitting the pre-existence of a subject of knowledge” (VFJ, 542). Writing in 1873, immersed in the culture of Neo-Kantianism, Nietzsche proposed the radical, “absolutely inadmissable” ideas that time and space are not a priori forms of knowledge; “they are, on the contrary, something along the lines of primordial rocks over which knowledge comes and attaches itself” (VFJ, 5431).

Foucault prefers Herkunft and Entstehung to Ursprung to assist more effectively in his project of de-centering the subject. Herkunft, often translated as “origin,” connotes “stock” or “descent” (la souche, la provenance): “Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity ...[t]he analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events” (NGH, 145-6). Rather than seeking continuity, genealogy maintains events in their dispersion. Genealogy’s task is “to identify the accidents, the minute deviations — or conversely, the complete reversals — the errors, the false appraisals,
and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents" (NGH, 146).

Genealogy and the Realization of the Critique of Reason

According to Foucault, "every origin of morality from the moment it stops being pious — and Herkunft can never be — has value as critique" (NGH, 146). As the reader asks, "Critique of what?,” Foucault draws our attention in a footnote to the section of Nietzsche's *Twilight of the Idols* entitled “Reasons for Philosophy.” In these five short sections Nietzsche proposes his genealogy as the means to realize the critique of reason.

Philosophers prefer the life of reason, according to Nietzsche, because they hate "even the idea of becoming" and instead seek to mummiﬁy and dehistorize. The philosophers accept the motto, "What is, does not become; what becomes, is not …" In order to stabilize the ﬂux of their own sense experience, philosophers must will the priority of reason and deny the ever present data of their senses. "Moral: escape from sense-deception, from becoming, from history, from falsehood — history is nothing but belief in the senses, belief in falsehood. Moral: denial of all that believes in the senses, of all the rest of mankind: all of that is mere 'people.' Be a philosopher, be a mummy, represent monotono-theism by a gravedigger mimicry!” (RP, 1). Reason, according to Nietzsche, thus ﬁrst introduces error by falsifying sensory evidence. The senses do not lie: "It is what we make of their evidence that ﬁrst introduces a lie into it, for example, the lie of unity, the lie of materiality, of substance, of duration ... 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses. " We philosophers are bound to persist in error "to precisely the extent that our prejudice in favour of reason compels us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being” (RP, 5). The purpose of a genealogy of morals, then, is to complete the project of the critique of reason by exposing reason's falsifications. The critique of reason — and there is nothing “pure” about

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it — does not seek reason's limits in order to "provide a positive foundation for the possibility of knowing" (OT, 317); instead the critique of reason is a genealogical investigation that unveils reason's falsifications and prejudices and reveals the moral will that undergirds it.

The last synonym for Ursprung Nietzsche employs is Entstehung which Foucault translates as "emergence." When genealogy searches for emergence, it takes special care to avoid the philosopher's prejudices in favor of unity, continuity, and substance. It avoids the philosopher's tendency to impose present needs and the present state of affairs on the point of emergence, which would enable the philosopher to show a continuous teleological development culminating in the present, thus introducing meaning and purpose into history. The genealogist, in contrast, seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: "not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations" (NGH, 148). The genealogist views the present as another episode: not the result of a meaningful development but of struggle, relations of force and domination. In the last year of his life Foucault summarized his project and attempted to root it in the project of the Enlightenment: genealogy "simultaneously problematizes our relation to the present, our historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject...."13