In philosophy we can recognise the *modernus*, the transition from the old to the new, if we relate the consciousness of one epoch to another.\(^1\) A distinction is made, for example, between *modernité*’s human consciousness of time and space in which the subject’s words order things and mediaeval Christianity’s ontology of things grounded in the word of God?\(^2\) Shorn of metaphysical determination in all but ultimate referent, Descartes’ I as a “unique but universal and unhistorical subject who is everyone, anywhere, at any moment” inaugurates our *modernus* and defines *modernité*’s consciousness of things.\(^3\) As Heidegger portrays it, the “subject of” knowledge conquers the world as a picture (*Bild*) via re-presentation (*vorstellen*). She sets out before and in relation to herself a thing as an object or structured image (*Gebild*).\(^4\) God and His will are bought out by the subject, homo, whose truth is the will to will *qua* the subjectivity of *humanitas* — (s)he replaces Him as the “lord of being.”\(^5\)

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At around the same time, Machiavelli intuits the political consciousness of *modernité* from the "subject of" knowledge. We can read *The Prince* as a basic manual about a secular sovereign power that champions juridical order as an end and employs a rational instrumental politics as the means, whilst Machiavelli's historico-empirical method introduces the question of the people — and the part of this whole, the subject as central to the legitimacy and authority of (city-)state power. In short, Machiavelli relates the survival of the prince to the people rather than the starry heavens above.

It is only later, "in the seventeenth century which suffers man as a sum of contradictions and seeks to discover, order and excavate him," that *modernité*'s subject of politics is given a moral eminence with regard to the state. The English excel in this respect. Hobbes' subject's material ontology, which generates perpetual movement between the basic emotions of appetite and aversion, realizes a state that both legally orders inter-subjective relation between mechanical subjects and guarantees the political right of instrumental liberty to the subject in her insatiable will to happiness. Locke then formalizes the moral status of the subject and the political domain. On the one

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12*Leviathan*, chapt. XV and chapt. XXI.

hand, the subject is a self who is “sensible and conscious of pleasure and pain and capable of happiness and misery.” The self’s unique experiences are recorded by and re-presented from memory and they distinguish her personal identity. On the other hand, and in imitation of Hobbes’ mechanical subject who vis-à-vis Leviathan is a “Naturall Person whose words and actions are self-authored,” Locke conceives of a “person qua self in terms of a forensic term that belongs to intelligent agents capable of law.” Locke’s person authorizes the “right and justice of reward and punishment” of the state which in turn is legitimate to selves who, insofar as “happiness and misery is that for which every one is concerned for himself,” are obliged to tolerate the product of this concern, or each other’s personally produced identity.

After the prince’s imposition of juridical order Hobbes and Locke obliges us to think of modernité as a democratic Weltanschauung. Their modernization of the relationship between the king’s head and his body anchors the law in a sovereign state in order to authorize the repressive effects of the power that it monopolizes against those who would hinder the subject’s legitimate pursuit of happiness and a personal identity. That is, a politics centered on the power of the state is born. It is derived from the conception of the subject who wills and her concomitant ability to autonomously determine her identity. Implicit in this relation of the subject to politics is a conception of her

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18. The “state” is a contested, multi-criteria concept but it is often defined as “a set of complex institutions which govern over a spatial territory inhabited by a population organized as a qualitatively distinct society.” It is in this sense that we talk about the state and the people’s relation to it, or the king’s head and body, respectively. See P. Dunleavy, “The State,” in R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), pp. 611-621; N. P. Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp. 61 ff.
identity as a "core aspect of individual or collective selfhood qua fundamental condition of social being which invokes something deep, basic, abiding or foundational that is to be valued, cultivated, supported, recognised and preserved." And, because of the equation of identity with selfhood, namely, identity as an original sense of self(determination), of who I am qua the "subject of" my identity, there is the belief that identity is and ought not to be subject to politics. It is for this reason that we talk of the moral — authentic because ethical, quæ apolitical because private — identity of the subject.

As a consequence, modernité's political philosophy is characterized by its reflection on the dichotomous relationship between the subject and power, specifically the limitation of the intrusions of the state on the subject's liberty (to self-determine her moral identity). Indeed, whether there should be a state at all is the condition of modernité's political philosophy. Its central aim is to evaluate the competing theories of justice that saturate the state; in fact, Rawls

19In their timely meditation on the contemporary ab/uses of the concept of identity, Brubaker and Cooper describe four additional ways in which identity finds analytical employment: as a ground for social and political action, identity is opposed to interest; as a collective phenomenon adopted by social movements, identity denotes a fundamental and consequentialist sameness among members of a group or category; as a product of social and political action, identity refers to the processual, interactive development of collective but contingent self-understanding, solidarity or group-ness; and as an evanescent effect of multiple and competing discourse, identity captures the unstable, multiple, fluctuating and fragmented nature of the subject. R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" Theory and Society, 29 (2000), pp. 1-47, esp. pp. 6-8.

20In the "massive subjectivist turn of modern culture" in the eighteenth century, the moral accent that had previously emphasized the subject's intuitive moral sense of right and wrong is eroded by an "ethic of authenticity." It is, Taylor argues, an ethic first elaborated by Rousseau and it describes an autonomous subject who chooses a moral sense of her own. See C. Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, (Concord, Ontario: House of Anansi Publishing, 1991), pp. 25-29.


22Kymlicka, for example, writes that political philosophy is "primarily concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state, and with limiting the state's intrusions on the liberties of citizens." See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 1.


claims there is an equivalence in *modernité* of political philosophy and a theory of justice.25 In parallel, the philosophers who exemplify the dichotomous relation between the subject and politics defer in their political *philosophy* to the moral department of the love of wisdom,26 as it gives them an account of inter-subjective relations that acts as a background for prescriptions in politics.27 In this sense, “selfhood and morality are inextricably intertwined themes”28 and the “idea of the self that is articulated in moral philosophy is used to organize a vast economy of concepts.”29 Hence, political questions about the role of the state or what justice is are given a rational foundation,30 most commonly in an ontology of the subject that is conceived in terms of her dignity that is ascribed as moral identity,31 and it is this ontological rather than the political aspect of *modernité*’s political philosophy that we examine here.

Our goal is to investigate whether moral identity can stand over against power through a politics focused on the state as the agency of power. In other words, can the moral identity of the subject be thought of in isolation from power or is power inherent to the moral identity of the subject? Is the subject the “subject of” or “subject to” moral identity? Our discussion thus inevitably oscillates between moral and political philosophy, even though it is the latter’s account of the ontology of the subject which is elaborated by moral philosophy that preoccupies us below. In any case, we commence with an examination of the classic statements on the dichotomous but constitutive relation


26Plant suggests that “political philosophy is a branch of moral philosophy... concerned with the questions of justifying the right way or ways and identifying the wrong ways in which political power is to be exercised and the nature of the claims which citizens can make on the state and on each other.” See R. Plant, *Modern Political Thought* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 2.

27Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 6.


between the subject's moral identity and politics that we find in Kant and Hegel. Thereafter, and in critical comparison, we focus on Foucault and how the synonymous relation between the subject and power implies that moral identity is shot through with politics such that we are "subject to" it. In conclusion, we examine the type of thought required to think against moral identity.

Rousseau: the Politics of Moral Identity

If Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke invite us to celebrate political philosophy in their attempts to create an "enlightened and self-ruling humanity apropos of alienation by God and Nature," eighteenth century political philosophy is a response to "alienation by Nature and Reason that commences with Rousseau and Kant and culminates in the historicist philosophies of Hegel, Marx and Dilthey and their ideals of freedom, history and culture." It is then to Rousseau that we turn first, not least because we find in his writings intimations of the two moments of modernité’s moral identity. With regard to politics, these are the a priori concept of the subject’s capacity of autonomy and the a posteriori notion of the process of recognition. Further, although Rousseau is "proud in regard to what he is, in spite of his origins, and beside himself when one reminds him of if;" he is also the obvious contrast to Hobbes and Locke. Rousseau pleads that whilst they might claim to be the diagnosticians par excellence of the true nature of the subject they do no more than confound her with the person they see daily before their eyes. Hobbes and Locke further confuse the issue by their advocacy of a politics of instrumental liberty and toleration which is based on the subject’s mechanical nature and her sovereign memory that coordinates the subject’s experiences into a moral identity. For Rousseau, this leaves the question of the

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33The Will to Power, § 100, p. 63.

subject’s virtue and its place in politics unanswered. Instead, in Rousseau’s world the moral identity of autonomy brought to our attention by Hobbes and Locke must be politically processed such that recognition effects virtue and we become the “subject of” moral identity.

According to Rousseau, the arts and sciences that characterize modern society and in respect of which the subject mediates her recognition are the products of vice. They effect only indolence and luxury and lead to the dissolution of a society that encapsulates virtue. As a consequence, a “civilized” society of inequality arises in which, Rousseau argues, the “savage” subject is divorced from her “natural liberty.” By this Rousseau means that the subject’s natural capacities of self-preservation and compassion which effect her \textit{amour de soi} do not require the recognition of others. The virtue in self-love is to love oneself without the mediation of others, hence natural liberty, which is why the subject of \textit{l’amour de soi} remains this side of the border of solipsism à la the subject (ipse) alone (sólus). Nevertheless, the alternative is no better and the subject whose recognition is mediated in respect of the arts and sciences and inequality is alienated from herself in virtue of a society that honours \textit{l’amour propre} and valorises egoism. The very society of production that throws us into intersubjective relations and raises the question of moral identity \textit{qua} the desire to be recognised also foists upon the subject the alienation which enjoins the compromise of blind obedience to appearance. As a result of pride, to seem to be what one is not reigns over to be who one is.

How, then, is the alienated subject who is “subject to” appearance because of the mutual exchange of vanity and egoism which produces recognition as pride to be reconciled with herself? Firstly, Rousseau is clear that we are no longer concerned with the reconciliation of the savage subject to her natural liberty. Despite its vices, modern society is indicative of the collective “maturity of a people” who are ready

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\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 15-21.
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 71-74.
\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 84 ff.
\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 95.
\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 125-126.
to shape their own laws rather than defer to tradition. The problem
of moral identity is thus asked in respect of the "civilized" subject as
she is so that she may reconstitute politics accordingly. For Rousseau,
the answer is that whilst the savage subject is endowed with the ca-
pacities of self-preservation and compassion it is only through the
capacity of reason that is particular to the civilized subject that she
can be moral. It is thanks to this universal capacity to reason that
Rousseau argues we are born free, yet under the conditions of vice and
inequality that he thinks are inherent to modern society the rousseauian
subject's capacity to reason is stifled. As she does not live
by the laws she makes herself qua realisation of her moral identity of
autonomy but pride as an appearance that is recognised by others,
the subject's freedom is in chains.

The solution, Rousseau suggests, is for all to jointly constitute a
power that protects everyone's liberty and goods yet simultaneously
allows each subject to be the author of her laws. Rousseau's central
claim for our purposes is that the subject is at home in a society in and
through which "civil liberty" is fostered with others. Reason enables
the subject to partake in the virtuous and communal activity of poli-
tics qua the legislation of the volonté générale, a process of reciprocal
dialogue in which subjects recognize themselves in others and acknow-
ledge the universality of their interests. At the same time, the subject
realizes through obedience to the laws she makes herself her civil lib-
erty. She throws off her obedience to appearance and as the master of
herself she is autonomous in her action. The subject is no longer
bifurcated from who she is by the pride mediated from the recogni-
tion of others. Who she re-presents herself and thus appears to others
to be is who she really is qua author of herself. The savage subject's
capacities that enable unmediated self-love but for whom liberty is
the mere impulse to appetite — slavery, as Rousseau calls it — is
transcended. And, as the civilised subject, she is reconciled with oth-
ers to the extent that civil liberty or autonomy as the effective truth of

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42 "Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," pp. 46-47.
44 Ibid., chaps. 6-7.

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the capacity of mason’s will to will is only possible through the mediated process of recognition that occurs in the formation of the volonté générale. The rousseauian subject moves beyond pride and into generally willed mutual recognition that nonetheless allows particularity in the shape of self-mastered autonomy. She is the “subject of” her moral identity. For Rousseau, the a priori moral identity of autonomy is the condition of possibility for social recognition which, as a process mediated by politics, effects an a posteriori moral identity.

Kant: The A Priori Moral Identity of Autonomy

The worry with Rousseau’s admirable “dream of a transparent society, visible in each of its parts, that penetrates the zones of darkness established by the privileges of royal power or corporate prerogatives,” is that the civil liberty of the subject produced by recognition which underpins the dream tempts the subject into the role of “overseer and comrade.” She arbitrates the process of recognition of all other subjects and if necessary exerts force to hurry along a fellow comrade’s freedom. There is always the potential in Rousseau’s dream for a political nightmare in which terror reigns, and Kant’s critical philosophy can in part be seen as an attempt to finesse Rousseau’s account of the autonomous subject’s civil liberty into a politics that is morally tenable.

In effect, the eighteenth century’s “domination by coeur over la tête” is brought to an end by Kant whose Prussian approach to the dream/nightmare scenario of the Éclaircissement is to systematize philosophy via four basic questions: what can I know?; what ought I to do?; what may I hope for?; and what is man? With regard to the

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48The Will to Power, § 95, p. 59.

first and fundamental question for *modernité*, ever since “the all-enlightening Sun that followed the blush of dawn at the termination of the mediaeval period.” Descartes and other modern philosophers had tried to resolve the paradox between the objective and subjective conditions for scientific knowledge. With Kant, the articulation of the conditions that separate the subject’s knowledge of humanity and the world from the subject as the origin and agent of such a knowledge requires “the systematic critique of the capacity for reason itself and all that can be established only by means of it.” “What can I know?” is answered through a metaphysics of human experience that limits our knowledge to how things appear to us. In addition, the evolution of Kant’s metaphysics vis-à-vis the Pantheismusstreit and his critique of the cultural conservatism of the Sturm und Drang undoubtedly raises his awareness of the problematic involvement of politics in recognition, too. Perhaps this is why Kantian Aufklärung sets store by the subject’s *a priori* moral identity that is sacrosanct from politics, which Kant develops in terms of the concept of autonomy that he picks up from Rousseau. In addition, Kant’s morality is spurred on by what we might term his pietist disposition, for he says that to employ the empirical subject as the ground for morality is a “gross and pernicious error.” What Kant aims to do is to substitute

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52In a similar vein, the question that lingers from Christian metaphysics, “what may I hope for?,” is sidelined from a critical philosophy which is solely concerned with experience that can be grasped by human reason.


the moral anthropology of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau and their concern with “what is man?” with a metaphysics of morals that advocates “what ought I to do?”

In its bare essentials Kant’s rousseauian revolution in political philosophy, his moral philosophy evident in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), is based on the subject’s capacity of autonomy. The subject gives the law to herself, as liberty is obedience to a law we prescribe to ourselves in order to transcend both the slavery that is our impulse to appetite and the pride induced by modern society. To this end, Kant suggests reason is bestowed on the subject as a practical faculty of action that aims to produce the absolutely and altogether good will, or Wille. When the subject’s

subject reflects no more than the capacity of desire. This is a gross error insofar as the modes of desire of practical pleasure, concupiscence and taste are external, irrational causes of the subject’s actions — Rousseau’s impulses of the appetites — as well as located in the intuitions of things-for-themselves. These actions are a pernicious error because they are the product of an arbitrium brutum, or animal choice — Rousseau’s slavery — which is subjective and leads to heteronomy. See “Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals,” pp. 40-54, esp. pp. 40-41.

In our consideration of Kant’s morality we focus on the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason*. The former classifies and the latter justifies the supreme principle of morality, autonomy, whereas the *Metaphysics of Morals* applies it. To note, although Gregor argues that it is unfortunate that the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and not the *Metaphysics of Morals* is taken as Kant’s definitive position on morality, we instead follow Beck, one of the most eminent commentators on Kant, who claims to the contrary that the *Metaphysics of Morals* is the least significant of Kant’s works on morals. See M. Gregor, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, pp. 1-28, esp. pp. 1-6; L. W. Beck, “Introduction,” in I Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason And Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, L.W. Beck (ed., trans. and introd.), (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 1-49, esp. pp. 16-17.

For example, Beck argues Kant uses autonomy to continue Rousseau’s critique of the subject’s natural liberty, which depends on the inclinations and is synonymous with slavery, whereas Velkley claims Kant uses autonomy to counteract the subject’s experience of alienation in modern society. See *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors*, pp. 489-491; “The Crisis of the End of Reason,” p. 78.

volition or will to act is motivated by the maxims of the Wille, the formal principle a priori, duty as necessity is performed and ideal legality or Moralität is realised. Under the ‘Law of volition’ the subject acts with herself and others in mind as an end and never as a mere means. The subject is an end in herself in virtue of what she has in common with other subjects, namely, Wille, the capacity of autós nomos or the self-legislation of laws:

AUTONOMY OF WILL IS THAT QUALITY OF WILL BY WHICH A WILL (independently of any object willed) IS A LAW TO ITSELF.

One difficulty for Kant is to demonstrate how the subject’s self-legislation constitutes Moralität — in Rousseau’s language, how autonomy effects the volonté générale — and this requires that Kant articulate the non-experiential aspect of ideal legality via the concept of freedom. Kant claims the Wille is a kind of causality that can be attributed to the subject and he asks us to consider freedom as the property of this causality. Freedom enables the Wille to originate events independently of the empirical world. Thus, if the “Law of volition” depends on the transcendental subject’s relation of her Wille to Moralität, the ability of the empirical subject to act autonomously as the practical realization of the capacity of autonomy requires the prioritization of the transcendental over the empirical subject. Kant eventually calls the former ability the subject’s Willkür, the capacity for choice or the executive will. Through the mediations of her Willkür

60Ibid., p. 42.
61Ibid., p. 55.
63“Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics,” pp. 57-60.
64Ibid., pp. 46-48.
in the realm of human choice, the subject realizes spontaneous subjectivity, which is an *arbitrium liberum* or the comparative (versus pure) freedom "of a simple desire subjected to some degree of rational control." Yet, for Kant, the condition that ultimately governs the *Willkür qua* freedom as a positive concept that is practiced — liberty — is the *Wille* of pure reason or the capacity of autonomy, which is also known as the negative concept of (pure) freedom. Together, the negative and positive concepts of freedom, the capacity of autonomy ([transcendental] moral agency) and the capacity of choice ([empirical] rational agency), constitute *Moralität*.

A final problem for Kant relates to the conceptual labyrinth that any systematic philosophy encounters, namely, that it is neither able to prove the objective necessity nor the real effectiveness of *Moralität* as the fundamental motivation for the empirical subject's autonomous actions. The solution, Kant suggests, "is to inquire if we do not occupy an entirely different station, when we regard ourselves, as by means of freedom, spontaneous *a priori* causes, from that station which we hold when we represent to ourselves our actions as events in the system we see presented to our senses."

Kant elaborates these two stations in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where he now talks of the idea of freedom as the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason. In contrast to the metaphysics of experience outlined in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in which the Kantian subject of knowledge settles for phenomenal knowledge of things-for-themselves, he argues that in moral philosophy practical reason gives the subject access to the noumenon of a thing which he designates as the idea of fremom. Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of *Moralität* and *Moralität* the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. The essential point is that the phenomenal station of the empirical subject

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70Ibid., p. 62.


72Ibid., pp. 118-120.
does not establish any universal obligations. Indeed *homo phaenomenon* is exposed to laws taken from pathological phenomena which results in heteronomy, a false principle for those concerned with a universal morality. Only the noumenal station occupied by the autonomy of Wille satisfies the key Kantian issues of obligation, duty and ideal legality.\textsuperscript{73} Here, the transcendental subject knows herself as a thing-in-herself, *homo noumenon*, whose self-mediated capacity of autonomy—"laws given it by its own reason"—connects her to freedom-in-itself. In this moment *homo noumenon* is the "subject of" her moral identity of autonomy, or she stands over against herself as *homo phaenomenon* located in the world and subject to the slavish "necessities of nature."\textsuperscript{74}

**THAT NECESSITY OF NATURE WHICH MAY NOT CONSORT WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE SUBJECT, ATTACHES SINGLY TO THE MODIFICATIONS OF A THING STANDING UNDER CONDITIONS OF TIME, i.e., TO THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE ACTING SUBJECT AS PHENOMENON; ...., yet, *e contra*, THE SELF-SAME SUBJECT, being self-conscious of itself as a thing in itself, CONSIDERS ITS EXISTENCE AS SOMEWHAT, DETACHED FROM CONDITIONS OF TIME, AND ITSELF, SO FAR FORTH, AS ONLY DETERMINABLE BY LAWS GIVEN IT BY ITS OWN REASON;... as NOUMENON.\textsuperscript{75}

**iv. Hegel: the a posteriori moral identity of recognition**

In his response to the basic question of modern epistemology, "what can I know?", Hegel acclaims Kant's distinction of *Verstand* from *Vernunft*. Yet, although Kant might take us beyond the traditional love of knowledge, he errs in his prioritisation of understanding and his design of a metaphysical straightjacket that constrains the remit

\textsuperscript{73}I. Kant, "Inquiry into the À Priori Operations of the Will (Extracted from the 'Critik of Practical Reason')" in Kant, *The Metaphysics of Ethics*, pp. 81-149, esp. pp. 99-100.

\textsuperscript{74}Insofar as they contain mutually incompatible concepts that would contradict each other were there not the homo noumenon-homo phaenomenon distinction, Kant acknowledges that his (so-called) copernican and rousseauian revolutions stand or fall on the subject who is bifurcated between the transcendental and the empirical. See "Critique of Practical Reason," pp. 195-201.

\textsuperscript{75}“Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics,” pp. 138-139.
of reason to the appearance of things only. Kant effectively denies reason its right to actual knowledge. In opposition, Hegel exchanges the Kantian a priori and the analytic-synthetic propositions of reason for his notion of the “absolute”, a pantheistic God qua Geist, and dialectical reason. Hegel’s central claim is that reason is productive of truth rather than merely regulative of the transcendental conditions which make truth in appearance possible. For Hegel, this is especially relevant if we want to transform the post-reformation epoch into Geist’s world in which the capacity of autonomy is real and thought governs reality. In terms of the hegelian subject who is to produce truth and transform morality, therefore, Hegel “asserts that consciousness is communal, public and socially interactive instead of private, inner, or a spectator of itself and the world.” Like Rousseau, Hegel builds on modernité’s a priori moral identity of the subject’s autonomy in order to reconcile her spiritually with socio-economic modernisation through the process of recognition that effects an a posteriori moral identity in respect of Sittlichkeit.

So Kant’s vision of Moralität is positive in Hegel’s eyes because it establishes the principle that self-consciousness qua the self-mediated

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78 R. P. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 249-251. With his metaphysics of absolute idealism Hegel deems to have overcome the four core problems of Kant’s transcendental idealism: it is endlich (finite), or limited to Verstand; it is subjektiv (subjective), which implies empirical things are dependent on the subject’s (Verstand); it is abstrakt (abstract), or, insofar as things are conceived atomistically and not relationally, undialectical; and it is persönlich (personal), for reality is constructed psychologically, not socially. See S. Priest, “Introduction”, in S. Priest (ed.), Hegel’s Critique of Kant (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 1-48, esp. pp. 21-28.
79 Ibid., pp. 4-12.
81 Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, pp. 35-36.
subject of freedom is the hinge on which modern philosophy turns.\textsuperscript{82} But Hegel also claims that with Kant we reach “the summit and the limit of the concept of the autonomous, self-conscious will.”\textsuperscript{83} Of Hegel’s four main criticisms of kantian Moralitāt, it is his “classical” objection to Kant’s abstract universalism and moral formalism that we take heed of.\textsuperscript{84} Firstly, Hegel says that the transcendental subject, who has the lord of duty in herself, legislates herself into rather than out of slavery. The difference between the soul of mediaeval christianity and Kant’s transcendental subject whose moral identity of autonomy links her to the abstract idea of freedom contained in the universalism of Moralitāt, Hegel writes,

is not that the former make themselves slaves, while the latter is free, but that the former have their lord outside themselves, while the latter carries his lord in himself, yet at the same time is his own slave. For the particular—impulses, inclinations, pathological love, sensuous experience, or whatever else it is called—the universal is necessarily and always something alien and objective.\textsuperscript{85}

Secondly, the empirical subject is separated from the “particular,” or what Hegel’s student, Feuerbach, coins the subject’s Gattungswesen, her empirical species-being.\textsuperscript{86} Insofar as she performs pure duty vis-à-vis...
vis a “dishonestly displaced beyond, a Jenseits, that is at a foggy distance from the self,” the formality of Kantian Moralität merely exacerbates homo noumenon’s tyranny over homo phaenomenon. Each time the empirical subject is tempted by the particular her transcendental relation to freedom carries her back to the human purgatory, Moralität. While Kant’s concept of civil liberty that is based on the capacity of autonomy might originate from Rousseau, his Moralität not only fails to reconcile the subject to herself but in fact perpetuates her experience of diremption. The Entzweiung that Hegel believes Plato first grapples with persists, and Rousseau’s analysis of “social man, who lives constantly outside himself and through opinion, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgement of others,” is exacerbated by Kant’s transcendental subject’s autonomy. Rousseau’s insightful analysis and Kant’s unsuccessful elaboration of the problem arguably informs the project of Hegel, and it is through phenomenology and the concept of “homo dialecticus” qua “finite being in a transitory but concrete world of Diesseits” that Hegel aims to redeem homo noumenon to homo phaenomenon.

Although it is not a dialectical method, phenomenology describes the historical forms or modes of consciousness and the dialectical experience which turns the subject qua consciousness into a self-consciousness whose experience of the limit of each mode “raises her up”

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(aufheben)\textsuperscript{93} to the next.\textsuperscript{94} Initially, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*\textsuperscript{95} describes the dialectic of knowing where consciousness cognises herself through her recognition of her otherness from things in terms of sense-certainty, perception and kantian Verstand.\textsuperscript{96} But because Kant's "motionless tautology of I am I" has unmediated being-for-herself only, Hegel proposes to show us "what this consciousness knows in knowing herself."\textsuperscript{97} Hegel's goal is to demonstrate that self-consciousness' journey to transcendental subjectivity is the result of the dialectic of the embodied subject's animal desire for self-preservation.\textsuperscript{98} She is located in the world and the subject's animal desire moves her to satisfy her material needs by reproduction, which entails an expression of individuality that places the subject at the centre of the world but dirempts her from the universality it manifests. Importantly, individuality is the pre-condition for the subject's human desire for Selbstgewißheit.\textsuperscript{99} This is the truth of self-certainty that designates our "notion of ourselves and the aims we strive for," which can only be


\textsuperscript{95}The Phenomenology of Spirit has two parts, each with three sections: "Consciousness, 'Self-consciousness,' and 'Reason,' are the basic divisions of individual experience, and 'Spirit,' 'Religion,' and 'Absolute Knowledge' are the basic divisions of social experience ... The relation between the 'individual' and 'social' sections reflects the fact that, for Hegel, the individual is an abstraction from society. The individual cannot exist in isolation." See R. Norman, *Hegel's Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction*, (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{96}Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 58-102.

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., p. 103.


\textsuperscript{99}Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 108-109. We should not confuse individuality with identity qua the outcome of the intersubjective relation of recognition and its fulfillment in Sittlichkeit. Individuality is subjective and gives the subject self-feeling only. Her being-for-herself is temporary and dependent on the world.
fulfilled by the recognition of another self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{100} Human
desire thus requires that the subject “leave behind the colourful show
of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlife void of the
supersensible beyond and step out into the spiritual daylight of the
present.”\textsuperscript{101}

The process of affirmation of human desire through recognition
commences after the subject acknowledges both the existence of an-
other in their individuality and the universal endeavour of all sub-
jects towards Geist. To show the other that she is independent of the
world necessitates that the subject ‘abolish’ the things upon which her
animal desire depends.\textsuperscript{102} Yet neither self-consciousness can labour on
things while the other watches, for it demands that they risk their life
to impress the other and implies not only that the other already pos-
sesses pure self-consciousness but that the other is the sole arbiter of
the subject’s independence. As a result, they engage in a life-and-death
struggle in a bid to demonstrate independence from their animal de-
sire and to receive the recognition that their being-for-itself is their
essence.\textsuperscript{103} Although the death of either subject would obviously be
self-defeating, Hegel suggests that through this experience ‘self-con-
sciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-conscious-
ness.’\textsuperscript{104} The human desire for permanent Selbstdgewißheit that risks
death awakens self-consciousness to the fact of her dependence on the
world for her material needs. At the same time, she becomes aware
that human desire is a spiritual need for the freedom which recogni-
tion affords. Such is humanity’s desire for freedom that it risks death
to procure it, as to follow the impulse of our appetites is inhuman
whilst the unloved \textit{qua} unrecognized life is not worth living.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{101}\textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, pp. 110-111.
\textsuperscript{102}Taylor discusses the dialectical idea of “abolition” in terms of Hegel’s concepts of
\textit{Aufhebung} (“to preserve at the same time as to annul”) and \textit{Versöhnung} (“to reconcile”). See Hegel, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, pp. 112-114.
\textsuperscript{104}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{105}Hegel uses the conceptual metaphor of love to aid our comprehension of recogni-
tion as representative of Geist; that is, only in love are we one with the object,
neither dominating nor dominated, a reciprocal giving and taking, a Juliet: “the more
I give to thee, the more I have.” We see “only ourselves in the beloved, and in turn, we
see the beloved as not ourselves.” \textit{See} \textit{History and Truth}, pp. 131-135.
Ultimately, though, the life-and-death struggle ends in a truce where one subject is independent and a being-for-herself whilst her opponent remains embroiled in the world as a being-for-another. Their mutual fear of death enforces the first social relation of inequality in the shape of the dependence between the lord and bondsman instead of the mutual reciprocity *qua* sociality that is desired.

Hegel is quick to dispel the intuition that the lord prospers from social inequality. His *Selbstgewißheit* is dependent on the recognition of the servile unessential consciousness of the bondsman, whilst in his relation to the world that is also mediated by the bondsman the lord’s truth of self-certainty is fleeting and without permanence. He is alienated from his species-being or animal desire to the extent that he does not labor. What is absent is the absolute certainty of the truth of himself which another autonomous self-consciousness would provide.106 Like a jilted lover, the lord is left to equivocate whether his being-for-itselashioned in the world before his acquaintance with the bondsman is indeed who he essentially is. Even an asymmetrical social relation in which the lord has the upper hand fails to procure, never mind enables at least mis-recognition. In contrast, the work of the bondsman is ‘desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes things.”107 It is through the bondsman’s formative activity, when labor *qua* reproduction of needs becomes work *qua* production of socio-cultural goods, that he gives an element of permanence to the world and through individuality establishes his independence from it.108 Work socializes the subject’s animal desire into reflexive, human desire that gives the bondsman a “mind of his own, a self-will within the permanent order of things”. Through his capacity to be autonomous the bondsman posits himself as a being-for-himself whose human desire for *Selbstgewißheit* is derived from the things he produces. In opposition to Kant’s identity of identity

106*Phenomenology of Spirit,* pp. 116-117.

107Ibid., p. 118.

without difference, the unmediated I am I who intuits things in “picture-thoughts” *qua* thought without reflection, we have Hegel's bondsman's identity of identity and difference, actual rather than virtual self-consciousness who knows the world because he transforms the things which constitute it.\(^{109}\) As Hegel hails,

[W]e are in the presence of self-consciousness in a new shape, … which *thinks* or is a free self-consciousness. For *to think* does not mean to be an *abstract* “I”, but an “I” which (relates) … itself to objective being in such a way that its significance is the *being-for-self* of the consciousness for which it is [an object]. For in *thinking*, the object does not present itself in picture-thoughts but in *Notions*, i.e. in a distinct *being-in-itself*.\(^{110}\)

It is through the bondsman’s absolute mediation of the world by thought (“*Notions*”), Hegel argues, that he realizes scientific knowledge of things-in-themselves at the same time as he “raises himself up” from the world to be a transcendental subject.\(^{111}\) Essentially, Hegel shows through the bondsman’s experience how self-consciousness *qua* self-understanding and society — an unequal one, at that — are born together. The lord-bondsman relation is the superstructure of the human desire for recognition which, albeit subsequent to the satisfaction of animal desire by material needs, is only fulfilled where there is social equality.\(^{112}\) Further, where Kant posits the transcendental subject *a priori* as his condition of possibility for knowledge, Hegel examines the conditions of possibility for the transcendental subject (from embodied consciousness to a consciousness of the universal desire for recognition).\(^{113}\) Transcendental philosophy’s constructive metaphysics is incomplete without a philosophy of *Geist* which charts the conditions necessary for transcendental subjectivity and a descriptive metaphysics that departs with consciousness as one phenomenon in the world of phenomena.\(^{114}\) Hence, if phenomenology is a dialogue

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\(^{109}\) *History and Truth*, pp. 122-126.

\(^{110}\) *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 119-120.


\(^{112}\) *History and Truth*, pp. 136-138.

\(^{113}\) *Hegel's Ethical Thought*, p. 91.

between self-consciousness and Geist, between the historicity of man’s modes of experience that culminate in the human desire for recognition and the history of man’s practico-social conditions which make this experience possible, then it is in post-kantian Aufklärung alias hegelian modernité that the journey of the transcendental subject collides with the progress of the historical career of Geist and its socio-cultural manifestation as Sittlichkeit.

In addition to the phenomenology of subjective spirit, therefore, Hegel’s philosophy of politics — in the early nineteenth century, jurisprudence explores the rational and apprehends in thought the present qua actual (German) ethical life or objective spirit. As for Rousseau, Hegel conceives of civil liberty as an intersubjective question insofar as the subject is born socially and her moral identity is a posteriori to the recognition mediated by others. The transcendental subject’s human desire is tantamount to a will or ‘mode of thought that translates itself into existence due to its need to know itself as united in its innermost being qua comprehended by others within the truth (of community).’ Where Rousseau implies autonomy and recognition, Kant perfects the former whilst Hegel concretises autonomy via recognition: the “right of individuals to their subjective determination of freedom is only possible insofar as they belong to an ethical actuality where the certainty of freedom (Selbstgewiβheit) has its truth.”

As Taylor suggests, Hegel’s philosophy of politics is an attempt at the “great re-unification” of the radical freedom of the capacity of autonomy with the subject’s expressivist desire for recognition that is realised in intersubjective identities. Hence, objective spirit qua the

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115 Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 55-56.
116 On Hegel’s differentiation of Kant’s account of enlightenment into modernity, or the dialectic of enlightenment, see J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, F. Lawrence (trans.), (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), Lectures I and II.
117Philosophisches Rechtslehre (jurisprudence) is concerned with the idea of law or ight, where the idea is the confluence of the essence of free will and the existence of community. See G.W.F. Hegel: Modernity and Politics, pp. 102-104.
118Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Preface, pp. 21-23.
119Ibid., p. 11.
120Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §§ 153-155, pp. 196-197.
121Hegel, pp. 23-49.
set of social institutions and practices is an ethical actuality in respect of which the subject *qua* subjective spirit identifies. In effect, Kant’s *Moralität* attains completion in hegelian *Sittlichkeit*,¹²² for we are compelled by already existant customs, *sitten*, which are the content of our moral actions, and by the expression of freedom that obliges us to tally our actions with the demands of reason such that *Geist* is realised in *Sittlichkeit*.¹²³ The subject willingly fulfils — indeed, finds her liberation in — her duties to ethical life which, as it determines the character of the subject, makes duty synonymous with virtue. And, if a virtue that is essential to the subject’s character can be called a custom, then duty appears as habit to the subject.¹²⁴ The diremption of *Sollen* from *Sein* that is expressed by Kant through *homo noumenon* and *homo phaenomenon* is reconciled in *homo dialectus*, who is recognised in and dependent for her moral identity on *Sittlichkeit*. *Homo dialecticus* proceeds from being-in-herself (“will in its concept”) that is safeguarded by abstract right *qua* freedom as property, to being-for-herself (“will of the individual”) in the realm of morality *qua* subjective freedom and, finally, to being-for-herself for and with another (self-sufficient individuality with universal substantiality), or *Selbstgewiβheit* in *Sittlichkeit qua* family, civil society and, in its highest actuality, the rational state:

Thus, ethical life is the unity of the will in its concept and the will of the individual ... Its initial existence [*Dasein*] is again something natural, in the form of love and feeling [*Empfindung*] — the *family*; here, the individual [*das Individuum*] has overcome [*aufgehoben*] his personal aloofness and finds himself and his consciousness within a whole. But at the next stage (of *civil society*), we witness the disappearance of ethical life ... the family becomes fragmented an its members behave towards each other as self-sufficient individuals, for they are held together only by the bond of mutual need ... (The)

¹²²To be accurate, Hegel “desynonymises” Kant’s ellision of *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität* to claim that *Moralität* is the province of an individual morality of conscience whilst *Sittlichkeit* is the sphere of a social morality in which the abstract good or the idea of freedom is concretised by the autonomous subject. M. Inwood, “Hegel and His Language,” in M. Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp. 5-18, esp. pp. 12-13.

¹²³Hegel, pp. 380-386.

¹²⁴*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §§ 144-152, pp. 189-196.
state emerges only at the third stage, that of ethical life and spirit, at which the momentous unification of self-sufficient individuality with universal substantiality takes place... (I)t is freedom in its most concrete shape, which is subordinate only to the supreme absolute truth of the world spirit.¹²⁵

Foucault: normal autonomy and disciplined recognition

In their answers to the question, “what can I know?,” Kant and Hegel both give center stage to what Heidegger terms the “metaphysics of subjectivity”: with Kant, the transcendental subject “conditions all objectivity” and, in the case of Hegel, she “gathers all objects to herself in the process of the production of herself as the absolute subject.”¹²⁶ The consequence, Nietzsche writes, is that “an epistemology that sets boundaries permits one to posit as one sees fit a beyond of reason whereas a will to defy the universe and life in order to find repose in contemplation and the bottom of things demands that we everywhere seek, and submit and acquiesce to, reason.”¹²⁷ As two of Foucault’s main influences, Heidegger and Nietzsche intimate the style of critique that can be forged against kantian and hegelian subjectivity, original and derivative.¹²⁸ Firstly, in its a priori moment the subject’s will to will underwrites the “subject of” autonomy, which today aids Rawls to conceive of justice because it allows the “notion of the free person” — “a normative, moral conception of the person who is the basic unit of thought”¹²⁹ — to decide, be solely responsible for and at liberty to revise her “fundamental interests and ends” (read moral identity).¹³⁰ Because the rawlsian subject “desires to be normal and

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 63-64.
¹²⁷The Will to Power, § 95, p. 60.
co-operative,” that is, to be “recognized as a self-respecting citizen who has a reasonable moral psychology as a consequence of the moral capacities and intellectual powers of autonomy,” 131 we can say that autonomy has the status of sameness over time that enables the beyond of Moralität in which the will to will qua liberty as “a possession of the individual”132 characterizes moral identity. Secondly, through her a posteriori development the subject’s will to will is, as per Taylor recently, conceived in terms of the transition within the subject from interpretation to recognition.133 Initially, the hermeneutical subject is a self-interpreting animal engaged in a monological journey of discovery through language that leads to self-consciousness, or Verstehen as the subject’s Seinmodus,134 subsequent to which the expressivist subject enters into a dialogue with the language community to affirm that her deep, self-interpreted desires established in monologue are indicative of the community’s moral-aesthetic intuitions.135 Through dialogue qua process of recognition, the subject draws a “moral map” of herself.136 She seeks, via her will to will, liberation, a “process with an end”137 in a moral identity she is a “subject of” and which signifies shared sameness across space that is surrounded by Sittlichkeit and to which the subject willingly submits and acquiesces in.

It is through Foucault’s “retrospective analyses of the historical phenomena of exclusion and conditionality which enable the constitution of reason and the human sciences”138 that we can problematize the transcendental subject’s sameness of autonomy that is contra power

131Political Liberalism, pp. 81-89.
133Where Hegel’s homo dialecticus ascends from animal to human desire via labor and work, Taylor’s subject moves from self-interpretation to the desire for expression that is fulfilled in dialogue through language.
137Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, p. 6.
and the difference grasped in the process of recognition to ensure Selbstgewißheit. We juxtapose these two moral identities with the "underside of the bourgeoisie's great dream" which, since the seventeenth century, has acted as the negative condition that makes them possible. Essential.\textsuperscript{139} Essentially, Foucault's criticisms are indicated from the outset by the fact that The Order of Things and Madness and Civilization are 'l'histoire du même, de l'identité, et l'histoire de la différence', respectively.\textsuperscript{140} His critique of autonomy and recognition is then an exposure of the 'great fantasy of a social body constituted by the universality of wills'.\textsuperscript{141} In turn (and to return to Heidegger and Nietzsche), universality is a function of the particular volonté de savoir which, most notoriously, deploys sexual activity in a discourse of a scienta sexualis that thrives on both autonomous liberty against repression and liberation in a mutually recognised identity.\textsuperscript{142}

Foucault's critique must of course be understood historico-culturally, for meaning is empty and inevitably perverted outside a context Post-war and conservative bourgeois France\textsuperscript{143}: the human cost of stalinism exacted by, amongst other lackeys, a logos on the psyché rather than the unconscious à la Freud\textsuperscript{144}: the hijack of political critique by the Parti Communiste Française, of thought by philosophy in the guise of dialectical or existential marxism such that its focus is reduced to the sphere of the economy,\textsuperscript{145} and of philosophy by the philosophie de la continuité de la conscience\textsuperscript{146}: these conditions all contribute to the general 'déracinement de l'anthropologie'\textsuperscript{147} and the


will to substitute ‘l'ordre de l'homme in favour of l'ordre des signes’, discourse. But why dethrone humanist philosophy and its man in favour of discourse? Well, as Bernauer argues, the pulse at the heart of Foucault’s thought is that of the ‘experience of imprisonment’ of modern human beings within systems of thought and practices which are so intimately a part of us that we embrace them as the very structure of our being. The *rapports de savoir* and a régime of truth traverse, constitute and make us who we are through the *rapports de pouvoir* which implore us to accept a discursively produced identity as obvious and natural. These relations of *pouvoir/savoir*, Bernauer continues, derive from ahistorical accounts of human nature, the egocentric illusions of subjectivity and the moral prison of reason conceived as a nature rather than an ethics. Further, it is in virtue of this experience of imprisonment that Foucault is the great skeptic of our times who questions this trilogy of post-kantian dogmas (which Rajchman describes as ‘master narrative schemes, anthropological foundation and universalist history’). Foucault’s experience of imprisonment that gives rise to his skepticism informs his philosophy, too, which is concerned with how to continue modernité’s critical thought and politics without inherited dogmatic assumptions. In short, Foucault’s concern is with an ‘ecstatic thinking that helps us to

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151 As Hoy says, power and knowledge are inseparable conceptually, hence the grammatical slash inserted between them in the heuristic device, relations of pouvoir/savoir: “the relation is such that knowledge is not gained prior to and independently of the use to which it will be put in order to achieve power ... but is already a function of human interests and power relations.” And, because power “produces rather than prevents knowledge,” Foucault inserts pouvoir before savoir. D.C. Hoy, “Power, Repression, Progress,” in D.C. Hoy (ed.), *Foucault: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 123-147, esp. p. 129; Foucault, “Body/Power,” p. 59.
153 Michel Foucault; *The Freedom of Philosophy*, pp. 2-4.
get free of ourselves."¹⁵⁴ It is the question of freedom as an "endless questioning of constituted experience qua ethic of free undogmatic thought,"¹⁵⁵ And, if it is the constituted experience of moral identity that we are interested in, turn we are skeptical about it precisely because moral identity is constituted by the transcendental autonomous subject who effects via recognition an experience of moral identity that is synonymous with imprisonment — that is, we are "subject to" it.

In this sense, Foucault's first obstacle is modernité's core philosophical myth of the "almost uninterrupted development of the European ratio from the renaissance to our own day,"¹⁵⁶ Foucault conclusively demonstrates that there is discontinuity — "epistemological transformation"¹⁵⁷— in the production of knowledge in virtue of the variety of ways in which words amalgamated as discourse address things; for instance, via interpreted resemblance and linguistic representation and, after Kant and Hegel, synthetic and dialectical representation.¹⁵⁸ In contrast, Foucault points to the "ontology qua order of things" in terms of what he calls an épistémè,¹⁵⁹ which is a mode of non-formal knowledge specific to an epoch and akin to a "world-view written by an anonymous hand from which the subject cannot escape, a slice of history that imposes norms and postulates and is common to all branches of connaissance."¹⁶⁰ An épistémè's "slice of history" or savoir refers to the historical rather than scientific conditions that are necessary for a thing to be given to, and a statement about it to be formulated by, connaissance (or a discourse), which in turn details the relation of words to things and the formal rules that govern the relation.¹⁶¹ Lastly, there is what Foucault describes as the épistémè's

¹⁵⁴ "Michel Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking", pp. 63-70.
¹⁵⁷ "La situation de Cuvier dans l'histoire de la biologie," pp. 30-36.
¹⁵⁸ The Order of Things, pp. 18-76.
¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 15, f. 2.
archive — "the border of time that surrounds our presence and delimits us"162 — which, as the historical a priori condition for discourses,163 differentiates them in their singular existence and duration.164 According to Foucault, it is through an analysis of a discourse's historical a priori that we discover the generalities of the archive which illuminates an épistémè's discursive order of things, not the diachronic subject and her "transcendental reflection with which philosophy since Kant has identified itself."165 Foucault's "science of the arche"166 humiliate the transcendental subject's will to know her experience as human and historical other than at the cost of a 'certain thought of the Same in which Difference is the same thing as Identity' apropos of the empirico-transcendental doublet, Kant's transcendental aesthetic plus Hegel's transcendental dialectic that equate to "man."167

Foucault's rejection of the transcendental subject who assimilate things by words and acts as the ground of a metaphysics of human experience is linked to moral identity by his critique of the human sciences which the doublet shoulders. Although they oscillate between doxa (public opinion that leads to a doxalogos168),169 and the general scientific conditions of savoir that are necessary for the connaissance evident in the natural sciences, it is the third dimension of the philosophical thought of the same that transposes the problems of doxa and savoir's empirical concepts which concerns Foucault.170 The human sciences, Foucault says, are dangerous intermediaries within this epistemological trihedron.171 They are discourses that become positivities qua disciplines,172 or "groups of statements that borrow

162Ibid., pp. 128-131.
165The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 200-206.
167The Order of Things, pp. 312-316.
168Ibid., p. 121, f. 18.
169The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 139.
170The Order of Things, pp. 346-347.
171Foucault's image of a trihedron invokes Nietzsche's "pyramid" of savoir in The Birth of Tragedy. See Guédez, Foucault, p. 53.
their organisation from connaissance, which tend to coherence and demonstrativity and are accepted, institutionalised, transmitted and sometimes taught as sciences,\textsuperscript{173} but which profess a discursive knowledge of the empirical subject in her truth in virtue of the doublet\textsuperscript{174} who authorises the transcendental interrogation peculiar to the human sciences.\textsuperscript{175} The dialectical thought that informs the human sciences is no longer theoretical but a mode of action in which “man’s Other must become the Same as himself.”\textsuperscript{176}

Instead of a “social sensibility that springs into action at the start of an epoch we are accustomed to define by the privileges of reason,”\textsuperscript{177} therefore, Foucault bears witness to the negative conditions of the social sensibility’s possibility. The raisonable “subject of” a moral identity that is an amalgam of moral obligation and civil law is sketched over against a profile of the experience of déraison as the other, which entails the castigation of the déraisonable and the economically inactive, the ‘debauched, spend-thrift fathers, prodigal sons, blasphemers, men who seek to undo themselves and libertines.’\textsuperscript{178} Ultimately and when raison defines the subject’s nature, the déraisonable are confined to the asylum under the auspices of the psychiatrist’s discourse on madness as a disease of the mind, and its inhabitants symbolise the imperative of reason beyond the gates of the asylum in the city of the normal:

The asylum ... organized (guilt) for the madman as a consciousness of himself, and as a non-reciprocal relation to the keeper; it organized it for the man of reason as an awareness of the Other, a therapeutic intervention in the madman’s existence. In other words by this guilt the madman became an object of punishment always vulnerable to himself and to the Other; and, from the acknowledgement of his status as object, from the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject, and consequently to reason.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{173}The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 178.
\textsuperscript{174}The Order of Things, p. 344.
\textsuperscript{175}The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 181-185.
\textsuperscript{176}The Order of Things, pp. 327-328.
\textsuperscript{177}Madness and Civilization, pp. 39-45.
\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{179}Ibid., p. 247.
Apart from these conditions of exclusion for moral identity to be possible and the city normal, the human sciences which disown those who fail the test of reason also elaborate the moral identity necessary to those who seek to pass it. Yet, when the subject partakes in the process of mediation in respect of the pseudo-knowledge of the human sciences of, for example, biology, economics and philology, her \textit{a posteriori} moral identity of recognition is doused in an ‘anthropological sleep’\textsuperscript{180} Similarly, the “indispensable correlative” for the Hegelian metaphysics of life, labour and language, the “synthetic activity of Kant’s foundational subject,” enjoys a “place of tranquillized sleep” in the guise of her \textit{a priori} moral identity of autonomy\textsuperscript{181}

But we need not take only Foucault’s critical word about the discipline of recognition and the normalisation of autonomy. The moral identity sustained in and by the institutions and practices of \textit{Sittlichkeit} cannot be resisted for they are rendered by reason. Socrates and Jesus, for instance, have to choose between faith to their extra-\textit{Sittlichkeit} truths about our moral identity, which requires that they withdraw from ethical life, or they can challenge \textit{Sittlichkeit} at the risk of death\textsuperscript{182}. As we know, they refuse to acquiesce and ‘choose’ death — they are denied recognition \textit{vis-à-vis} the truth they apprehend and wish to be identified with — for beyond the community is barbarity and slavery. In contrast, when Kant advocates autonomy as the transcendental subject’s hotline to the idea of freedom that is universally affirmed in \textit{Moralität} he aligns himself with the ‘moral fanaticism of Rousseau’, albeit a fanaticism of ‘subterranean christian values’ enforced by the subject’s tyranny over herself rather than the comrade as overseer\textsuperscript{183}. For Kant, the risk of heteronomy which results from utilitarianism and Hutcheson’s moral sense or Epicurus’ physical sense theory must be avoided at all costs\textsuperscript{184}. Although he is a critic — in the history of philosophy, a revolutionary, no less — of Christian metaphysics, Kant is a pietist whose hope is firmly wedded to the basic

\textsuperscript{180}The \textit{Order of Things}, p. 341.
\textsuperscript{181}The \textit{Archaeology of Knowledge}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{182}Hegel, pp. 377-378.
\textsuperscript{183}The \textit{Will to Power}, § 101, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{184}Kant, “Inquiry into the À Priori Operations of the Will (Extracted from the \textit{Critik of Practical Reason}.), p. 85 and pp. 102-108.
framework of the beyond of reason, "... the moral precepts of the Gospel... (which place) all good conduct in man's subordination and subjection of his will to the discipline and training of a duty laid before his mental vision."¹⁸⁵

Hence, we need to realize that the ontology of the rational, diachronic subject's narrative of a responsible bourgeois life which requires us to be the 'subject of' the moral identity of autonomy that is affirmed by recognition costs too much for those marginalized by the normal and proffers nothing but subjection to identities sold as true for the disciplined. We are as a result "subject to" moral identity, and political struggle ensues against it as an experience of imprisonment, what Foucault calls a form of subjection that ties the individual to herself and demands the submission of the subject to others.¹⁸⁶ The resistance of moral identity entails a specific struggle that is transversal, immediate and against the effects of power rather than a main enemy to be overthrown in the future. It is a struggle about the status of the individual *qua* right to be different and with others and against the "government of individualization," the *régime du savoir* in which knowledge and expertise effect power relations that implore the subject via an identity determined to be true to be the individual who bears the identity.¹⁸⁷ Consequently, it is necessary to conceive of a synonymous relation between moral identity and power, of a "self conceived in the same way that we conceive of political relations,"¹⁸⁸ such that politics

is an activity that provides at the same time one single answer to the questions 'who am I?' and 'who are we?'. It is the power that makes souls and orders. As such, the power of the political must itself be an

¹⁸⁶See "The Subject and Power," pp. 212-213. There are struggles against subjection in respect of, for example, the feminisation of the female body and mind, the medicos-administration of the human body, or the man who takes sexual pleasure with another man and who, through a focus on the truth of who he is a qua the nature of his desire and its object, is locked into, identified as, homosexual.
¹⁸⁷The struggle against another's subjectivity imposed upon the subject as an identity can be distinguished from early modern struggles against domination (ethnic, social and religious) and nineteenth century struggles against exploitation (the terms of separation of individuals from what they produce). See "The Subject and Power," pp. 211-212.
object of our understanding, a source of our anxiety, and possibly a chance for hope.\textsuperscript{189}

We must then discard the dichotomous relation between the subject and power and the notion of the "subject of" moral identity who stands over against politics, as it is premised on the power of the state as a totalizing form of power. After Machiavelli, who is one of the few to conceive of the Prince's power in terms of force relationships, we must "go a step further and do without the persona of the Prince so that we can decipher power mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships."\textsuperscript{190} \textit{A priori}, we are "subject to" moral identity and, if we leave the king's head atop the social body and refuse to chop it off,\textsuperscript{191} we also ignore the individualizing power that takes its cue from the pastoral power of mediaeval Christianity and subjects us \textit{a posteriori} to moral identity. The state distributes a form of pastoral power that promises salvation in terms of health, well-being, security and protection, which is marketed by institutions like the police and welfare societies or via the structures of medicine and education.\textsuperscript{192} To be a citizen in the city of the normal is thus conditional upon integration, which we should understand as a process of discipline that promises salvation in exchange for the subject's acknowledgement or affirmation of an identity through which others can recognize her as a citizen, a comrade, or a normal autonomous subject who is on the same journey to \textit{Geist} "(Pastoral power) ... is a form of power which makes individuals subjects ... subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge."\textsuperscript{193} This is why the subject struggles

\textsuperscript{189}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{190}\textit{The History of Sexuality, Volume One}, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{191}Truth and Power," p. 121.
\textsuperscript{192}When the original distributor of pastoral power, the ecclesiastical institutions and their sales representative, the pastor, lose their vitality the modern state supplants them. It conceives of the population as a social body, the flock as a congregation, into which the individual is integrated. In contrast to totalising power, therefore, the state's pastoral power is salvation oriented (rather than politically focused), it is obblative (as opposed to the principle of sovereignty), it is individualising (instead of a legalised power), and it is coextensive with life and productive of the truth about the individual in terms of her identity. See "The Subject and Power," pp. 214-215.
\textsuperscript{193}"The Subject and Power," p. 212.
against the individualizing power that "categorizes the individual and marks him by his individuality, attaches him to his own identity and imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognize in him" — as Foucault implores,

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are ... The ... political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our day is not to try to liberate the individual from the state ... but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.\(^\text{194}\)

**Conclusion**

We have argued that the core concept which conditions our consciousness of *modernité* is the subject of knowledge and her will to will. After Machiavelli's introduction of the question of the state's authority and legitimacy *vis-à-vis* the people and the consolidation of this relation by Hobbes and Locke via the subject of politics, it falls to Rousseau to illuminate the twin moments of moral identity in *modernité*. Rousseau proposes an *a priori* concept of autonomy which requires the reciprocal recognition of others that is *a posteriori* to the establishment of the *volonté générale qua* politics of recognition. Whether Kant's obsession with autonomy because of the threat to the subject by a politics that mediates who she is, or Hegel's demonstration of the interconnectedness of autonomy and the desire for recognition such that politics must be harnessed to bring it about, both conceive of the "subject of" moral identity over against power insofar as the subject's will is constitutive of the juridical law that anchors it. Via politics, the *demos* shapes *kratos* in virtue of the "subject of" moral identity.

However, there is as we argue through Foucault at the price to be payed for the notion of the subject's moral identity as an informant of power. It is a politics of deliberate mis-recognition insofar as those who do not exhibit autonomy are marginalized from the city of the normal whilst those who are residents are 'subject to' the process of

\(^{194}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 216.}\)
discipline by the human sciences which produce the identities we are recognized by. This explains why, even with their caveats, Foucault’s phenomenology of madness but particularly archaeology is a risk-free wager against the human sciences in which Foucault stands to gain the erasure, “like a face drawn at the edge of the sea,” of their condition, the transcendental subject of knowledge. It is her death only—the specific epistemological consciousness of ‘man’, the sovereign of a discourse of the ‘subject of’, and neither the subject per se nor the thought and agency necessary to transform the human sciences—that is imperative for Foucault if the rebirth of a form of philosophy ‘cleansed of transcendental narcissism’ is to occur. It seems appropriate, therefore, to conclude with a brief consideration of the type of thought that can cleanse the philosophy that makes us ‘subject to’ moral identity and by implication moves us beyond the problems of normalisation and discipline which are associated with moral identity.

Through Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault advocates an approach to our knowledge of things in terms of Kant’s *philosophische Archäologie* that is oriented around the question, *Was ist der Mensch?*. As Kant outlines it, *philosophische Archäologie*:

is neither a historical nor empirical philosophical history but a rational, *a priori* philosophical history which, when it establishes facts of reason, does so not on account of the history of reason but renders them from the nature of reason itself as philosophical archaeology."
In other words, the four Kantian questions we alluded to earlier must be historicized and reduced to three so that we may know what (generic) man is, or who we are: how have my questions been produced and the path of my knowing determined? (versus what can I know?); how have I been situated to experience the real and how does exclusion operate in delineating the realm of obligation for me? (versus what ought I to do?); and what are the struggles in which I am engaged and how have the parameters for my aspirations been defined? (versus what may I hope for?). Elsewhere, Foucault also speaks about a raison analytique that resembles the methodology of the natural sciences, which premise a mode of existence according to which things function, develop and transform. Foucault’s point about a raison analytique is that, unlike the human sciences, it operates without the “prior objectification” of a subject of knowledge who is in rapport with humanity. Rather, in his desire to imitate the approach of the natural sciences Foucault says that “analytical work proceeds as an ongoing conceptualization,” which in turn implies a suspension of the system of values referred to and a “critical thought or a constant checking.”

Thus, Foucault rejects a Hegelian “history of reason” through Kantian philosophische Archäologie and the “prior objectification” of the Kantian subject of knowledge via a raison analytique. Where moral identity is concerned, Foucault rejects dialectical thought altogether but he cut and pastes Kant’s concern with epistemological limits and talks of the limits of our identity and how to transgress it via a critical ethos. This requires and Foucault alludes to the logical compatibility between archaeology and genealogy, which are mutually inclusive.

 encore qu’elle établit des faits de Raison, ce n’est pas au récit historique qu’elle les emprunte, mais elle les tire de la nature de la Raison humaine au titre d’archéologie philosophique (siez zieht sie aus der Natur der menschlichen Vernunft als philosophische Archäologie).” Kant, Fortschritte der Metaphysik (Gesammelte Schriften, Band XX), quoted in Foucault, “Les monstruosités de la critique,” p. 221, note.

202“Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking,” pp. 46-47.
204“The Subject and Power,” p. 209.
as the “method and design” of a historical ontology of who we are.\textsuperscript{206} Foucault then combines this historical ontology with a philosophical ethos that is characterized by a critical or limit-attitude. Where Kantian critique is a negative metaphysics and a transcendental practice — know the limits of knowledge in order not to transgress them; search for the formal structures of consciousness that have universal value — foucauldian critique is positive and practical. Historical ontology seeks out the singular, contingent and arbitrary from within the universal, necessary and obligatory so as to know — but, crucially, in order to transgress — the limitations of the present.\textsuperscript{207} Lastly, Foucault says a philosophical ethos is historical and empirical rather than global or radical, and when superimposed upon historical ontology the outcome is a “critical ontology of ourselves as a historicco-practical test of the limits of the present that we may go beyond.”\textsuperscript{208} The critical ontologist “... highlights the point at which philosophy must grapple with the darkness that at every instant overshadows it but which is also the condition for philosophy’s continued existence.”\textsuperscript{209} if we care about the “virtual fractures which open up the space of freedom and transformation.”\textsuperscript{210}

It is thus wrong to see Foucault’s critical ontology as indicative of his return to the philosophical discourse of the Aufklärung and modernity which, from Kant and Hegel to the Frankfurt School, has

\textsuperscript{206} Archaeology “treats the instances of discourses that articulate what we think, say and do as historical events,” and from these “contingencies that have made us what we are genealogy separates out the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do or think.” See M. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, pp. 32-50, esp. p. 46.

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p. 45. In contrast, as Heidegger describes for us, Kant advocates a “critical ontology of the transcendental subject of apperception’s synthetic capacities” in respect of the limits beyond which our knowledge of the things of our sensuous intuition must not go. M. Heidegger, “Kant’s Thesis about Being,” Pathmarks, pp. 337-363, esp. pp. 349-350.

\textsuperscript{208} What is Enlightenment?,” p. 47.


been concerned with a critique of reason in the name of an "ontology of contemporary reality" that answers to the challenges of the moment.\textsuperscript{211} Similarly, Foucault's critical ontology of who we are does not represent a break with his earlier work nor a sudden interest in freedom and autonomy,\textsuperscript{212} nor does Foucault reaffirm a critical theory and in so doing take his place "with Habermas on the side of Enlightenment."\textsuperscript{213} Instead, Foucault locates himself within this tradition of reflection only.\textsuperscript{214} He neither retrieves Kantian nor habermasian maturity, whether the rule of the subject by herself through reason or an undisturbed communicative ethics of mutual recognition, but rather Foucault's maturity is an attitude towards oneself of transgression.\textsuperscript{215} As Foucault says as early as 1969 in his homage to Hyppolite delivered at the École Normale, modern thought is \emph{la finitude philosophique}. Hyppolite's idea is of philosophy as a critical question to itself that asks what the appropriate limit to the philosophical discourse that speaks of man, the limits of knowledge and liberty is.\textsuperscript{216}

Accordingly, philosophy itself is brought into question in respect of both the constituted and subjective experience Rajchnnan and Bernauer speak of. Firstly, philosophy raises the paradoxes in thought because it continually questions the limitations that are inherent to any corpus of knowledge.\textsuperscript{217} Thought as Foucault understands it is sceptical, and like one of the first sceptical thinkers in greco-roman antiquity, the oneirocritic Artemidorus, scepticism demands that we submit \emph{historia} to \emph{peira}, received knowledge to experience, as a way


\textsuperscript{216}"Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968," p. 781.

\textsuperscript{217}"The Return of Morality," p. 254.
round abstraction and conjecture. Secondly, Foucault argues that philosophical activity today is the critical work thought brings to bear on itself. Philosophy, Foucault says, must explore what might be changed in thought through the research and contemplation of the practice of a knowledge alien to it. The philosopher, rather than assimilate what it is proper for one to know to have a certain amount of knowledgeability, is motivated by a curiosity to get free of oneself based on a passion for knowledge that helps one stray afield of oneself. Foucault speaks here in terms of égarement, which Sheridan interprets as a desire to bewilder oneself in the research one pursues. S’égarer, though, is essentially to lose oneself without knowing, hence to wander in error rather than in truth, and for Foucault it is tantamount to a flirtation with madness via his philosophical practice that tests the limits of our experience of truth.

Instead of a reflection on what is true and false, philosophy moves beyond good and evil to a reflection on our relationship to truth, which is truth qua constituted experience that is thought and truth qua actions we perform as subjects of truth. Kant’s motto of the Aufklärung, Aude sapere (“dare to know”), requires that we participate in the age of critique collectively as actors and personally as agents. Yet we always proceed from the ethical axis to a focus on the experience of who we are in order to experiment with the possibility of going beyond this experience. Foucault’s assumption is that we are, and are always potentially, “subject to,” and the aim of foucauldian transgression is the maturity where we are a “subject of.” The philosophical life as an ethos of critical thought links itself in this respect with the ethical realm in as much as the acquisition of knowledge.

222What is Enlightenment?, pp. 34-35.
223Ibid., p. 38.
demands *askésis*, or antiquity’s conception of philosophy as the exercise and training of oneself in the activity of thought. For Foucault, therefore, critical thought analyses “the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought,” because it originates from “the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.”

In contrast to the autonomous subject’s desire for recognition in *Geist*, Foucault’s work is a “cry of spirit” against these moral identities that make us “subject to” normalisation and discipline in parallel to the promise that as a “subject of’ autonomy and recognition we can stand over against power. Foucault’s attempt to push through Hegel and Kant is a skeptic’s critique of the experience of imprisonment and an invitation to see the political in philosophy and our moral identity in the political:

Philosophy’s question therefore is the question as to what we ourselves are. That is why contemporary philosophy is entirely political and entirely historical. It is the politics immanent in history and the history indispensable for politics.  

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224 *The History of Sexuality, Volume Two: The Use of Pleasure*, p. 9.


226 “Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking,” p. 75.