In 1965, on the solemn promise that “this nation can be great again!,” Ferdinand Marcos succeeded Diosdado Macapagal to the Philippine Presidency, but then proceeded to co-opt the public apparatus to his political agenda.¹ To establish networks of individuals who personally and politically would be beholden to him, he expanded the size, resources, and power of the government bureaucracy and military establishment.² To gain effective control over the nation’s principal industries — agriculture, communications, power production and supply — using “cronies” to “front” for him, he established monopolies in all of them. To secure his re-election as President in 1969 on a campaign of fraud, intimidation, and “dirty-tricks” (against his political rival, Sergio Osmeña, whom he humiliated with unproven allegations that he had been a war-time Japanese collaborator), he dipped into the government’s operating budget, stripped the country’s foreign exchange reserves bare, ordered the printing of millions of pesos worth of excess banknotes.³ The sum of Marcos’ maneuverings brought hitherto unimaginable levels of corruption and political patronage into the government bureaucracy, compromised the country’s ability to deal with its mounting foreign debt, triggered runaway inflation, and caused the national economy to slide to its lowest levels. But instead of facing the corruption and economic issues squarely, Marcos papered them over with massive

² Ibid.
infusions of funds from the International Monetary Fund⁴ (placing the nation in even greater international debt), and from the American government, which he pressured into forking over to his government advance “rental” payments (a hundred million dollars) for the military bases at both Clark and Subic.

With economic conditions in the country deteriorating, opposition to the Marcos administration grew.⁵ In 1969, on the idea that the true liberation of the oppressed is brought about by means only of armed struggle, the New People’s Army (NPA) was established.⁶ The situation came to a head on the night of August 21, 1971 when grenade explosions ripped through a crowd gathered at Plaza Miranda for a political exercise organized by the opposition Liberal Party, instantly killing eleven persons and injuring ninety. A social firestorm developed in its aftermath, providing Marcos with an excuse to mobilize against all troublemakers a police apparatus whose powers he had vastly enhanced through his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.⁷ On September 21, 1972, immediately following the stage-managed “ambush” of Juan Ponce Enrile, his Defense Secretary, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1091, establishing Martial Law.⁸ Thereupon he ordered the arrest of all potential opponents to his Martial law designs — Senators, Congressmen, university professors, journalists, student and labor activists. He imposed an information blackout and issued a ban on all foreign travel, effectively sequestering the country from the rest of the world.⁹ To enable his government to deal with a broad range of dissident actions, he issued Presidential Decree No. 90, which criminalized “rumor mongering.” He ordered the suspension of classes on all levels, and closed schools. He imposed a ban on labor-related strikes and political rallies. By means of Preventive Detention Action (PDA), he authorized the military, in the absence of formal charges,

⁵ Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, p. 25.
⁶ Ibid., p. 29.
⁷ Ibid., p. 30. When a legal challenge was brought up against his action, the Supreme Court threw it out — a development that took no one by surprise as nine out of its twelve Justices owed their positions to him.
⁸ Ibid., p. 31.
⁹ Ibid., p. 40.
to take into custody anyone who they might suspect of involvement in activities hostile to the government. The "forced disappearances" of the enemies of the regime, in tandem with their extra-judicial execution, (colloquially termed, "salvagings"), became matter of course. In the countryside, under the rubric of "strategic hamleting" or "clustering," the populations of entire villages were forcibly resettled, to obviate their deployment by the NPA in support of its activities.

The workhorse of this flurry of activity was, of course, a military establishment that as Commander-in-Chief Marcos controlled, and a police network total control of which, in the years leading up to 1972, he had wrested away from mayors and provincial governors. With training assistance from the American C. I. A., the F. B. I., the Border Patrol, he had equipped them as well with the know-how for the establishment of a military-police state. With the military squarely behind him, Marcos proceeded to undo the nation's democratic institutions. Among his key targets was the judiciary. Letter of Instruction No. 11 put him and his agents beyond any possibility of judicial review or inquiry. A provision in the 1973 Constitution, tailor-made for the purpose, specified that none of his appointments to the judiciary (extending from local courts to the Supreme Court) was subject to judicial review, and the 1983 Judiciary Reform Act, in abolishing the entire court system (with the exception of the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals), handed him a carte blanche in populating the reconstituted judiciary from top to bottom with his own partisans. By its own inaction, the judiciary abdicated every last ounce of its former authority. Indeed, to its own undoing, throughout the period of Martial Law, the Supreme Court

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11 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
12 Ibid., p. 32.
13 The Marcos Dynasty, p. 204.
14 Ibid., p. 206.
15 The Marcos Dynasty, pp. 208-209.
16 Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, p. 82.
17 Ibid., p. 84.
granted Marcos a whole string of judicial concessions, notably, (1) its ruling upholding the legitimacy of the suspension of the *writ of habeas corpus*; (2) its ruling upholding the President’s authority to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the 1973 Constitution; (3) its ruling upholding the validity of the 1973 Constitution; (4) the constitutionality of Martial Law; (5) its ruling upholding the constitutionality of the referendum; (6) its ruling upholding the legitimacy of the creation and jurisdiction of the military tribunals; (7) its ruling upholding the authority of the President to propose amendments to the Constitution; (8) its ruling upholding the legitimacy of the Judiciary Reorganization Act; (9) its ruling upholding the authority of the President to continue the exercise of his legislative power beyond the official termination of Martial Law.\(^\text{18}\)

A second key target was the Philippine legislature, which ceased to exist following the symbolic padlocking by Martial Law operatives of the Senate building.\(^\text{19}\) Marcos wielded full and exclusive legislative and executive powers in its place, through his issuance of presidential decrees, general orders, letters of instruction (all of which immediately passed into the body of the law of the land, retaining their validity even in the post-Martial law period\(^\text{20}\)). Legislative power, theoretically, should have passed into the Interim Batasan Pambansa (IBP), when it was convened in 1978, but since the law creating it had provided it with no fixed term, forcing it to depend for its existence on the say-so of Marcos, whose previous and present enactments it had the authority neither to review nor to veto, far from exercising full and exclusive legislative power, it served merely to rubber stamp Marcos’ political and administrative agenda and provide a veneer of legitimacy to his authoritarian rule. A third key target were the political parties, the abolition of which he decreed upon the declaration of Martial Law.\(^\text{21}\) The quasi-revival of the multi-party system in 1978 did little to change matters, since it served mainly to cater to Marcos’ sensitivity to world opinion.\(^\text{22}\) Figures identified with the political opposition (unless they had managed to flee overseas), were seized and placed in detention.

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\(^{19}\) *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines*, p. 84.


Stripped of any ability to put up a challenge to Marcos' rule in and through the courts and the legislature, the various components of the opposition, hobbled by conditions of fracture amongst themselves, had to resort to secret meetings, and the clandestine reproduction and circulation of its political manifestos. As the opposition groped for unity amongst themselves, support for Marcos grew. Martial Law presided as well over the transmogrification of the Philippine press, from being the "freest in the world," into a servile instrument of Marcos' propaganda. Long-running national newspapers such as *The Manila Times* and the *Philippines Free Press* ceased to publish. Not even the powerful Catholic Church was spared. Following his issuance of a pastoral letter amounting to a plea for honest and fair elections in 1978, for example, Jaime Cardinal Sin, the Archbishop of Manila, was banned from foreign travel. On the economic front, as a consequence of its hostile takeover of the businesses of Martial Law's political opponents, its preferential treatment of Marcos' oligarchic allies in terms of the grant to them of government tax exemptions and loan guarantees, and of monopolies in key industries, the Martial Law government, in 1985, was financing and operating an astounding 303 public corporations (in contradistinction to 65 in 1970). Quite the reverse of promoting the efficient and equitable use of the nation's resources, Marcos' nationalization of these industries, had little positive effect on the economy beyond the enrichment of his friends. Arguably, however, the most significant element in Marcos' strategy to establish and maintain his hold on power was his expansion of the civilian bureaucracy, which he accomplished by means of a twofold strategy: lower down in the government apparatus, under the rubric of regionalization and decentralization, he moved government closer to the people; higher up, he concentrated power and decision making in himself.

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23 *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines*, p. 85.
27 *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines*, p. 91.
29 *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines*, p. 86.
Unhampered by the courts, unfazed by a weak and fragmented opposition, and confident of the obsequious and subservient support of the members of his own political party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (whose only ideology was that of loyalty to him),\textsuperscript{30} of the military establishment, of the government bureaucracy, of members of the business sector who were benefiting directly from his patronage, and of an assortment of figures across the political spectrum, Marcos succeeded created a police state over which he presided as the supreme authority.\textsuperscript{31} It was important to him, however, to establish the legal basis for such an accumulation of power, in order to lower the political costs of Martial Law. Even before he had imposed Martial Law, he had sought from the Constitutional Convention, which then had been in session, an amendment to the constitutional ban on a third presidential term for him. It was when he failed to get it that he imposed Martial Law. With Martial Law and the threat of detention hanging over their heads, the Constitutional Convention delegates worked quickly to deliver to Marcos the Constitution he wanted, which extended his term indefinitely, granted to him the authority to appoint and remove local government officials at will, and provided for a “rubber-stamp” parliament, the Batasang Pambansa (which, as soon as it was convened, invested Marcos with the powers of both President and Prime Minister).\textsuperscript{32} An astonishing 95% of the electorate — through the overt manipulation of the ratification process — came out in favor of the 1973 Constitution. A number of years into Martial Law, he substituted for the term, “Martial Law,” the better-sounding term, “constitutional authoritarianism.”\textsuperscript{33} Following the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. Presidency, and the Pope Paul VI’s visit to the Philippines, which brought his government under powerful international scrutiny, Marcos announced on January 17, 1981, that he was “lifting” Martial Law, and putting in its place the “New Republic.” His left hand very quickly took back what his right hand had just given, for all Martial Law decrees, orders, and powers were stipulated to remain intact. There was nothing under the new

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 76.
\textsuperscript{31} The Marcos Dynasty, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{33} Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, p. 43.
dispensation to stop Marcos from continuing to throw his political opponents into prison. By means of the so-called 1981 amendments to the Constitution, he had merely transferred to the President the functions of the Head of State, the Chief Executive of the Republic, and control over all the ministries. \textsuperscript{34} Presidential elections were scheduled for June 1981. Mounting a campaign of civil disobedience, the opposition urged voters to stay away from the polls, since a fair and honest contest was unlikely anyway. Voter turnout was nevertheless high—the government had issued a warning that the failure to participate in the process would elicit stiff fines and prison sentences. Predictably, Marcos received an overwhelming number of votes for the position of President of the Philippines. His “election” to the presidency, and the convening of the Interim Batasan Pambansa, made it appear that the Philippines had returned to being a participatory democracy. \textsuperscript{35} Under the impact of the repression of citizens’ civil and political rights, \textsuperscript{36} the horrors perpetrated by an abusive military, the maltreatment of political detainees, and the dearth of opportunities for true popular participation in public processes, opposition to his rule, nevertheless, grew. On August 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., on his return home following three years of exile in the United States, was felled by rifle fire on the tarmac at the Manila International Airport. Aquino’s assassination triggered massive public protests that grew in intensity over the nearly three years in which they took place. This social unrest came to a head in 1985, with the economy in shambles and the people fully cognizant of the fact that the government had long before ceased to serve its interests. The political opposition at the Batasang Pambansa filed an impeachment resolution against Marcos which, while it was swiftly met with the predictable counter-resolution from his in-house partisans, left Marcos scrambling for a more decisive legitimation of his rule. He advanced the presidential elections to January 1986, to show the world that he still enjoyed the unstinting support of his people. It was apparent to most observers that the opposition’s standard bearers, Corazon C. Aquino, and her running mate, Salvador Laurel, won that election,

\textsuperscript{34} “The Succession Issue,” p. 9. 
\textsuperscript{35} Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, p. 75. 
\textsuperscript{36} Politics of Plunder, p. 27.
but since Marcos controlled both the balloting and tally processes, they lost out to Marcos in the end. Aquino, however, would not concede the election to Marcos, precipitating truly massive public protest actions, culminating in the defection to her side of a vital group among Marcos' supporters within the military, and the February, 1986 People Power Revolution.\textsuperscript{37} Amazingly, in the span of three short days (Feb. 22-25), Marcos was toppled from power. A new government was installed. The Marcos regime had been crushed beyond any possibility of retrieval. It was a revolution the likes of which had never been seen before.\textsuperscript{38} In the course of three days and four nights, hundreds of thousands of people had flocked to EDSA to pray, chant, cheer, and turn back armored vehicles and truckloads of Marcos troops simply by staying put, offering enemy soldiers food and flowers. A basic tenet of our Constitution is that sovereignty resides and all governmental authority emanates from the people. The revolution was a valid act of a sovereign people against Marcos.\textsuperscript{39} It was an act of solidarity; an expression of the co-joining wills and desires of a nation in turmoil. Fr. Pacifico Ortiz, S. J., President, at the time, of the Ateneo de Manila University, notes:

The growing fears, the dying hopes, the perished longings and expectations of a people who have lost their political innocence; a people who now know that salvation, political or economic, does not come from above, from any one man or party or foreign ally; that in the last analysis, salvation can only come from below — from the people themselves, firmly united ... to stand for their rights whether at the polls, in the market place or at the barricades.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{A Take On the Foregoing From Michel Foucault}

But why did it take such an excruciatingly long time for the People Power Revolution to come about? Michel Foucault provides us with a way into that question, in his description of the working of power

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{39} "The Succession Issue;" pp. 76-77.
\textsuperscript{40} The Marcos Dynasty, p. 220.
relations within society. Whenever the discussion shifts to power, he notes, people assume that what is meant is a political structure, a government, a dominant social class, relations between master and slave. Power is understood in that sense to be exercised from a determinate central point, meting out punishment in such a manner as to bring to public display the "imbalance or excess" of the sovereign's ability to beat down upon the body of his adversary in order to master it. Foucault rejects this juridical, sovereign-subject construction of power as unworkable. It engenders, among other things, an emotion of disquietude, even a spirit of revolt — to tell from the fact that a multitude gathered to witness a public execution more often than not is moved to take the part of the condemned, assigning to him a status of heroic proportions. This happens because the spectacle of public punishment introduces a whole aspect of the carnival in which rules are inverted and authority mocked. So quite the reverse of bringing the operations of royal power to overpowering visibility, the sovereign-subject arrangement of power relations sparks a loathing for such power and provides its enemies with compelling public opportunities to mock or curse the power that is attempting to break them. Indeed, rituals of public execution provide the space for an onslaught of linguistic lawlessness whose main function, according to Foucault, is to provide the means for the release of furiously pent-up emotions.\textsuperscript{41} The theater of terror inadvertently introduces into society the hand-to-hand contest between the vengeance of the prince and the contained anger of the people.\textsuperscript{42} What is more, power exercised in this manner is poor in resources, occasional, and non-pervasive. As violent as the expiatory rituals of sovereign power might appear to be, the intermittence of its exercise creates the space and atmosphere for the emergence and growth of collective identities and solidarities opposed to the sovereign project of a monopolizing power.\textsuperscript{43} In short, a negating and censoring power is dangerous as it does not work well. It leaves individuals in the shade, and leaves them as such to circulate

\textsuperscript{41} Frank Lentricchia, \textit{Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, Wallace Stevens}, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 44.

\textsuperscript{42} As much as its perpetrators might have carried out the 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino with the intention of quelling rebellion, it rocked the nation instead, instigating people by the hundreds of thousands to take a stand against Marcos rule.

\textsuperscript{43} "Notes on Michel Foucault," p. 4.
freely, hidden from the gaze that controls.⁴⁴ On the other hand, power, as it operates today, remains for the most part hidden, within the micro-theaters of discipline and surveillance located everywhere in society. Insofar as it is the open-ended product of strategic conflicts between subjects at the local and capillary levels of society, it also is fragile.⁴⁵ In *Discipline and Punishment*, Foucault traces the development of this power in his account of reforms introduced into the prison system with a view, not so much to establish a new right to punish based on equitable principles, as to set up a new economy of power that, by means of time-tables, minute regulations, technologies for the discipline of the body (e.g. the sitting posture of school children, the routine movements of an assembly-line worker, the marching step of soldiers, the regimented actions of prisoners), would operate in a continuous way everywhere, all the way down to the finest grains of the social body.⁴⁶

This shift of power to its manifesting presence in a political anatomy of detail encompassing individual movements and gestures, is characterized by Foucault in terms of the architectural strategies of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. The Panopticon envisioned by Bentham was a circular disposition of cells, each with two windows, one facing the world outside, the other facing a surveillance tower, where light streaming in from the outside would silhouette whatever figure happened to be in his cell and subject him to “compulsory visibility.”⁴⁷ The panoptic schema not only made the apparatus of power more intense at the same time that it guaranteed its economy,⁴⁸ it underwrote as well a crucially important shift in the operation of power allowing it to work automatically and invisibly.⁴⁹ It was a powerful evocation of the spectacle of subjugated, individuated individuals positioned before the eye of a now invisible power. This omniscient surveillance is the best-known feature of the Panopticon.

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⁴⁴ *Ariel and the Police*, p. 77.
⁴⁵ "Notes on Michel Foucault," p. 1.
⁴⁹ *Discipline and Punish*, p. 203.
Though the individual is not under observation twenty-four hours a day, the structure is designed in such a way as to make it impossible for the prisoner to tell.\textsuperscript{50} Hence, the realization of Bentham's requirement of power: it should be visible and unverifiable.\textsuperscript{51} Bentham had hoped to engender a society where power would be imposed, no longer by the personal presence and brute force of a caste of nobles, but by the rituals of a normalizing power, both dissociated from particular people and allowed to swarm, invisible and anonymous, throughout society. In panopticism's dissociation of power from particular people, and in its investment of power in a surveillance that is permanent in its effects, even if discontinuous in its action, lay the genesis of the celebrated individualism and heightened self-consciousness, the hallmark of modern times.

At the same time that panopticism opened up possibilities for involving the human body directly in the political field, by permitting power relations to have an immediate hold upon it, to invest it, to mark it,\textsuperscript{52} it provided the means for its constitution into an "object of possible knowledge."\textsuperscript{53} The human body that panopticism had enclosed in spaces marked off from the rest of the world became the specific point at which the micro-strategies of power could begin to be observed,\textsuperscript{54} and constituted into the knowable object of an "apparatus of knowledge."\textsuperscript{55} This power-knowledge relationship was an important one. It underscored the fact that power and knowledge directly imply each other. There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.\textsuperscript{56} There is no outside, no confused hell into which the inassimilable may be cast. The delinquent, as such, is never outside the law, but is, from the outset, at its very heart.\textsuperscript{57} The delinquent serves as an anchor-point

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Discipline and Punish}, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Discipline and Punish}, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Foucault: A Critical Introduction}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Discipline and Punish}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Foucault: A Critical Introduction}, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Discipline and Punish}, p. 301.
for the use of power; it is his presence alongside of "law-abiding" citizens that authorizes the general policing and surveillance of the population. Indeed, normalizing society harnesses delinquency to its larger disciplinary project, by drawing police-informers from the class of delinquents, an army of spies that can be coerced into serving as the eyes and ears of policing agencies. It mobilizes delinquency into becoming the margin that writes the center. There is, therefore, with reference to the panoptical structure no single source: whether King, President, Prime Minister, or Congress. The Panopticon, in that sense, loosens the hold upon us of the "great man of history theory." As much as Marcos might have sought to parlay the impression that he had consolidated power into his own hands, in point of fact, when power is at work, it cannot be shunted into a particular system, circuit, or path. As it moves invisibly but effectively through progressively finer channels, through individuals, their bodies, gestures, practices of everyday life, neither politics, law or economy is ever able to fully account for it. Foucault further argues that, by means of finely tuned techniques that enclose, partition, separate, and distribute human bodies, that homogenize physical activity, that install permanent and intense forms of surveillance, panopticism brings its targets to clear visibility. It is, however, a visibility that plays itself out in terms, not of fixed positions, but of distributions and circulation in a network of relations.

Each individual has his own place; and each place its own individual. Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration.

The panoptical apparatus, in this way, is in a position to create useful spaces, to establish presences and absences, to determine where

58 Ibid., p. 111.
59 "Notes on Michel Foucault," pp. 9-10.
60 Foucault: A Critical Introduction, p. 93.
61 Ariel and the Police, p. 75.
62 Discipline and Punish, p. 146.
63 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess, to judge it, to calculate his qualities or merits. One can read this back into the forced relocation (hamleting) of villagers during the Marcos regime to obviate the possibility of the villages becoming sites of guerilla support. Specific combinations of individuals were created through these practices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to ensure the elimination of any politically detrimental coagulation of individuals. The condition of permanent visibility involves a condition constant assessment or judgment; it means control through normalization. This control is effective because it is relatively invisible. Indeed, this aspect of control is a very important element of Foucault's understanding of power. Control in modern societies is achieved not through direct repression but through strategies of normalization. The panoptical apparatus creates individuals who conform to certain standards of sanity, health, docility, competence, and so on. "Normal" is neither more nor less than the social forms of life within the dominant discourses that power creates. This process of normalization defines for us the way we are supposed to be. It is seen not as a product of power's operation but as the true measurement of the way the world is. Furthermore, normalization operates as the principle that enunciates the extent of deviation, and in enunciating, provides both a directive for reducing the deviation and sustaining it. In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity, but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another. The judges of normality, in the figures of the social worker, the teacher, the doctor, are everywhere assessing and diagnosing each individual according to a normalizing set of assumptions. Discipline cannot tolerate gaps. It cannot produce standardization in schools, hospitals, and factories

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64 Ibid., p. 143.
65 Foucault: A Critical Introduction, p. 94.
66 Ibid., p. 97.
68 Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, p. 102.
69 Discipline and Punish, p. 184.
unless it first produces the norm through which differences can be recognized, evaluated, and reduced. The purpose of the Panopticon is not only to secure a separation of the abnormal from the normal, but to dissipate abnormality at the same that it distributes normalcy. The mechanics of normalization are relatively simple to comprehend. The slightest departure from correct behavior is subjected to punishment and under such threat, each subject finds himself caught in a punishable, punishing universality. That it to say, each subject finds himself under pressure to conform. Subjects are shaped through the coercion of disciplinary power, but remain unaware of the shaping. Indeed, panopticism has less to do with forcing people to do what the sovereign wanted and more to do with steering them in the desired direction without coercion. The analysis of power as institutionalized in state structures or elite groups, therefore, is rejected by Foucault. He focuses instead on the "regimes of truth" which operate power directly upon the body.

Another matter of note in relation to the disciplinary society is the indispensable function within it of mechanisms of surveillance. Hierarchized, continuous, and functional surveillance is organized as multiple, automatic, and anonymous power. This enables disciplinary power to be absolutely discreet at the same time that it stays alert. With surveillance becoming continuous and intense, the physics of power, its hold upon the body, takes the form, not of the recourse to excessive force or violence, but of activity undertaken under the impact of the laws of optics and mechanics. This accounts for the lightness and speed with which power takes hold of the body, depriving subjects, once shaped, of any incentive for resistance or revolt. The technical expression of a will to normalize is the examination, which combines the ceremony of power with the form of the experiment, the deployment of force with the establishment of

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70 Ariel and the Police, p. 76.
71 Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, p. 105.
72 Discipline and Punish, p. 178.
73 Foucault's Discipline, p. 29.
75 Discipline and Punish, p. 177.
76 "Power Goes to School."
77 Ariel and the Police, p. 76.
truth. Through the examination, those attributes deemed by power important enough for it to order and manage, are reduced to a form that can be computed and averaged, and in that way, deployed. The more extensive and finer-grained the knowledge of individuals produced by the examination is, the more continuous and pervasive a control of individuals is it able to foster which in turn offers further possibilities for more intrusive inquiry and disclosure. The examination constructs individuality by means of a documentation that casts the individual as an effect and object of power and knowledge. In this new regime of power, the least powerful become the most visible and individualized members of society. This is in contrast to the regimes such as those of feudal Europe where only kings and nobles were in a position to assert and establish their individuality. With the gradual establishment of the examination as the central mechanism of control, it was not the noble but the abnormal, not distinction but deviation, that came to be documented and displayed.

Under the impact of panopticism, with its principal functions of surveillance, normalization, and examination, governments came to understand that they were not dealing simply with subjects, a view that was predominant in the sovereignty structure, but with a population that could be known, brought under control, cared for, made to flourish. At this juncture, the State’s interest in the life of the population, bio-power, came to the fore. Bio-power recast the population as an object of measurement and comparative study. At the same time that it deployed the human body as a machine, extracting from it efficiency, productivity, and economy of movement, it brought its sights to bear upon the biological processes of the collective social body through strategies for increasing life expectancy, birthrate, levels of health, and the like. Foucault characterizes bio-power as coalesced around two poles:

One of those poles centered on the body as a machine, its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an

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78 *Discipline and Punish*, p. 184.
79 “Notes on Michel Foucault,” p. 17.
anatomo-politics of the human body. The second focused on the species body: a biopolitics of the population.\textsuperscript{80}

The production of individuals through disciplinary mechanisms and the management of populations through the art of government underwrite a conception of power that is formidable, in that there is no outside to it, being present everywhere, but hardly monolithic or impervious to critical interrogation.\textsuperscript{81} Indeed, in Foucault's description of it, it is never finally localized, never finally in anybody's hands, never finally appropriated as a commodity or a piece of wealth. Individuals are thus always in the position of simultaneously undergoing an exercising this power.\textsuperscript{82} So while the system of power might be pyramidal in form, its apex or summit is neither the source nor the principle from which all power derives.\textsuperscript{83} Indeed, it is the apparatus as a whole that produces power and distributes individuals throughout the social field. This insight provides us with a motive for studying power historically, in terms of "ascent" rather than of "descent," and for identifying those agencies truly responsible for making it economically and politically useful. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault studies punishment as a social phenomenon that cannot be taken into account by means of the juridical structure of society alone.\textsuperscript{84} Power, in his view, must not be confused with law. It must not be seen as prohibition, as something negative, for it is a productive network which runs through the whole social body. Although the universal juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate, on the underside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforces, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law.\textsuperscript{85} Nonetheless, Foucault does not dismiss legality. While discipline is not an extension of the juridico-political structures of society, neither is it independent of it, since the system of rights is supported by the

\textsuperscript{80} "Notes on Michel Foucault," p. 18.
\textsuperscript{81} Foucault's Discipline, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{82} Foucault: A Critical Introduction, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{83} "Power/Knowledge, Society and Truth."
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 223.
micro-powers of discipline. The law in a way follows discipline. Law, in this sense, is secondary; it sustains and legitimates as a type of discourse, what technologies of power have already been established. However, one must remember that although disciplines are the bearers of a discourse, this cannot be a discourse of right. In other words, the discourse of discipline has nothing in common with that of law, rule or sovereign will. The code that they come to define is not that of law but that of normalization. 86 During the Marcos years, a host of authors sought to explain the rationale for the EDSA revolution in these broad terms:

The Constitution in Article II, Section 1, says that: The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The Constitution then is a social compact between and among the people themselves severally; it is likewise a solemn covenant between the people collectively as one party and the government as the other party. 87

Perhaps the primary confusion that liberalism introduces into our effort to understand human social arrangements, derives from its focus on consent as the privileged site of political and social legitimacy. But for Foucault, a theory that traces rights back to the consent of individuals and societies has its efficacy undermined by forces of power that work below the level of such surface phenomena. 88 Disciplinary power is dispersed and operates in a realm that is not, by its nature, consensual. Rights do not provide a defense against disciplinary power. Rights are not bad. It is just that they produce a false sense of security, allowing a powerful force to go undetected an unopposed. 89

Be that as it may, Marcos was, to some extent, traversing the correct path with his excessive concern for the legitimization of his regime as manifested through his pushing of the 1973 Constitution with the amendments relating to his power and authority as President. He utilized the law to legitimize his pernicious deeds. He was correct in his estimation that law when enacted, legitimizes a type of discourse

86 "Power/Knowledge, Society and Truth."
87 A People's Revolution of Our Time, p. 76.
88 Foucault's Discipline, p. 158.
89 Ibid., p. 159.
and sustains a certain technology of power, especially to those who have not yet achieved the critical frame of mind to see through the encompassing effect of power's normalization. All the Constitutions drafted throughout the world since the French Revolution, the Codes written and revised, and a whole continual and clamorous legislative activity: these were the forms that made an essentially normalizing power acceptable. Nonetheless, Foucault gives us an explanation of this strategy's inevitable folly. Although law operates more as a norm and indeed normalizes in the sense that a judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses, discipline — that machinery of power — has its discourse on normalization and not law per se. It would be a mistake to confuse one for the other. Law is merely secondary in that it follows technologies of power that already exist. Though it may provide the delusion of legitimization and may serve as a tool of political power, true power cannot be equated with the law. The law is the servant of power. The effects of power come from something else than the decree of law. Specifically, it is derived from the relations within the social body, the vehicles of power itself.

As for the police, Foucault gives his own account of the increasingly prominent role it plays in society. With the spread of discipline, the police became the police of the entire society. Everything that happened had to be checked with "thousands of eyes posted everywhere, mobile attentions ever on the alert." Police power must bear over everything: it is not however the totality of the State nor of the kingdom as the visible and invisible body of the monarch; it is the dust of events, actions, behavior, opinions — everything that happens; the police are concerned with those things of every moment, those unimportant things. Marcos' strategy consisted in the creation of a police state. The art of surveillance and observation, leading to the individualizing effect of power — these he understood well. He even had an inkling of the panoptical society and the crucial part of discipline in the fruition of pervasive power. Marcos knew that to transport this to the greater part of society, he had to find an institution capable of showcasing the

90 Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, p. 130.
91 "Power/Knowledge, Society and Truth."
92 Discipline and Punish, p. 213.
type of discipline needed to sustain his dictatorship. He found this in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century, but there was also a military dream of society. Its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine; not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercion; not to fundamental rights but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility.\textsuperscript{93} To elaborate on the strategy, Foucault tells us that the program of power of the Panopticon is transportable or applicable to other social contexts. Hence, by increasing the prominence and the role of the military in the everyday life of the Filipino from policing the population to performing administrative and judicial functions, an entire panoptic network with the efficiency by which power operated in the military could be expected. Although this was the logical conclusion, it will be shown later in this paper that Marcos left out much of the important details from his estimation. The result was that his application of the military discipline did not bring out the precise effect intended. Marcos grafted the local police to the military. Since the military was at his command, then the police were likewise an institution that came under his disposal. In his creation of the police state, he realized the crucial role of the police in the control of the population. More than mere brute force, the police united the king’s powers and the lowest levels of power in all of society. The police was instrumental in generalizing discipline throughout society. The operation of the police, according to the author Von Justi, presents a grid through which the State, territory, resources, population, and towns, can be observed. It is at once an art of government and a method for the analysis of a population living on a territory.\textsuperscript{94}

We mentioned above that power is never finally localized, never finally in anybody’s hands, and that individuals are thus always in the position of simultaneously undergoing an exercising this power. The discursive formations that transmit and produce power relations are

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 169.

always reversible. There is always a resistance which can be put up to power. Repression and resistance are not ontologically distinct; rather repression produces its own resistance. There are no relations of power without resistances (though this is not to equate repression with power relations). The network of surveillance established through discipline, this social circuitry of illegalities and delinquencies, is responsible for the emergence of new resistances even as it renders older ones obsolete. What does not become obsolete is the freedom that is generated through resistance to order, the transgressive impulse that comes into play through the very establishment of limits. Though the normalized body is a coerced body, it is also a body that is placed into a temporal frame that demands that one imagine oneself as a free subject of a particular kind. The "free subject's" resistance to power, however, must be played in the same court as the power that dominates. The field of the operation of power is the same battlefield that provides for its resistance. One escapes from a domination of normalized truth not by playing a game that is totally different from the game of truth but by playing the same game differently or by playing another hand. For Foucault, asking the way out of the maze (or the game) is the wrong way to think about opposition. Individuals are not only the effects of power but are also its vehicles. Being part of the power mechanism of the disciplines, they are in the best position to challenge it. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political or military means, one is faced with a state of domination. Thus, liberation (such as the 1986 EDSA revolution) is the political or historical condition for a practice of freedom. Freedom, in turn, is the condition for a practice of power. Liberation paves the way for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of freedom.

95 Foucault: A Critical Introduction, p. 98.
96 Ibid., p. 101.
97 Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, p. 114.
98 Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, p. 102.
100 Foucault's Discipline, p. 35.
101 Ibid., p. 36.
102 Michel Foucault: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, p. 283.
course, this is not to imply that resistance is impossible in every state of domination. These states do exist in the world today. In these cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom. What is crucial in these cases is to be able to discern where resistance will develop whether it be in the form of a strike, a revolution or parliamentary opposition.\textsuperscript{103} As long as there is room for even the minutest freedom, there is the capacity for resistance. It is this very introduction of the categories of freedom and autonomy which brings us back to the original insight that the social realm is permeated with power relations that are enabling, unstable, and reversible.\textsuperscript{104}

Power, as such, can no longer be understood to operate in a unidirectional fashion. It operates, rather, along the lines of an "antagonistic struggle" that takes place between free individuals.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, the fight against power can no longer be conceived in terms of the fight against State, capital or law. The criticism and resistance of power should be local, presenting a multiplicity of genealogical researches.\textsuperscript{106} In this process of localized struggles, the intellectual only provides instruments of analysis: the fighters have to do their own fighting. The philosopher can only give a survey of the battlefield. Power cannot be analyzed by focusing exclusively on legitimate and institutionalized centers of power such as State apparatuses. This can only lead to an oversimplified and functionalist understanding of power.\textsuperscript{107} Power is not localized in the State apparatus and nothing will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below, and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed.\textsuperscript{108} This is why Foucault criticizes the myth of the Revolution which focuses on the State as the absolutely essential target to be attacked and taken over. This narrow focus on the summit of political power in society derives from the view that only a complete revamping of economic and political

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., pp. 292-293.
\textsuperscript{104} Foucault: A Critical Introduction, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 85.
\textsuperscript{106} "Power/Knowledge, Society and Truth."
\textsuperscript{107} Foucault: A Critical Introduction, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{108} "Power/Knowledge, Society and Truth."
conditions can improve humanity's situation. But because not everything is run from central headquarters, because local circuits of power-knowledge have their own rationality, their own means and ends, local struggles do not have to wait for revolutions in the broader structure in order to be meaningful, actual agents of change. The fact that the whole system is not changed does not mean that none of the parts can change. The results of local struggles, actions, or movements can have significant effects precisely because broader structures are built up on the basis of these local centers. Thus, although Foucault is against the idea that only a Revolution can make a difference, we would do well to quote Kant, who by his writing demonstrates the non-concentration of power in any entity but in the whole of society:

It was the way in which the Revolution provided a spectacle, the way it was welcomed all around by spectators who did not take part in it, but who observed, attended it, and for better or worse, were carried away by it...what is important in the Revolution is not the Revolution itself, but what takes place in the heads of the people. Thus, the ... revolutions were ideal: swarming masses of people swamping one police state after another with the overwhelming power of their moral demands. Violence was kept to a minimum.

In his rejection of the myth of Revolution, Foucault clearly displays his preference for a local approach to change over a global one. It is in the local arena that new forms of power are invented, applied, and revised; it is also there that one ought to be able to locate the genesis of resistance. Foucault recognizes, nevertheless, the risk that these local struggles will not develop for lack of a global strategy or outside support. Therefore, he considers cooperation across local struggles crucial. This sums up the People Power Revolution — not the three-day affair which occurred in February 1986, but the sum of local struggles spanning a decade on the part of subjects grown weary with the Marcos regime. An analogy can be drawn to the fact that if prisons and punitive mechanisms are ever to undergo a transformation, it will not be because a plan of reform has found its way into the heads

109 Foucault's Discipline, p. 60.
110 Ibid., p. 113.
111 Ibid., p. 103.
112 Ibid., p. 149.
and hearts of social workers in the prison system, but rather because the sum of the people who are implicated in its apparatuses have started to collide into one another, to run into dead-ends, problems, and impossibilities. What galvanized the Filipino people to engage in practices of resistances to the Marcos regime were the twin stimuli of despair and conflict raging within his daily existence. Though one found criticism aplenty during the early years of Marcos rule, it took the impending ruin of the country to stir the common man to revolt. Only when inflation, unemployment, graft and corruption started to bear down heavily upon people in their everyday lives did resistances develop that bore the possibility of attaining tangible results. Once again, let it be emphasized that power is not a piece of property but a set of strategies; its effects of domination do not derive from “appropriations” but from dispositions. Consequently, its overthrow is not acquired once and for all by a new control of the apparatus or by a new functioning and/or destruction of the institution.\textsuperscript{113} Something more than this is required. Power’s overthrow requires the formation of new relations. The simple seizure of power by the working class or the simple investment of existing forms of power with new functions in each case leaves the forms themselves untouched.\textsuperscript{114} So if anyone asks how far we have progressed since Martial Law, and is brought to say, “not far,” the reason for it is that the overthrow of the Marcos regime required more than a superficial revolt. A mere changing of the guards may signify a political change of regime but it is doubtful if it effectively emasculates the underlying relations of power. On the other hand, because of our experience with Martial Law we have learned to hope in the fact that nothing can eliminate the possibility of that moment when life will no longer barter itself, when the powers can no longer do anything, and when, before the gallows and the machine guns, men revolt.\textsuperscript{115}