An Aristotelian Method for Contemporary Ethics: The Contribution of Martha Nussbaum

ARTHUR MADIGAN
BOSTON COLLEGE
U.S.A.

Martha Nussbaum’s *The Fragility of Goodness*¹ made a significant contribution to the field of ancient philosophical ethics. A particularly important and controversial part of that book was its articulation and defense of an Aristotelian conception of philosophical method and in particular of method in ethics.² In the thirteen years since the appearance of that book, Professor Nussbaum has addressed herself to a wide range of contemporary ethical, social, and political

¹ *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Hereafter, adverted to as FG.

issues. Given her increasing recognition as a public intellectual, it is opportune to revisit her discussion of philosophical method in Chapters 8 and 10 of that volume. The purpose of this essay, then, is to provide a context in which to understand Nussbaum’s more recent work in ethics and politics.

The method of appearances.

It may be helpful to preface Nussbaum’s account of Aristotelian philosophical and, especially, ethical method with a very different (and no doubt oversimplified) picture of Aristotle and his philosophical method. I call the Aristotele of this picture the old foundationalist Aristotle, because he thinks that ethical truths can be derived from certain first principles that serve as foundations. He believes in the power of intellect to grasp the first principles of logic and of the theoretical sciences of physics and of metaphysics. Notwithstanding Aristotle’s habit of starting his books with surveys of common and expert opinions and other preliminary and skippable dialectical chit-chat, it is these first principles that form the basis for the practical science of ethics. Nicomachean Ethics I, especially I 7, is the parade example: knowing from the general study of nature and of being that nature involves final causality, and knowing from the specialized study of nature that human beings are distinctive in their possession of reason, Aristotle concludes that the final causality of human beings involves the use of reason, and the activity which figures in the definition of happiness turns out to be the activity of reason. Likewise in NE I 13: given a certain distinction of parts of the soul, presumably established in psychology, there follows a distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues, which distinction in turn structures most of the rest of the NE. The question about the relative importance of reason as theoretical or contemplative and reason as practical or directive of conduct is settled, in NE VI 12-13 and X 7-8, in favor of the primacy of theoretical or contemplative reason. Of course, practical wisdom, the power to hit the mean, to make the right choices in the right circumstances, is terrifically important for good living; but it is not foundational to the science of ethics. The foundations of

---

3 A list of Professor Nussbaum’s principal publications in these areas appears at the end of this article.
ethics lie rather in the principles of logic, the metaphysical study of being, causation, form and matter, actuality and potentiality, and the physical study of nature as principle of movement and of the human species, with its distinctive substantial form, the human soul. If, in addition to these, epistemological foundations are desired, the old foundationalist also has them in stock: the human power to derive universals from experience of particulars, expounded in the Posterior Analytics and further grounded in the De Anima, and the confident realism of Metaphysics IV, in which Heraclitean scepticism and Protagorean relativism are refuted.

Resemblance between the old foundationalist Aristotle and Professor Nussbaum’s Aristotle is largely coincidental. To put the matter simply, the method of appearances followed by Nussbaum’s Aristotle appears to lack foundations. Protagoras is supposed to have held that the human being is the measure of all things, and that what seems true is true. By this standard, Nussbaum’s Aristotle is a Protagorean. That is, he is committed to a certain conception of philosophical method, and in particular of ethical method, explained in chapters 8 and 10 of The Fragility of Goodness, which may be called “saving the appearances.” “Appearances” is a broad term, taking in our experiences, and others’ reports of their experiences, and theories about the experiences. Simply put, the method is to accept the appearances, at least provisionally, and then to try to make sense of them, or to make more sense of them than they currently make, sometimes by broader collection of appearances, sometimes by a resolution of real or apparent inconsistencies between appearances, sometimes by sharper or more adequate formulation of theories. The method is anthropocentric, in the sense that it appeals to nothing not given in human experience, and it is Protagorean, accepting the human being as the measure of reality. It is not, however, anthropocentric or Protagorean in any individualist sense of those terms, for it consults not the experiences, theories, appearances of an isolated individual, but the experiences, theories, appearances of a group or community. Non-scientific deliberation (in effect, practical wisdom in action) is central not only to living but to ethical theory as well. The contrast with the old foundationalist Aristotle is clear.
But why would Aristotle work so hard simply to save “appearances”?

When Aristotle declares that his aim, in science and metaphysics as well as in ethics, is to save the appearances and their truth, he is not, then, saying something cozy and acceptable. Viewed against the background of Eleatic and Platonic philosophizing, these remarks have, instead, a defiant look. Aristotle is promising to rehabilitate the discredited measure or standard of tragic and Protagorean anthropocentrism. He promises to do his philosophical work in a place from which Plato and Parmenides had spent their careers contriving an exit. (FG, 242-43)

Can a method of “saving the appearances” ever be sure of making contact with a reality beyond or beneath or above those appearances?

Aristotelian reason is not so much in bonds, cut off from something that we can, nonetheless, describe or point to, as it is committed to something, to language and thought and the limits of these. Appearances and truth are not opposed, as Plato believed they were. We can have truth only inside the circle of appearances, because only there can we communicate, even refer, at all. (FG, 257)

To win through the appearances to a reality beyond is but a futile Platonic dream, and it is Aristotle’s merit to have seen its futility.

The Platonist has charged the Aristotelian with philosophical laziness. We might now answer this charge in Aristotle’s behalf by saying to him that his kind of hard work, struggling for an unconditional vantage point outside the appearances, is both futile and destructive: futile, because such a vantage point is unavailable, as such, to human inquiry; destructive, because the glory of the promised goal makes the humanly possible work look boring and cheap. We could be pursuing the study of ourselves and our world in ethics, politics, biology, physical science. (FG, 258)

The Platonic project of getting beyond appearance to reality had a certain rationale: to make human life make sense, to show that the good human life is in fact invulnerable to the changes and chances of the phenomenal world. But this risks denaturing the good human life.

But if it is a universal human desire to grasp the world and make it comprehensible to reason, then it seems clear that oversimplification and reduction will be deep and ever-present dangers. In
seeking to be at home, we may easily become strangers to our home as we experience it. In our anxiety to control and grasp the uncontrolled by technē, we may all too easily become distant from the lives that we originally wished to control. (FG, 260)

So long as we are dealing with our lives — and we have no others to deal with — we must remain within the ambit of the appearances.

The Platonic aspiration to an external "god's-eye" standpoint has already been criticized in our account of the method of appearances (Ch. 8). Aristotle has defended the view that the internal truth, truth in the appearances, is all we have to deal with; anything that purports to be more is actually less, or nothing. (FG, 291)

"What about the principle of non-contradiction? Surely that is an example of a rock-bottom absolute foundation." Not so! The principle is, so far as we know, one of the appearances, albeit a very deep appearance, one with which our whole system of appearances is bound up, and one which we would abandon only with the greatest reluctance and on pain of abandoning the whole system. Is that all there is to it? Not necessarily; but that is all that we, situated as we are, can make of it.

Aristotle does not, however, assert that there is nothing more to non-contradiction than paideia or our practices. He would say, I think, that we are not in a position to judge this; that this claim, like the skeptic's denial of the principle, asks us to stand outside language and life, and is therefore doomed to fail. No argument rules out that some god might be able to say more, or something different. All we can say, however, is that everything we do, say, and think rests on this principle. (FG, 254)

So what is left for us, bereft of the "god's-eye" standpoint? To deal with life's contingencies, or better, with life's opportunities, opportunities that are inseparable from fragility and vulnerability. And the way to deal with life is practical non-scientific deliberation.

Aristotle says two anti-Platonic things about practical deliberation. First, that it is not and cannot be scientific: 'That practical wisdom is not scientific understanding (epistêmê) is obvious' (EN 1142a23-4). Second, that the appropriate criterion of correct choice is a thoroughly human being, the person of practical wisdom. This person does not attempt to take up a stand outside of the condi-
tions of human life, but bases his or her judgment on long and
broad experience of these conditions. (FG, 290)

The epistemology of value and the account of the vulnerability of the
valuable things must go hand in hand (cf. FG, 291). It is perfectly rea-
sonable to ask about the shape of the good life. But the answers are not
to be sought from foundations supposed to be already established by
other sciences, as the old foundationalist Aristotle would have it.

Our question about the good life must, like any question what-
ever, be asked and answered within the appearances. (FG, 291)

But what about the specifically human? Of course, we consider what
is distinctive about human beings, what differentiates us from miner-
als, vegetables, and even from other animals. But this is not because an
analysis of human nature is expected to yield a list of duties, or a list of
guidelines for achieving happiness. The issue is framed not in terms of
nature but in terms of identity.

We begin an ethical treatise by looking at the characteristic func-
tioning of humans — both its shared and its distinctive elements
— because we want a life which includes whatever it is that makes
us us. (FG, 293)

The old foundationalist Aristotle sometimes talks as though an exami-
nation of our nature yielded not only a list of goods but also an ordered
hierarchy of goods, a ready-made set of priorities. Not so Nussbaum’s
Aristotle; for him the most important work remains to be done.

[Aristotle] argues that the values that are constitutive of a good
human life are plural and incommensurable; and that a percep-
tion of particular cases takes precedence, in ethical judgment, over
general rules and accounts. (FG, 294)

But if this is so, then general principles really tell us very little. Where,
then, do we obtain information? From experience, of our own judg-
ments and those of others.

Principles are perspicuous descriptive summaries of good judg-
ments, valid only to the extent to which they correctly describe such
judgments. They are normative only insofar as they transmit in
economical form the normative force of the good concrete deci-
sions of the wise person and because we wish for various reasons to be guided by that person's choices. We note that their very simplicity or economy will be, on this conception, a double-edged attribute: for while it may help the principle to perform certain pedagogical and steering functions, it will also be likely to make it less correct as a summary of numerous and complex choices. *(FG, 299)*

Talk about the superiority of experience to the principles, which are merely formulations or distillations of experience, may suggest to some an uncontrolled relativism or situationalism, in which the person is new every moment. We might think that we were faced with a choice: either accept the Platonic view that any genuine objective understanding of particulars depends on a grasp of universal criteria or principles, or fall into the subjectivism attributed to Heraclitus and Protagoras. But Nussbaum's Aristotle will not be bound by this dilemma.

What does experience contribute, if what practical wisdom must see is the idiosyncratic and the new? Here we must insist that Aristotelian practical wisdom is not a type of rootless situational perception that rejects all guidance from ongoing commitments and values. The person of practical wisdom is a person of good character, that is to say, a person who has internalized through early training certain ethical values and a certain conception of the good human life as the more or less harmonious pursuit of these. He or she will be concerned about friendship, justice, courage, moderation, generosity; his desires will be formed in accordance with these concerns; and he will derive from this internalized conception of value many ongoing guidelines for action, pointers as to what to look for in a particular situation. If there were no such guidelines and no such sense of being bound to a character, if the 'eye of the soul' saw each situation as simply new and non-repeatable, the perceptions of practical wisdom would begin to look arbitrary and empty. Aristotle insists that a person's character and value commitments are what that person is in and of himself; personal continuity requires a high degree, at least, of continuity in the general nature of these commitments. *(FG, 306)*

One last point about the method. The old foundationalist Aristotle knows well enough that ethical knowledge involves more than deduction from principles. He recognizes an intuitive knowledge of first principles, and an intuitive or directly perceptive grasp of particular situa-
tions. He also recognizes that moral knowledge can be, and in the best cases is, accompanied by appropriate feeling. None of this is in dispute. But Nussbaum's Aristotle goes a step further. He recognizes certain types of desire, of feeling, of passion, as necessary conditions for certain kinds of ethical knowledge.

The experienced person confronting a new situation does not attempt to face it with the intellect 'itself by itself.' He or she faces it, instead, with desires informed by deliberation and deliberations informed by desire, and responds to it appropriately in both passion and act. Frequently the perception of the salient features will be achieved in a way that relies centrally upon the discriminating power of passion. (FG, 308)

To play upon the Vulgate rendering of Isaiah 7:9: unless you feel, you shall not understand.

Some critical questions

As the purpose of this essay is to provide a context for Nussbaum's more recent ventures in ethics and politics, I will not attempt to evaluate Nussbaum's presentation of Aristotelian method from an historical or exegetical point of view. Instead I will raise three philosophical questions about the method of appearances. The first question is whether the method of appearances unduly limits the range of our ethical knowledge. The second question is how much help the method of appearances gives us in solving ethical disputes. The third question is how the set of appearances, or perhaps better, the set of participants in discussion, is constituted.

While Professor Nussbaum insists that the anthropocentrism of the method of appearances does not entail relativism (cf. FG, 242, second note), some philosophers may question whether the method of appearances provides a sufficiently solid foundation for ethical knowledge, whether in the end the method leaves too much "up in the air."

Could we ever, by the method of appearances, know a moral absolute, i.e., a moral principle that holds always and unconditionally? This is not Nussbaum's question, or (I think) Aristotle's, but asking it may help us to probe what the method of appearances can and cannot do. It is clear that we could never know a moral absolute by the method of appearances, for two reasons. First, a moral absolute claims to be
exceptionless. But the method of appearances supposes a back-and-forth relationship between formulations and experiences, with experiences holding the primacy; thus in principle any supposedly absolute formulation could be invalidated by an unforeseen case. Second, a moral absolute claims to bind unconditionally. But such an unconditional binding force would either have to be known in and for itself, or else derived from an unconditional principle or principles, known in and for itself or themselves; but that is precisely the kind of knowledge that the method seems to rule out. Such knowledge might be open to another species, but it is inaccessible to us humans. "Appearances," whether understood as summaries of experiences, collections of opinions, theories, or all three, would seem insufficient to yield knowledge of an unconditional obligation. And no set of relative or conditional obligations, assumed to be known, would add up to unconditional or absolute obligations.

The method of appearances does not, then, permit us to know any moral absolutes. Still, it remains an open question how close we could come, by the method of appearances, to knowing a moral absolute. And here the answer is, surprisingly close, or, at all events, closer than one might think. While the method of appearances has no room for knowledge of exceptionless moral principles, or at least for none with any degree of concreteness and specificity, it is quite open to the discovery of principles that hold for the most part, and "for the most part" need not be limited to the proverbial 50.1% of cases. There is no reason why the method of appearances should not yield principles that hold in all the cases that a given agent actually experiences. That would be a contingent matter, but contingency is not the same as randomness or arbitrariness. Take as a case the principle, "one should not torture innocent children." The method-of-appearances theorist would say, I think, that we do not have adequate evidence to claim that this is exceptionless, and that in principle a case might occur in which this principle would not hold. But the appearances theorist could go on to say that he or she did not envision such a case as likely to occur, and so saw no good reason why it should distract our attention from the kinds of cases that do regularly occur.

The method-of-appearances theorist might develop this point as follows. To insist that ethics has the task of establishing exceptionless principles is to legitimate an ethical discourse in which rare or even
hypothetical counterexamples bulk large, a discourse disproportionately devoted to arguments about the last 5%, or even the last 1%, of cases. It used to be an axiom among lawyers that hard cases make bad law. An analogous axiom holds in ethics. The method of appearances focuses ethical discourse on the actual case, the typical case, the genuinely likely case, rather than on the atypical or fanciful case. To those who would labor to pin down the exceptional 5% or the unforeseeable 1%, it says that this sort of control over our future is a Platonic chimera, a reaching after what is not to be had, a distraction from the pressing labor of appropriating the experience we actually have.

Further, while the method of appearances has no room for any unconditional obligation, it has room for a very high level of conditional obligation, which we may term obligation on pain of loss of identity. I may come, in the course of experience and reflection on the appearances, to appreciate a certain good as not merely one good among others but as so important that if I should ever willingly abandon it and disregard it, I would become, in the most important sense of the word, a different person.

“Well, what if I want to become a different person? Why shouldn’t I? What is to stop me?” The answer would be *ad hominem*: someone who framed these questions in a casual way would not be talking about values deeply appreciated and firmly embraced. “But what if I recognize no such values at all, if there is no value to which I am deeply committed?” The questioner’s problem is not just a problem about this or that value, considered as accidental to the person. A person is to a large degree constituted by the appreciation and embrace of values (cf. *FG*, 293, 306). Someone without a deep appreciation of and embrace of at least some values is in the most important sense not a person, has no truly personal identity to lose. Such a one stands outside the circle, outside the shared context of appearances, rather like the hypothetical denier of the principle of non-contradiction.

The second question is how much help the method of appearances gives us in the resolution of seemingly intractable ethical and political disagreements. Let us suppose that the method works well enough

---

4 Here it may be helpful to distinguish two ways in which the method of appearances might be employed: by an individual reflecting on the appearances and on the views of others (e.g., Aristotle in the earlier parts of several of his treatises), and
when practiced by a group of people who are largely in agreement on the appearances that they recognize. What use is the method when people are in radical disagreement about the appearances? Alasdair MacIntyre provides some good examples in the second chapter of *After Virtue.*

He exhibits a pacifist, a deterrence theorist, and an exponent of revolutionary (and only revolutionary) war, each approaching the issue of war from a radically different perspective. Likewise three speakers on abortion: one starts from a person’s dominion over his or her body, a second from the Golden Rule, and a third from the wrongness of murder. Likewise two speakers on government policy: a thoroughgoing exponent of equal opportunity, and an equally thoroughgoing exponent of individual liberty. These disputes appear to be unsettled, because there is not sufficient common ground on which to argue them out and settle them. MacIntyre’s examples indicate that on crucial issues people may have irreconcilable differences about the appearances. (I imagine the old foundationalist Aristotle smiling, and Plato with him. How else could it be, without first principles, or absolute standards?) The method of appearances seems to be group-relative in a rather unfortunate sense. And it seems to offer no guidance to the honest seeker after truth who is trying to determine which viewpoint to follow, which set of appearances to recognize.

What could the method-of-appearances theorist reply? The following reply is not drawn, in so many words, from *The Fragility of Goodness,* and Nussbaum is not necessarily committed to it, much less to the position that her Aristotle has an answer for everything.

The theorist could say that there are fairly clear and workable norms for distinguishing between those who are worth listening to and those who are not, those whose experience and analysis thereof are likely to be more reliable and those whose experience and analysis are likely to be less reliable. These would probably include age (at least up to a point!); breadth of experience; reasoning ability; attentiveness to tradition; temperance, in the sense of enjoying food, drink, and sexual

by a group of people discussing the appearances together (e.g., a group jointly deliberating about a social or political issue). My remarks here are concerned mainly with the second use of the method.

---

activity, without, however, being dominated by desire for any of these; devotion to the interests of family and community, together with reasonable success in advancing these interests; commitment to and enjoyment of long-lasting friendships; relish for theoretical science. No one of these, of course, guarantees that someone is a good interpreter of the appearances. Guarantees are not to be had. But let us improve the odds! And if there are people who decline to enter into dialogue with us, or with an elite selected on these norms, that is a matter for the practical politician, the police, the diplomat, or the military. Some people need discussion, others the use of their senses, and still others coercion. (cf. *Topics* I 11, 105a3-7). In effect, this is to take Aristotle’s assumption that we can identify the man of practical wisdom, the *phronimos*, and extend it in the sense that we can, albeit imperfectly, identify a class of people with practical wisdom, a class of *phronimoi*, whose judgment about the appearances is superior.

Now supposing that we could identify such a set of people with practical wisdom, they might not necessarily agree about the appearances. But even if they had strong differences about the appearances, the method-of-appearances theorist could still urge that a discussion among practically wise people would be quite different from the type of unsettled dispute described by MacIntyre, and would have a much better chance of making progress towards agreement than a discussion open to those not practically wise.

If this attempt to answer the second question is on the right track, then the method of appearances will involve, at least in certain difficult cases, a restriction on the set of appearances taken seriously and a corresponding restriction on the participants in discussion. This brings us to a third question: how is the set of appearances constituted? Perhaps better, how is the set of participants in discussion, constituted?

Part of the appeal of the method of appearances is that it does not canonize isolated individual experiences, but rather insists on personal continuity and belonging to a group as essential contexts for the examination of the appearances. The method of appearances is Protagorean, but not in the episodic and individualist sense that is demolished by Plato in the *Theaetetus* and by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* IV. “The human being is the measure” means not that each of us is his or her own measure but that we together are the measure. Anthropocentrism does not entail episodic individualism. Well and good. But who are the relevant
"we," who pool experience and work through the appearances together? Everybody, or is the group somehow specified or restricted? Who are the "we" to whom Nussbaum so constantly refers?

I do not find a clear answer in the pages of *The Fragility of Goodness*, and my attempt to construct an answer for the method-of-appearances theorist is correspondingly tentative. It seems to me that the answer ought to be that in principle everyone is entitled to have his or her appearances recognized and to take part in the sorting out or sifting of the appearances, but that in practice different people’s appearances will receive greater or lesser recognition, or perhaps no recognition at all, and that certain people will participate far more effectively than others in the sorting out or sifting of the appearances. One thing seems clear, that in practice the method of appearances will place a premium on articulateness, on the ability to state and defend one’s view of the appearances and to question and challenge other views of the appearances. To the extent that articulateness is a natural gift, the method will privilege those born with that gift over those not so favored. To the extent that articulateness depends on a certain kind of education, the method will privilege those who have had such an education over those who have not.

Now this is not in itself a devastating criticism of the method of appearances. An advocate of the method might well reply that in privileging the more articulate over the less articulate the method of appearances is no worse off than any other approach. Even if some highly articulate persons have a very weak grasp of moral or ethical appearances, we are still more likely to come to a more adequate view of things by way of reasoned discussion, and if this privileges the more articulate over the less articulate, that is the price of progress. And it is not to be assumed that the more articulate are generally selfish egoists who regularly disregard the claims of the less articulate. Aristotelian practical wisdom is not simply the ability to deliberate well about one’s own good; it includes the ability to deliberate well about the good of one’s family and one’s community.

This reply is persuasive. Still, it is important to underscore the distinction between someone’s claim to have his or her appearances recognized, or to take part in the sorting out of the appearances, with the person’s (in my view) more basic claim to be respected or (to employ Kantian language) not to be used as a mere means to an end. To be
articulate, to be practically wise, may well ground claims to have a greater say in the discussion of the appearances. But they are not, so far as I can see, the grounds for basic respect or basic human dignity. So far as I can see, Professor Nussbaum would not disagree with this distinction. A deep concern for human dignity pervades her work, and her writings on ethical, social, and political issues implement that concern for human dignity in a variety of ways. If the method of appearances can lead us to a more thorough and inclusive appreciation of human dignity and to more effective ways of respecting that dignity, it will have served us well.

---

6 Robert Spaemann makes a similar point in reference to a certain understanding of discourse ethics. If the claim to respect or to human rights is based on the possession of freedom and reason, then those who lack freedom and reason — the unborn, small children, the mentally ill — have no claim to respect or to human rights. Further, possession of freedom is not a brute fact; rather it presupposes a context of recognition. Before one can develop into a free human being, one must first be recognized as having a right to live. See “Die Aktualität des Naturrechts,” in Robert Spaemann, Philosophische Essays, 2ed. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1994), pp. 77-78.
Principal writings of Martha Nussbaum on ethical, social, and political issues:

Books:

Articles and chapters in books:


