Though class-based interpretations of the Revolution go back to Isabelo de los Reyes’ characterization of the Katipunan as “socialist” it is principally in the years since independence and the growth of the Marxist movement that systematic efforts have been made to follow up De los Reyes’ indications. In this article we shall survey the principal writers on the Revolution, and then attempt to evaluate the actual nature of class distinctions in the Revolution and the extent to which they operated.

I. Traditional Historiography of the Revolution

A. ANTIFRIAR STRUGGLE

The earliest accounts of the Revolution, taken in its wide sense from 1896 to 1902, were largely based on the writings of participants or victims. The accounts of anticlerical or anti-Catholic Filipinos, some of them already holding high positions under the American colonial regime, generally portrayed the Revolution as principally a struggle of Filipinos to free themselves from friar oppression.¹ These accounts later provided the basis for American anti-Catholic histories in English, some of which have kept alive to the present the stereotypes of an antifriar struggle that fill popular historiography.

The converse of this one-sided approach may be seen in the accounts written by a number of friars who had suffered from the Revolution as prisoners.² These tended to attribute the Revolution and its antifriar

¹This was especially true of Americanistas, who wanted to downplay the notion of nationalism, e.g., Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the first Filipino members of the Philippine Commission, in his Reseña histórica de Filipinas desde su descubrimiento hasta 1903 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1906).
²E.g. Graciano Martínez, O.S.A., Memorias del cautiverio (Manila: Imp. del Colegio de Santo Tomas, 1900).
character solely to a supposed international Masonic conspiracy, intended to deprive Spain of its colonies and the Philippines of its Catholic faith. In pursuit of this double end, the Masons had stirred up agitation against the Philippine friars, making them the targets of the Revolution.

What makes the two different approaches similar is that for both, nationalism had scarcely been a factor in the genesis of the Revolution, a conclusion convenient to Americans, Americanistas, and friars alike.

B. UNIFIED NATIONALISM

A second historiographical current, on the other hand, tended to take an exclusively nationalist view, denying or passing over in silence any regional or class conflicts within the Revolutionary movement. All the Filipino protagonists, from Hispanophile reformists to radical revolutionaries equally became heroes in these histories.⁴

II. The Revisionist View

Under the impact of the peasant revolts of the late 1920s and 1930s, and of the Communist-led Huk rebellion of the 1940s, the growth of class conflict in Philippine society became an undeniable fact, and there was a move to look back to the Revolution for the roots of that conflict. Already at the foundation of the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1930, the organizational meeting was set for August 26, with the intention of linking it up with the 1896 “Cry of Balintawak.” Bonifacio was increasingly hailed as the “Great Plebeian.” This would soon affect revolutionary historiography.

Among historians the most notable revisionist was Teodoro Agoncillo in his Revolt of the Masses, which saw the pre-1896 nationalist movement as merely an ineffective ilustrado reform effort. For Agoncillo, the Revolution itself emerged from the masses led by the proletarian ideals of Bonifacio embodied in the Katipunan.⁴ In

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⁴Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses. The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956).
Agoncillo’s sequel, *Malolos*, the theme was continued. The American assault on Spain in 1898 offered the revolutionary leaders an opportunity to renew the struggle with more hope of success. This time the upper-class ilustrados who had held back in 1896 took charge over Aguinaldo. But once conflict with the United States became a reality, the “haves” rapidly went over to the enemy, betraying the revolution of the “have-nots,” who were shedding their blood in unequal fight against the new colonialists. The theme of “the betrayal of the ilustrados” was seized upon in the student activism of the late 1960s.

Renato Constantino subsequently took up the theme of class conflict in a more sophisticated and systematic form, recognizing that Bonifacio was not a proletarian, but belonged to the lower middle class. Nonetheless, Constantino so qualifies this class denomination that it scarcely differs from proletarian—“lower echelons of the middle class,” “instinctively identified with the masses,” “almost plebeian in status,” “class distinction was not very marked at the lower levels.” For Constantino, the Revolution of 1896 was a people’s revolt, the culmination of a long series of revolts down through the centuries, each quantitatively raising the people’s revolutionary consciousness until finally producing the qualitative jump to a national revolution. The *ilustrados* would explicate the inchoate declarations of Bonifacio, while putting their own imprint on the movement. In the end the Revolution became “a people’s war under elite leadership.”

In Agoncillo’s view the Katipunan was for practical purposes equated with the Revolution. The Revolution in turn was identified as proletarian; for Constantino it is a “people’s war.” The class enemy of the proletariat was the *ilustrados*, identified with the economic elite. It was they who had betrayed the proletarian revolution of Bonifacio. These presuppositions deserve to be analyzed more closely.

**III. The Katipunan and the Revolution**

Surely the key role of the Katipunan in initiating the Revolution cannot be denied. However, the Katipunan had not arisen solely from the

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ideas of Bonifacio. It was, in fact, the heir of the Propaganda Movement, too easily dismissed as an ineffective “reform movement.” There were to be sure, propagandists who sought nothing more than the assimilationist reforms their public program called for. But for its key figures — Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar, Antonio Luna, and others — there is no question that independence was the ultimate goal. The principal difference between Bonifacio and the major ilustrados of the Propaganda Movement was not even on the method of obtaining independence, but on the timing.\(^7\) The writings of Bonifacio and Jacinto mirror those of Rizal and Marcelo del Pilar, and the Katipunan’s official teachings are quite in continuity with the major works of the Propaganda Movement.\(^8\)

It is for this reason that though the initiative for the Revolution certainly came from Bonifacio and his Katipunan, once the Revolution began, it immediately attracted to itself a far larger number who had never been Katipuneros, but had imbibed similar ideas through the writings and activity of the Propagandists. In his memoirs Aguinaldo cites his cousin Baldomero Aguinaldo, speaking to the revolutionaries in Cavite of how there had been only 300 Katipuneros in that province on the eve of the Revolution, but the following day more than a thousand revolutionaries assembled.\(^9\) It was part of Bonifacio’s tragedy that he did not, or was unwilling to, realize that the Revolution was already a much wider movement than the Katipunan, and that there were others besides the Katipuneros who were legitimate heirs of the Propaganda Movement.

**A. IDEOLOGY OF THE KATIPUNAN**

Nonetheless, the Katipunan is correctly seen as a privileged heir of the Propaganda Movement. As a consequence, it may also be said that the

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\(^8\)Besides the work cited in the previous footnote, see Cesar A. Majul, *The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1957), p. 15 and *passim*.

philosophy of both movements was essentially socially conservative, as Rizal’s best biographer has noted:

There is nothing in Bonifacio’s “Decalogue” or in Jacinto’s Kartilla that hints at the expropriation and distribution among the workers of the great landed estates, at the seizure of mines, banks, corporations and other private enterprises, at the equalization of wealth or even of opportunity, or even at the organization of labor unions to protect the workers from sweatshop wages and hours.\textsuperscript{10}

Far from being socialist, as some \textit{ilustrado} writers, like Isabelo de los Reyes, claimed, the Katipunan had an ideology which was essentially bourgeois, not proletarian. There were indeed egalitarian elements, in Jacinto’s writings especially (as there were to a certain degree in Rizal’s), but they were principally concerned with the equality of peoples in opposition to Spanish racism. Their egalitarianism “primarily signified equality of nature or being . . .”.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, as nationalists they stressed the brotherhood of all Filipinos. But this was an ethical perspective, not one based on socialist ideas of economic equality.\textsuperscript{12} It was a call for Filipinos to be united in the defense of a common motherland, not a program for restructuring society. Other Filipinos, especially those who viewed events through the prism of religious egalitarian ideals, might and did interpret their appeals to brotherhood in a wider sense, but such was not the program of their authors.

\textbf{B. CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE KATIPUNAN}

Such a limited vision of nationalism is not surprising when we probe a little further behind such clichés as “the Great Plebeian” for Bonifacio, or assertions that the members of the Katipunan “belonged to the workers [sic] and peasant classes.”\textsuperscript{13} Though there were differences between


\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}

the Manila Katipuneros and those in the provinces, an analysis of the status of key figures shows that neither worker nor peasant class was significantly represented among them.

*i. The Katipunan in Manila.* Indeed, an analysis of the occupations and circumstances of the leading Manila Katipuneros shows that the organization was essentially middle-class. One can indeed say that it was *ilustrado* to a large extent, if we understand that term in its primary sense of an educated man. Emilio Jacinto was a law student; Pio Valenzuela was a fourth-year medical student at the time of his initiation into the Katipunan. So too, other original members of the Katipunan had a university education (in Manila) and held positions within the Spanish bureaucracy, such as that of court clerk, which demanded at least a certain level of Spanish education. Bonifacio himself, I would add, can in a real sense be considered *ilustrado*, even if a self-made one, in spite of his lack of higher formal education. Anyone who was reading in Spanish Victor Hugo’s *Les misérables*, *The History of the French Revolution*, and the *Lives of the American Presidents*, among other books, was clearly an educated man by the standards of Manila in the 1890s, undoubtedly much better read in modern thought than many of the more affluent students who frequented the colleges and university in Manila for social prestige rather than out of interest in education. His socioeconomic status is likewise indicated by the fact that his second marriage to Gregoria de Jesus was into a landowning family, and by his membership in such upper-middle-class organizations as Masonry and the Liga Filipina.

*ii. The Katipunan in the Provinces.* The Katipuneros in the provinces came from a roughly similar social class. In general they came from the *principalia* elite — schoolteachers like Ricarte, *cabezas de barangay* or *gobernadorcillos*, and medium landowners like the Aguinaldos, the Tironas, Vito Belarmino, and the Alvarez in Cavite, Francisco

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14 Fast and Richardson, *Roots*, pp. 70-71.
16 Fast and Richardson, *Roots*, pp. 69-70, with similar details on the background of other early Manila Katipuneros.
Makabulos in Tarlac, Manuel Tinio in Nueva Ecija, Miguel Malvar in Batangas. But, as has been remarked, there was a difference. The urban Katipuneros were generally

by the nature of their jobs precluded from senior responsibility, while Aguinaldo [and other provincial elite like him] had no social superior in his own milieu. Simply put, the advancement of Bonifacio’s career depended largely on his willingness to carry out orders. Aguinaldo’s class matrix demanded that he give them.\(^\text{17}\)

\[\text{IV. The Elite in Nineteenth-Century Philippine Society}\]

The discussions as to whether the Revolution was an “elite” revolution or a “people’s war” have been bedeviled not only by ideological determinism, but by a lack of clear terminology. It seems necessary, therefore, to preface any further discussion by clarification of terms.

\[\text{A. DIFFERENT KINDS OF ELITE}\]

Not only were there different levels of the elite, but the classification itself deserves to be broken down into economic, political, and intellectual. The confusion engendered by taking the term “ilustrado” as synonymous with economic affluence and political power, often assumed to be at the highest level, is considerable.

In the last decades of the Spanish regime, economic affluence no longer coincided with political power, at least if the latter is understood in terms of holding formal political office. The developing economy and the attendant wealth it brought to some had created a class of wealthy men who considered it no longer worth their time, and perhaps below their dignity, to hold the office of cabeza de barangay or even capitán municipal. These “super-principales” were to be found not only in the upper levels of urban society, but likewise in the provinces, especially the more affluent ones, like Batangas, Pampanga, Negros, Iloilo. Because of their wealth, they exercised an informal kind of political power as caciques rather than as principales, the local elite of a town.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 74.

vicinal elite thus did hold both economic and political power in their provinces, but in a different way and at a different level than the traditional *principales*. Once Spanish domination had ended, many of these men, together with the wealthy and educated Manila elite, formed the Malolos government, thus emerging as the new national elite.

**B. ILUSTRADOS**

Naturally, it was the wealthy who were most likely to send their sons for higher education, especially if it meant education in Europe. There is therefore a certain degree of correlation between the wealthy and the *ilustrados*. Nonetheless, as the example of the relative educational attainments of Bonifacio and Aguinaldo, cited above, indicated, the correlation was by no means complete. Some of the older generation, too, though having studied only in Manila, possessed greater wealth than the younger generation which was able to go to Europe for their studies. At the other end of the economic spectrum, a man like Mabini was certainly an *ilustrado*. One could not fail to classify him among the national intellectual elite, whether by native talent or by intellectual attainment, in spite of the relative poverty from which he had come and which had more than once forced him to interrupt his university studies in Manila.

In brief, though there was a large degree of identification between wealth and education, it was never total. Filipino society still allowed for mobility between different socioeconomic classes, and education was a key means to that mobility.
V. Elite Participation in the Revolution

To keep such distinctions in mind will help evaluate such slogans as “the betrayal of the ilustrados,” “haves vs. have-nots,” or “a people’s war under elite leadership.” Once the total identification between education and economic status is left behind, a more careful analysis of leadership and participation in the Revolution, which also takes into account different periods of time and their attendant circumstances, will enable us to evaluate the role of socioeconomic class.

A. THE REVOLUTION OF 1896.

As the analysis of the Katipunan has shown, the actual initiative for the Revolution of 1896 came from a lower middle class urban membership allied with local and provincial elite, almost completely in the Tagalog provinces and Pampanga. It is not true, however, that the wealthy and educated took no part in it.

The national elite, not themselves part of the Katipunan, varied in their support for the Revolution once it was underway. Some of them, like Rizal and Antonio Luna, had been approached beforehand by the Katipuneros, but, though not rejecting revolution in principle, had argued that the means for a successful revolution were not yet at hand. Numerous figures of the old Liga Filipina or Cuerpo de Compromisarios, like Mabini and Moises Salvador, were arrested on suspicion by the Spaniards, and most were executed, however little or much had been their complicity in the actual revolt.19 Others of the national elite, about to be arrested, escaped abroad and assisted the revolutionaries from Hong Kong, like Jose Alejandrino, Felipe Agoncillo, and Galicano Apacible.20 Still others who were in Europe when the Revolution broke out, returned to take part in it, like Mariano Ponce in Hong Kong and

19Mabini, who escaped execution only because of his paralysis, had been a regular source of advice for the Katipuneros, but opposed their plans for revolt and became suspect to Bonifacio as a result. See Agoncillo, Revolt, pp. 105, 107. Salvador is said to have actually been a member of the Katipunan, but was arrested before he could join the revolt (Jose Alejandrino, La senda del sacrificio [Manila: Nueva Era Press, 1951], p. 29).

Edilberto Evangelista, who was killed in the battle of Zapote Bridge in 1897.\footnote{\textit{La senda}, pp. 12-15, 53.}

Many of the very wealthy national elite, however, neither believed in the revolutionary cause nor were they willing to contribute to it. In consequence of Bonifacio’s having left to the authorities forged documents compromising them, some of them, like millionaire Francisco Roxas, who had refused to listen to the Katipunan’s demands for financial support, nonetheless paid with their lives.\footnote{Agoncillo, \textit{Revolt}, pp. 112, 129, 143.}

To summarize, elite attitudes to the Revolution of 1896 were varied. Though wealth was certainly a factor which was negatively correlated with willingness to join the Revolution, age was a more important factor than wealth by itself. The young\textit{ ilustrados}, wealthy or not, who had taken part in the Propaganda Movement, were generally found joining the Revolution; the older men who had held aloof from that movement, likewise held back when the Revolution came.

\section*{B. THE MALOLOS REPUBLIC}

In 1898 the situation would be somewhat different. Recognizing that American intervention against Spain had changed the whole equation, the elite of all levels joined Aguinaldo when he returned with Dewey’s fleet. Not all were of one mind, to be sure. But with the prospects of successfully establishing a Filipino republic now much brighter, many who had earlier held back, now moved to give their own direction to the course of the new republic.

\textit{i. The National or Cosmopolitan Elite.} As it became more clear that there would be war between the Americans and the Filipinos, however, there was a division based on various interests — economic, political, regional, or religious. The Negros\textit{ hacenderos}, for example, had never really given support to Aguinaldo, and were ready to set up their own republic had the Americans left the Philippines. Once the Americans made their intentions clear, however, the leaders of the Negros repub-
lic lost little time in attaching themselves to American rule. Similarly in Luzon, some of the distinguished men whom Aguinaldo had appointed to his cabinet gradually began to distance themselves in the closing months of 1898. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, Cayetano Arellano, Gregorio Araneta, all withdrew from the Malolos government and accepted positions in the American regime by the beginning of 1899. Though none of these men had shown support for the Propaganda Movement and though most of them were wealthy, it is not at all clear that it is to be simply described as a division between the “haves” and the “have nots”. Others of comparable wealth like Pedro Paterno and Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista remained with the government of the Republic until they were captured. Arellano and Araneta were at least partially motivated to abandon the Republic for religious reasons as the government took an increasingly antireligious direction under Mabini.23

If there was a substantial number of the national elite who soon went over to the Americans, there was also a substantial number who remained with the Republic until their death or capture, or at least until after the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901. Mention has been made of Paterno and Bautista, who were captured in late 1899 or 1900. Major figures of the Propaganda Movement worked with the Malolos government whether as agents abroad, like Mariano Ponce and Galicano Apacible, or as military and civil officials, like Antonio Luna, Fernando Canon, Vicente Lukban, Jose Alejandrino, Gregorio Aguilera, Teodoro Sandiko, Lauro Dimayuga. When we examine the record in detail, it is clear that though economic class was one factor in determining loyalties, there was no clear dividing line such as has been stated or implied in slogans based on theories of economic class determinism.

23Archbishop Bernardino Nozaleda would later say that Arellano had joined the Malolos government in the first place at the archbishop’s request, so as to be able to exert influence toward the release of the imprisoned friars. Araneta held the position of Secretary of Justice, under whose office religious affairs fell, until the cabinet fell in December 1898. In this capacity he worked to prevent the Filipino priests from being driven into a schismatic position by the policy pursued by Mabini and Aglipay. See John N. Schumacher, S.J., Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement, 1850-1903 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1981), pp. 74-78, 87; Fast and Richardson, Roots, pp. 88-89.
ii. Provincial and Local Elite. On the other hand, the provincial and local elite were generally active under the Republic. Indeed, the study of Milagros Guerrero has shown that there was widespread continuity between the provincial power structure in the late Spanish regime and under the Republic.

The provincial presidents were invariably men of stature and wealth who more often than not rose from the ranks of the municipal elite. Many were educated and continued to maintain sufficient contact with the cosmopolitan elite in Manila... so as to claim importance and prominence beyond their respective spheres of influence. Most of the [provincial] presidents elected during 1898 and 1899 in Luzon had at one time or another occupied important positions open to Filipinos in the colonial government.24

It is not surprising that it should have been so. It was, as we have shown above, primarily from the provincial elite that the Katipunan had emerged into the Revolution of 1896. In the second phase of the Revolution, some of these men had established themselves, because of their military accomplishments or due to Aguinaldo’s favor, as major figures of the Republic. The decree of 18 June 1898, providing for the organization of provincial and local governments, had so specified the qualifications for voting that it was inevitable that the great majority of those elected were from the principia. For the vote was restricted to “the inhabitants most distinguished for high character, social position, and honorable conduct...”25 Not all were equally fervent supporters of the national cause, of course, and more than a few used their offices to enrich themselves and to oppress their fellow citizens rather than to serve the Republic.26

What is clear however, is that there is no question whether the great majority of the provincial and local elite supported the Malolos government. It was in fact on this level that the Revolution found its strength. As the war with the Americans dragged on, however, the pic-

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ture would vary. Many who now saw the war as a losing cause, or who had been lukewarm from the beginning, did not hesitate to accept American sovereignty. Others, however, though ostensibly holding office under the American government, were in fact the selections of the regional guerrilla commander, with whom they secretly collaborated. Where the guerrilla leader was a popular figure from the region itself, as in the case of Malvar in the southern Tagalog provinces, the elections were arranged beforehand and the town officials formed a shadow guerrilla government while appearing openly as officials elected under American auspices.27

Among the provincial and local elite should be included the Filipino priests, who were not infrequently blood relatives of the local and provincial leaders. Thus in Cavite the most important figure among the clergy in support of the Revolution, Fr. Manuel Trias, was the uncle of General Mariano Trias, the highest ranking military officer in the province. Or from another side, among those who went to negotiate with the Americans in Cebu was Fr. Pablo Singzon, no doubt a relative of Segundo Singzon, one of the laymen in the negotiating commission. Fr. Singzon would rule the diocese as vicar-general when the Spanish Franciscan, Bishop Martín García Alcocer, was forced to go to Manila.28 The great majority of the clergy, however, worked more or less closely with the Revolution, even into 1902.

To sum up, the continuity of the local and provincial elite from Spanish times to the Republic was a general phenomenon. Though not all of them had been supporters of the Revolution, once it was a fact at least traditional politics and expediency, if no higher motive, saw to it that they often continued to hold positions in the new government. When the war turned against the Republic, many such quickly went over to the Americans, but many others did not. Various factors played their part in determining whether particular officials held out and how long they did so. But economic class alone was not a determining factor.

27Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, pp. 126-127.
28Ibid., pp. 130, 135.
VI. Mass Participation In The Revolution

Was the Revolution indeed a "revolt of the masses"? Was there indeed a "people's war"? In what sense? Was there mass participation of ordinary Filipinos in the Revolution? Did they consider that it was their own freedom which was at stake? Did they remain loyal to the Filipino cause to the end? Though some answer has already been given to those questions, and though it is impossible to give a single simple answer that will cover all parts of the country and all periods of the Revolution, certain generalizations can be made.

A. MASS SUPPORT OF THE REVOLUTION

The fact of mass support of the Revolution is nowhere better stated than by one of its more intelligent and objective victims. Fr. Ulpiano Herrero, Dominican parish priest of Orion, Bataan, was one of the friars taken prisoner by revolutionary forces in the early days of the 1898 phase. Not only did he receive an enthusiastic cheer from the besieging revolutionaries when he came down from the church tower to negotiate the surrender of the Spaniards holed up there, but his parishioners begged Aguinaldo, though in vain, that he be allowed to remain as parish priest. After enduring several months of painful journey to northern Luzon, Herrero set down the impressions he had gathered from his journeys and from discussions with his fellow friar prisoners regarding the Tagalog and Ilokano provinces through which they had passed.

The native masses welcomed with wild enthusiasm the victories of the Revolution, attracted by the idea that in the future none but Indios would be in command, and that they would constitute a nation, although the majority did not really understand the meaning of nation. But they did understand their being in charge and being the ones to govern. . . . We do not believe that in the first months of their victories there would have been a single Indio who was not overwhelmed with joy and pride on considering themselves independent.\(^\text{29}\)

After recounting the exploitation of Filipino by Filipino and the abuses perpetrated by military and civil officials of the Malolos government, especially those committed by Tagalog troops in the Ilokano provinces, he nonetheless concluded:

In spite of these bitter complaints about these and other abuses, let the reader not think that the ideal of independence lost its following, even in the northern provinces of Luzon. The people complained of the numberless forms of oppression and exploitation, of the favoritism of Tagalogs and the intrigues of scoundrels with no other merits than their own boldness and the pack of rogues with them; they poured out words of anger against the government. But in their souls the burning love of being self-governing still blazed. . . . The heart of the people is still for the defenders of independence, and we think it will continue to be so even though in the face of reality the peaceful citizen will wait for and receive the Americans as the defenders of his interests, and as the only possible government after the stupid and infamous behavior of his own government.30

The testimony is the more significant inasmuch as earlier it was precisely the Spanish friars — as the Americans would do later — who insisted that the whole revolutionary movement was the work of a handful of elite leaders, under Masonic inspiration, who did not represent the ordinary Filipino. Under pretext of independence, it was alleged, these men had exploited and terrorized the ordinary people into joining a revolution for which they had no desire.

B. THE MASSES’ CONCEPT OF THE REVOLUTION

Herrero’s analysis, particularly the italicized statement that “the majority did not really understand the meaning of nation” raises a question of the goals of the ordinary Filipino. For, as Ileto observes,

the physical involvement of the masses in the revolution is pretty clear, but how did they actually perceive in terms of their own experience, the ideas of nationalism and revolution brought from the West by the ilustrados?31

30Ibid., p. 817.
The friars' understanding of "nation" and "revolution" was similar to that of the Filipino *ilustrados*. As Herrero's observation indicates, many ordinary Filipinos had a different understanding, which he interprets as not understanding fully the idea of nation. It is in fact clear that not all of those who flocked to the standards of revolt had the same hopes or goals. One striking case which has caught the attention of more than one historian is that of the Pansacula brothers, Teodoro and Doroteo, who had organized an armed following in the last days of the Spanish regime in Zambales. On the outbreak of the Revolution, they proclaimed themselves governor and brigadier general. When formal provincial and local governments were organized under Aguinaldo's decree of 18 June 1898, the Pansaculas had urged the people not to recognize the new authorities. At the same time they harassed various wealthy and educated persons of Botolan, trying to force them to leave town. Their purpose in this, it was reported to Aguinaldo, was to secure [the wealthy's] real property and distribute it among their followers, as according to their doctrine it was already time for the rich to be poor and for the poor to become rich, endeavoring to make the people believe that the ignorant should direct the towns and the intelligent be subordinate to them; with these extravagant theories, they have succeeded in deceiving the masses and securing their adhesion.\(^{32}\)

Though it is not possible from this hostile report to know what the real intentions of the Pansacula brothers themselves were, it seems clear that the understanding of the Revolution which they propounded found a ready hearing among many of the peasants who heard them. It is equally clear that these were very different conclusions than were being drawn at Malolos, where the rights of property were held sacred. It seems very likely that here we find the key to the different understanding of independence and a new nation noted by Father Herrero. It is what Reynaldo Ileto has called to our attention in observing the difference between *independencia* and *kalayaan*. For those already possessed of wealth and a certain political power under the Spanish regime — the

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\(^{32}\)Taylor, *Philippine Insurrection*, 3:401-403. See also Guerrero, "Provincial and Municipal Elites," p. 156; Ileto, *Pasyon*, p. 147. Ileto gives the name as Pensacola, but it is clear that all are discussing the same incident.
Spanish-speaking elite — freedom required only the removal of the Spanish overlords. For the oppressed peasants, however, it meant freedom from all the sources of their oppression; indeed, an abundance of all good things.33

How widespread was this perception of nationalism and revolution? It is difficult to say with any degree of assurance. Certainly it corresponds to the perceptions of the Guardia de Honor in northern Luzon, of the Santa Iglesia of Felipe Salvador in central Luzon, of the Babaylanes of Papa Isio in Negros.34 All of these movements had existence in some form before the Revolution, responding, it would appear, to various stresses coming from the rise of commercial agriculture in 19th-century Philippines. Once the Revolution had been set underway by the Katipunan, all of the above-named movements at first joined the revolutionaries in expelling the Spaniards. But sooner or later, all withdrew, were persecuted by the Malolos government, or even became actively hostile to the Revolution. One reason, no doubt, was that they saw that the same forms of oppression from which they believed the emerging nation would free them still continued in new forms — taxes, compulsory labor — and the same abuses perpetrated by principals, now military or civil officials of the Republic.35 They would continue to struggle against the Americans as well, for analogous reasons.

All told, however, these movements, at least as organized groups, formed only a relatively small part of the Filipino masses — the truly marginalized — though the ideas no doubt influenced many more. The great majority of the masses continued to fight under the banner of the Malolos government. Surely the largest part of the revolutionary army, at least in the first year or two, was recruited on the basis of patron-

35The Babaylanes of Papa Isio maintained a loyalty to the distant Aguinaldo government, at least theoretically, but fought against the provincial and local governments of Negros, which had accepted American rule. Though this may at first glance seem an exception, in fact the dynamics were the same: the local and provincial authorities, whether appointed by Aguinaldo or by the Americans, came to be seen as the oppressors of the poor.
client relationships. Given the quasifeudal organization of Philippine society, it was the adherence of the local and provincial elite which brought their men to the Revolutionary army. Both Guerrero and Ileto have agreed on the "essentially pluralistic and clientist nature of the Revolution."\(^{36}\)

Important too, especially in certain parts of the country, such as Ilocos, the Bikol region, Iloilo, and the southern Tagalog provinces, was the favorable influence of the Filipino clergy. By the very fact that, as Guerrero has demonstrated, the abuses of officials of the Republic were so widespread, purely clientist explanations of mass adherence to the revolutionary cause become less convincing as time passed. Especially after guerrilla warfare was proclaimed at the end of 1899, and the Americans controlled large parts of the country, it was largely the influence of Filipino priests on the ordinary people which determined whether the resistance could continue.\(^{37}\)

VII. Consolidation of Class Structures

It seems clear from the analysis done here that the Revolution, whether in its first or second stage against the Spaniards, or in the war against the Americans, cannot be described solely in economic class terms. Filipinos of all socioeconomic classes fought in every stage of the national struggle. If there were indeed wealthy Filipinos who refused to take part, or who early on went over to the Americans, there were others of the same class who did not. If there were conservatives among the wealthy classes, there were also conservatives among the poorer classes. There were peasants, on whom fell the heaviest burdens of the war, who longed for peace, and as the pressures of terrorism and counterterrorism spawned by guerrilla warfare became more unbearable, withdrew from the war to the extent they could. Participation and nonparticipation in the Revolution were not the monopoly of any single socioeconomic class.

\(^{36}\)Guerrero, "Understanding Philippine Revolutionary Mentality," *Philippine Studies* 29 (1981): 244; Ileto, "Critical Issues in 'Understanding Philippine Revolutionary Mentality,'" *Philippine Studies* 30 (1982): 101. Ileto adds, however, that "it appears that the masses also had a vision of the future they were fighting for." Certainly at least some did.

\(^{37}\)See Schumacher, "Perspectives," in *Making of a Nation*, pp. 198-203; and more extensively in my *Revolutionary Clergy*. 
If one asks, however, who profited from the Revolution, a rather different answer has to be given. It is clear that Aguinaldo made a conscious effort to appoint wealthy and highly educated Filipinos to his cabinet; it would have been surprising if he did not. What was less understandable was that he continued to try to keep them there even when they had clearly cast their lot with the Americans. On the provincial and local level, by and large there was very extensive continuity between the principales of Spanish times, even when they had been notorious Spanish sympathizers, and the officials elected and confirmed under the Malolos government. Only participation in the military seems to have had some effect on enlarging the composition of the elite. Guerrero concludes:

> It may be said that the Revolution gave the provincial and municipal elites an altered configuration. Constituting a new layer within the elite, municipal bureaucrats-turned-military-officials could, if they so desired, contest the old class from which they were a spin-off.

Such upward mobility was to be found among the elites of different levels. The lower class — the peasants, the laborers, the tenants — were indeed separated by a distinct line from the principales and their superiors. But above that line, the possibilities were large. Moreover, though a detailed study has not yet been made of the continuity between the office-holders of the Republic and those of the early American regime, there is considerable immediate evidence for it. For both phenomena one need only refer to pre-Revolutionary municipal elite who after being generals in the Revolutionary army, became provincial governors under the Americans within a few months after their surrender. Such were Martin Delgado in Iloilo, Leandro Fullon in Antique, Juan Cailles in Laguna, and Mariano Trias in Cavite. Very likely there were others.

To return to the question of who profited by the Revolution, class generalizations here are easier to substantiate. Given the American policy of conciliating the Filipino elite, all levels of the elite profited,

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39Ibid., pp. 172-73.
whatever had been their role in the Revolution. If those of the cosmopolitan elite who early went over to the Americans became Supreme Court justices and members of the Philippine Commission, diehard generals such as we have mentioned became provincial governors. Others were able to enter the new modernizing economy under favorable conditions — the friar lands sale would be the most notable example of this. As new large landowners arose, or older ones consolidated their position, caciquismo became more and more the dominant pattern of the provinces. Privately, more responsible American colonial officials recognized and deplored cases of cacique oppression of the masses, but in fact the policy of governing through the elite was the course along which the Americans would allow Philippine society to be directed right up to independence.

One can say that the Revolution of 1896-1902 was indeed a nationalist revolution in which all classes of society participated. But beneath that common surge of national feeling, there existed a complexity of motives and goals which no monolithic framework adequately explains. Some goals received satisfaction, at least in their substance; others did not, or did so only for an elite. The structures of Philippine society which the Revolution gave birth to or strengthened persisted and entrenched themselves under the American colonial regime. These structures would be carried forward beyond the colonial period. Whether through design or through benign neglect, the American regime eventually made possible the achievement of independencia; kalayaan is still a goal to be won for a large majority of Filipinos.