Introduction

In 1965 I was studying theology in preparation for priestly ordination at Bellarmine School of Theology in North Aurora, Illinois. While Bellarmine was clearly a seminary in transition, it was by and large a closed society. All the students were Jesuits. All our professors were Jesuits. We ate meals at the same time in the same refectory. Depending on our year in the program, we attended the same classes together. After lunch and dinner, we had designated periods of recreation during which we played cards or chatted with one another. Meals, study, classes, and recreation all took place in a single complex of buildings.¹

In 1965 The Secular City, by Harvey Cox, appeared in print.² The book sounded a clarion call to our generation of seminarians for our involvement in the civil rights movement, our instinctive beliefs that the secular had its positive aspects (in contrast to the generalized suspiciousness of the “world” in the ghettoized Catholicism of our upbringings), and our conviction that the inauguration of John F. Kennedy as U.S. President signaled the dawn of a new day.

When The Secular City penetrated Bellarmine School of Theology, however, its impact on our communal life had some negative effects. It became impossible to attend dinner or recreation afterwards without entering into conversation about Cox’s book. Even the most innocent


²Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: Macmillan, 1965). In fairness to Cox the book originally was given as a set of lectures to the National Student Christian Federation. The first printing comprised 10,000 copies. No one, not even Cox himself, dreamed that he had written a best-seller.
remark reminded one’s conversation partner of something he had just read in the book. Within a week or so the figure of Harvey Cox had become Bellarmine School of Theology’s guru.

In the face of this Coxomania, four of us sat down one night and invented a book: *The Urban Vortex* by Hans Aufbau of the Stuttgart Institute of Religion and Technology. The thesis of *The Urban Vortex* was that, in the various social movements of the sixties, the voice of God was speaking too loudly in our time; as a result, people were no longer confronted with the traditional either/or choices crucial to authentic moral life. Our book sounded its own clarion call for the need to educate people in moral discernment lest the aforementioned movements reduce them to moral automatons. *The Urban Vortex* had the same number of chapters as *The Secular City*; and each chapter by Hans Aufbau asserted a counter-thesis to the central assertion of the corresponding chapter by Harvey Cox.

Subsequently, each attempt to foist on any of the four of us the wisdom of Harvey Cox was parried with a “I realize that. But Hans Aufbau in *The Urban Vortex* makes a quite different point on that same issue.” When one of our fellow students found a review of *The Secular City* and put it up on the theologians’ bulletin board, one of our gang of four composed a review of *The Urban Vortex* and posted it beside the other review. One of our fellow Jesuit scholastics even managed to get a Chicago bookstore to order *The Urban Vortex*.

Eventually, the four of us discovered that we had to gather nightly to keep the story straight. Yours truly, for instance, had discovered that he was no longer free to embellish on the book lest he meet the retort: “Well last night Jim Brown (or Pat McManamon or Joe Sikora) said quite the opposite about Hans Aufbau.” We also needed to have a suitable explanation why *The Urban Vortex* was not available for its now intrigued public to read it. We did start a waiting list for those Jesuits who wanted to read the book.

Some of our fellows caught on to our hoax fairly quickly. They were welcomed into the inner circle of *The Urban Vortex*. They were taught the story of the book, its various counter theses, and relevant biographical data regarding Hans Aufbau. Furthermore, they attended the nightly meetings of the now enlarged authorship-readership as we continued to labor to keep the story straight. In roughly three weeks everyone at Bellarmine realized that *The Urban Vortex* was a chimera. With that
realization not only did talk of Hans Aufbau cease, but also *The Secular City* disappeared from recreation chatter.\(^3\)

Five years later I read the following in *The Sacred Canopy*:

The fundamental dialectic process of society consists of three moments or steps. These are externalization, objectivation, and internalization. Only if these three moments are understood together can an empirically adequate view of society be maintained. Externalization is the ongoing outpouring of human being into the world, both in the physical and the mental activity of men. Objectivation is the attainment by the products of this activity (again both physical and mental) of a reality that confronts its original producers as facticity external to and other than themselves. Internalization is the reappropriation by men of this same reality, transforming it once again from structures of the objective world into structures of the subjective consciousness. It is through externalization that society is a human product. It is through objectivation that society becomes a reality *sui generis*. It is through internalization that man is a product of society.\(^4\)

As I read Peter Berger, I remembered that the four of us had invented a book and formed ourselves into an inner circle that knew the real story (externalization). *The Urban Vortex*, however, took on a life of its own (objectivation), making it necessary for us to gather nightly to keep the story straight. When a few of our fellow students figured out our ruse, we let them in on the secret and indoctrinated them into the mysteries of Hans Aufbau (internalization).

In the remainder of this essay, I hope to explore how these moments of social construction, as well as other insights from social theory, can enlighten our understanding of the church. In what sense is the church a human product? How does it produce its members? How do they grow up in or convert to a church that is a reality *sui generis*?\(^5\)

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\(^3\)Actually our fellow Jesuits took the hoax quite well. A year later many of them joined us for a celebration and closer examination of *The Urban Vortex*. The highlight of the evening's proceedings was a paper delivered by Patrick McManamon, S.J., "The Urban Vortex: Secular or Sacred? Yes!"


\(^5\)The terminology employed will come by and large from Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
Human Being/Agency

At the onset some preliminary remarks need to be spoken about human being and human agency.\(^6\) Human beings are composites of nature and culture where the basic life task is to impose order on an otherwise chaotic existence. They are corporeal beings existing in material environments. Likewise, they exist as society-building bodies through their various modes of communication, principally their linguaging. This second component is not reducible to corporeality. In short, human beings are spirits who express themselves as bodies that talk.\(^7\)

Through much of the modern era, the ideal of "I think, therefore, I am," has persisted as a key to understanding human persons. The ideal has been an isolated, individual thinker who by dint of the assiduous use of method attains objective knowledge as a private prize. It would be better to say of human agents, "We think and act, therefore, I am in interaction with you." The basic human given is that we are linked together bodily through our languages and an assortment of publicly identifiable skills. Thinking may go on in individual heads, but the building blocks of intellection are concepts shared in common with our fellow human beings.\(^8\)

For humans time is not a succession of nows that could just as well go backwards as forward. Human time is rather the becoming of possibilities which interpolates both the given of memory (collective as well as individual) and an anticipation of the future that temporally thrusts towards death and nihilation. As Whitehead says, "What we perceive in

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\(^6\) While I am following Giddens here, it should be noted that his remarks on human being and agency are grounded in the work of Martin Heidegger. Giddens is also influenced by Karl Marx.

\(^7\) The Sacred Canopy, 4-7.

the present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation."^9

Human being is ever in flux, time being at the core of its existence.

At this same core of human being lies a contradictory character. We
construct our institutions as stable protests against the finite, death-
laden character of human existence. Yet these institutions are thoroughly
the work of beings- unto- death and are doomed to being eventually
perceived as dehumanizing by subsequent generations.\textsuperscript{10}

In 1776 a group of high-minded Americans declared "All men are
created equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable
rights." This declaration articulated a sense of purpose that enabled
them and many of their fellow colonists to rebel against and defeat the
army of the British crown and eventually to form the fledgling United
States of America. "Men" in \textit{The Declaration of Independence} meant for
many of the original signers "males who own property" and applied only
to a small minority of the colonists. While some did wonder about the
compatibility of the \textit{Declaration} and slavery, the document and that
practice managed to co- exist.

In 1860, civil war broke out when a large group of U.S. citizens felt
strongly that slavery contradicted the truths of the \textit{Declaration} and in-
sisted on the abolition of slavery. The uneasy compromise of the found-
ing fathers had died along with their demises, and a subsequent gen-
eration of Americans, also high-minded, would not rest until the slaves
were emancipated and the federal constitution was amended so that
slavery was outlawed.

Almost a century later two leaders arose to press forward with the
application of the \textit{Declaration} to former slaves. In 1954 Thurgood
Marshall convinced the Supreme Court that the nineteenth century
devise of "separate but equal" was no longer acceptable in regard to
schooling. Martin Luther King emerged a few years later to argue that
equality and inalienable rights had far-reaching implications for the
ballot box, jobs, and housing—far more reaching that earlier genera-
tions had imagined. While we can now celebrate the achievements of
Marshall and King, we also know, as a lesson of history and as a socio-
logical premise, that future generations will find contradictions in their

\textsuperscript{9}Giddens says only that Whitehead said this somewhere. Cf. \textit{Central Problems in
Social Theory}, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}, 3-4.
construal of practices in accord with the foundational ideals of the coun-
try.

Human agency is not a series of discrete acts which somehow get
combined together, but a continuous flow of conduct situated in time
and space. Human agency is rational. The reason involved, however, is
a practical consciousness made up of tacit stocks of knowledge, the ha-
bbitual skills out of which we act. Such consciousness is distinguished
from discursive consciousness which expresses itself in discourse and
from the unconscious, those hidden—even from ourselves—motiva-
tions of our actions which can lead to unintended consequences.11

This very essay is an example of discursive consciousness. As I write
it, however, I make use of a number of writing, thinking, and research
skills that enable me to compose and are only operatively conscious on
the periphery of my consciousness. Who knows how my unconscious
is affecting this endeavor!

The intentions that guide human agency are not discrete, separate
presence lurking behind or accompanying social activity which can al-
ways be articulated in discourse. Rather, human intentionality flows
continuously through time and is generally embedded in routine (the
tacit stocks of knowledge). It is only imperfectly expressible in discourse.
Like practical consciousness, intentions are usually habitual; when we
develop certain skills, we also learn the appropriate intentions that give
public purpose to the exercise of those skills.12

A basic theorem regarding human agency is that every social actor
knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society
of which she or he is a member.13 In fact we become effective mem-
bers of that society by learning what to do in certain standard situ-
atons, the standards having been set by our forebears and kept alive
through the repeated practices of our contemporaries. A corollary to
this basic theorem is the principle that language relates the self and the
world via practices.14 The world is not a set of discrete objects, but the
malleable in which social actors intervene. A tree is not merely an
object with a brown trunk and green leaves, best known from the

11 *The Constitution of Society*, 2-7


13 *Central Problems in Social Theory* 5.

perspective of a disinterested observer. It looks different to a gardener, a poet, a lumberjack, or someone late for an appointment. Objects in the world appear to practical consciousness in terms of their availability and interest to us.

A second basic theorem asserts that any agent could have acted otherwise. While freedom can be limited by the unconscious or external interference, neither society nor its institutions operates behind the backs of social actors who are always held accountable if, on occasion, only in a diminished sense. There is no such thing as "I was only doing my job."

The practical consciousness that drives human agency is a social reality. We reason with concepts that are publicly shared and look to fellow agents for like mindedness. We become free by acting in concert with our fellows and are held accountable by them for what we do. Responsible action is first and foremost a social reality; individual conscience can be attained by withdrawing from the crowd, but, first, we need to master how the rest of the crowd does it.

Externalization

How is society produced by human beings? Unlike the remainder of the animal kingdom, humans are biologically world-open. Little of their behavior is done instinctively or determined by their physical environments. Lest their lives descend into chaos, they repeat certain actions until the very reproduction of those actions achieves an economy of effort and becomes recognizable as defined patterns of behavior. When these patterns of action are reciprocally typified by the actors involved, human beings have externalized themselves into a society.

University classrooms exemplify such externalization. Teachers enter these classrooms, having learned from their mentors and, through such mentoring, having mastered how to teach. They know that lectures need to have a beginning, middle, and end and to be punctuated with humor as changes of pace. They also know how to link their theoretical expositions to apposite examples and illustrations. They can recognize and entertain questions from their students without losing their

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15 Ibid., 56.
16 The Social Construction of Reality, 28-34.
trains of overall thought or letting the lecture lose its momentum. Teachers also can lead discussions of assigned readings, asking questions of the students and showing pleasure or pain when the latter give good or bad answers. Most significantly students enter these classrooms knowing what to expect from their teachers. And the students have learned appropriate behavior in response to their teachers’ teaching. They take notes, ask questions if puzzled, and try to get recognized when a question about the readings addresses an issue which they have well understood. This mutuality of teaching and attending class behavior reproduces itself over a term with concomitant recognition by the social actors what actions teachers and students appropriately perform in the classroom. It is this mutuality of behavioral reproduction and recognition that makes these actors whose paths might never have otherwise crossed into a society.

Language plays a crucial role in the production of a society. Language provides publicly available and enduring indices which mediate a common world to all the social actors. Language has a coercive facticity about it. It mediates to us the world we know and we are not free to say whatever we like in language—at least if we want to be understood. Language is a game whose rules we must follow if we are to play the game well. Through language our everyday lives are endowed with order. Language enables us to perceive phenomena in pre-arranged patterns. In American English the word *compromise* means that two or more parties work out a certain agreement where each party gives and gets a little; in French *compromise* means that one party has given in. In both the U.S. and France, the identical phenomena are perceived quite differently—in one case the behavior is deemed by and large acceptable, in the other it is likely to be judged harshly—because the two languages have it in different ways. Finally, in language, our everyday lives possess an inter-subjective character. In language’s self-evident and taken-for-granted routines, all the actors in a society share with one another

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17Twenty-five years ago I was helping a friend in Paris translate an article from English into the French. One of our problems was how to translate the word *discussion* which in the U.S. means a sharing of various viewpoints. The French word *discussion* means a fight whether physical or verbal. We finally settled on *debat*, which is very close to *debate*, as the best translation. This experience considerably enlightened the behavior I had been observing during the seminars I was attending.
stocks of common sense knowledge. Our everyday lives have a certain style to them—a style that endures by means of the defined ways according to which we speak to each other.\textsuperscript{18} A visitor to a Jesuit community who says “Ignatius” and expects his hosts to know he is talking about Ignatius of Antioch is in for a rude shock. Most religious communities in the church have their stylized ways of speaking to each other that occasionally befuddle outsiders. These styles of languaging, however, play a crucial role in making the members of the religious community what they are.

The church produces itself first and foremost in the celebration of the Eucharist. In each celebration the people of God reproduce definite words and gestures recognizable as the way Eucharist is done. The various actors, whether the presider, persons in the assembly, choir, acolytes, gift-bearers, or ministers of communion, all have their typical roles to play. And each party knows not only how to play his or her role, but what counts for the others’ playing their various roles.

The language of the liturgy mediates to all the assembled the publicly available communal world of the paschal meal. This meal in language assumes a very definite order which enables the participants to perceive that the Eucharist is rightly administered and creates, furthermore, the intersubjective reality of church where members of the celebrating assembly know that they have participated in the saving events of Christ’s passion, death, and resurrection. The Eucharist is a prototypical instance of externalization: it involves face-to-face encounters which admit some flexibility, but every celebration relies on typified behavior from beginning to end.\textsuperscript{19} Our everyday lives, including worship, require dependable expectations of what people will say and how they will act.

One of the principal reasons why many Catholics resisted liturgical changes (or, even if enthusiastic about the novelty of it all, felt uncomfortable at the Eucharist until they could settle again into accustomed routines) is that Catholics know instinctively that every liturgical alteration changes the church that they are.\textsuperscript{20} When I was a child, the Mass

\textsuperscript{18}The Social Construction of Reality, 21-23, 30-38.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 28-32.

was said in Latin, a strange and foreign language, and the priest said Mass with his back to the people who could observe only snatches of his commerce with the mysteries. Little wonder, then, that priests in other contexts were called by the formal title, "Father," and treated with reverence. As a priest I have presided at Eucharists facing the people and using a language that we all understood. Members of the assembly call me "Dave" and expect their pastors to dialogue with them on parish issues and share authority.

Power

Externalization is not an innocent process. It can lead to societies where equality and fairness rule—or their opposites! Any adequate account of externalization, therefore, must speak of power: i.e., how autonomy and dependency among the members of any society are regulated. Power-relationships can be extremely subtle and are almost always reciprocal.²¹ Looking at an organization chart and drawing conclusions about how power is exercised can be deceiving. On thinks of British factories where shop stewards can lead a walk-off the job that brings even the Director of the firm to his knees. All of us have heard stories of parishes where the cook-housekeeper in the rectory was reputed to be the person who actually ran the parish.

Some power is coercive and often involves physical force. This type of power is most commonly found in agrarian societies where control of the land yields power. In coercive power, A has power over B to the extent that A can or does get B to do something B would otherwise not do. Here one focuses on decision-making and looks for observable conflict. Consensus reigns when there exists a lack of overt conflict.

A second type of power involves management. It is found in industrial societies where control of the means of production and of the ballot box produces power. A has power over B to the extent that A prevents B from participating in the decision-making process. Here one focuses on decision-making or the lack thereof (e.g., a low voter turnout). As long as no one protests, the power-laden life goes merrily on.

In our increasingly post-industrial societies, power is taking a new shape. In post-industrial societies, control of the media of communi-

²¹ Central Problems in Social Theory, 6.
cation and determination of the agenda have become crucial. A, in these societies, has power over B to the extent that A can or does get B to desire what is in A's interest and not in B's. In this third kind of power, one needs to focus on decision-making, but, more importantly, on how information is communicated and how the approach to certain questions comes about. Here consensus is achieved if we lack overt, covert, and latent conflict. Latent conflict occurs when contradictions are perceived between the interests of those in power and of those excluded from power.

Power today is more and more becoming the ability to exclude conflict or secure compliance by influencing, shaping, and determining the wants of the powerless. Power shapes perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that the oppressed accept their roles in the existing order because they cannot see or imagine any alternatives or because the extant order is seen as natural or unchangeable and perhaps valued as divinely ordained and beneficial.22 Much of the argumentation between liberals and conservatives in the U.S. turns on naming the problem. Do tax cuts unfairly reward the rich to the detriment of the poor and the middle class or do they stimulate the economy enlarging the pie so all can have more? Do cuts in welfare fall disproportionately on the weak (children, the disabled, the elderly) or do they encourage the shiftless to find jobs and stop having illegitimate children? Do increases in the discount rate ward off inflation so that wages of ordinary Americans are not eroded or do they reward bondholders and the banking community to the detriment of the rest of us?23

I said before that I preside at the Eucharist for people who call me by my first name. Obviously, I was speaking of liturgies at JSTB and St. Augustine's in Oakland. On occasion, however, I preside for assemblies for whom it would be unthinkable to address me that way. They are Hispanics, Filipinos, or other recently immigrated groups. For these people I am "Father," and they accord me a great deal of authority as an entitlement. I've also learned that "Father" brings obligations as well as authority for those who are called so. In this role reverence and expectations of benefaction [to them] go hand in hand. This point is worth

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23It should be noted that Anthony Giddens takes issue with Lukes whether this third kind of power really is so. CF. Central Problems in Social Theory, 89-91.
mentioning because moderns often confuse hierarchies with domination. Domination can exist indeed in hierarchical arrangements; but the very existence of a hierarchy does not automatically make one group of people autonomous and the other dependent. Reciprocity of roles can and often does characterize hierarchies. Those at the top are judged by whether they use their positions for self-interest or the benefaction of their underlings. In the first case domination occurs; in the latter the hierarchy issues in behavior appropriate for all parties.

Power, then, changes behavior, decisions, or desires. It can be resisted by refusing to change and/or resisting the sanctions that exist to punish recusants. Power can operate strategically or exist as an institution. Political campaigns involve strategy. The police have institutionalized power to arrest, question, detain, etc.24

The exercise of coercive power by members of the church is less common than in earlier centuries since the state and other secular agencies have taken over functions once deemed ecclesiastical. The Inquisition no longer meets on a regular basis in several venues around Christendom. One looks in vain for prisons in contemporary religious communities. Coercive power, however, is still exercised in the church. Occasionally, someone does get excommunicated, or a certain parish is placed under interdict. Theologians are silenced. Religious communities are reformed against their wills, or have their constitutions revised by church officials. And people lose their jobs at church-sponsored institutions for taking exception to a particular policy.

More common in the church are management conflicts and power-laden responses to these conflicts. At the parish level who is in charge? The pastor alone? The parish council? The ministerial team? What say do the people in the pews have in decision-making? How does the bishop deal with the senate of priests? His chancery staff? The Deans? The various pastors? Does he have and obligation to have and to heed a pastoral council? How does the bishop function as teacher of the faith of his dioceses in relationship to those who give religious instruction to children or teach theology at universities in his diocese? How are episcopal conferences related to Vatican congregations? Can one of the latter simply veto decisions of a national episcopal conference.

24Ibid., 190-193
If one looks at the issue of the ordination of women, one often sees exercises of the third kind of power: determining the questions and defining terms looms large. Is the ordination of women a closed or open question? Are we dealing with a profoundly theological issue or primarily a pastoral decision? What do episcopos, presbyter, priest, apostle, the twelve, etc. mean in the New Testament? How is what we glean from the church fathers conditioned by attitudes towards women in their time which we would repudiate today? Does the fact that Jesus of Nazareth was male and chose only males among the twelve, tell us something essential about, or accidental to, ministerial priesthood? Does the firmly held belief that no baptized person can claim a right to be ordained justify exclusion of women from the role of presbyter? In these very-much-alive debates, official church teachers generally exercise power institutionally; those who dissent often engage in power strategically.

**Objectivation**

Through externalization, human agents produce societies which attain facticity and confront those agents as realities in their own right. Externalization produces society by means of the habitualization of human behavior and its reciprocal typification by the actors involved. From the vantage point of objectivation, which enables societies to exist sui generis, the process of habituation, action and mutually recognizing it as such is called institutionalization.\(^{25}\) In other words, externalization and objectivation are not two discrete moments in the production of a society, but two sides of the same coin. The church is primarily neither a set of buildings nor a reality that can be depicted on an organization chart. It is a mutuality of roles and routines along with the shared expectations of what will be done and said, the performance and proclamation of the Eucharist being its paradigmatic moment.

For a society to remain objective, it needs a means to integrate the disparate institutions and more specific roles individuals have in the complex societies we inhabit.\(^{26}\) This means is called legitimation. The first way we legitimate our societies is through linguistic objectivations:

\(^{25}\) The Social Construction of Reality, 49-55.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 78-79.
the words we use to describe one another’s roles and routines. For instance, most of my students call me “Dave”; a few refer to me as “Father,” “Doctor,” or “Dean Stagaman.” These titles are linguistic objectivations. Furthermore, we legitimize our societies by means of proverbs, moral maxims, and wise sayings. In a very formal educational setting, one might hear, “All students are fools.” In the less formal situation where I administer and teach, faculty do say, “I think of my students as junior colleagues.” Legitimations can also be explicit theories which provide fairly comprehensive frames of reference. In *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Paolo Freire contrasts two quite different approaches to education: the banking method where the teacher is the expert and the students are dependent on the teacher’s expertise to the point where their learning is almost a completely passive affair; and an inquiry method where the students in the company of the teacher take a more active role, identifying the ways they are oppressed, especially by the language they speak, and then inquire how they might change this condition through learning.

For societies to endure over long periods of time and become embedded in culture, they must develop symbolic universes which integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass institutional order in a symbolic totality. Symbolic universes put everyone and everything in their place and proclaim all reality, even such marginal situations as sickness and death, meaningful and call upon the entire cosmos to ratify human existence as practiced and perceived in a particular society as valid.

In their groundbreaking work on the notion of a civil religion, Bellah and Glock provide examples of two symbolic universes. They observe that Europeans and Americans have quite different notions of the divinity. Europeans believe in a provident God who creates and cares for people in their place. By contrast early citizens of the U.S. were inclined towards a Deistic God who creates the world and mankind, but, then, leaves human beings ample space to work out their own destinies in freedom. While the Provident God (and its secularization in socialism) allows Europeans to maintain a comparatively rigid social class

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stratification, their parliaments felt free to adopt far-reaching welfare legislation to assist people whom God or society had placed in unfortunate situations. Here in the U.S. we see welfare as a set of rewards for the undeserving whose bad choices have led to their lot. We also exult in our social mobility. 29 Where people in the U.S. see psychological problems requiring therapy, Europeans see communal problems which require political action.

Legitimations are not rationalizations, i.e., the explanations actors give why they acted as they did. Nor are they a consensus that individual actors have come to. Legitimations are the interplay of a society’s values actualized as rights, obligations, and sectional interests. They consist of tacit knowledge skillfully applied in conduct as we reflexively (but not necessarily discursively) monitor our actions. 30 One can ferret out a legitimation by inquiring what are the intentions or purposes implicit in the routines of social actors.

One of the intriguing aspects of doing presbyteral ministry today is that the priest can encounter two sets of people in the pews for whom the social world differs remarkably: the Catholics who have grown up in the United States as cradle-to-grave Catholics, and whose ancestors once lived in Europe; and the recently immigrated church whether from Latin America, Southeast Asia, or elsewhere in the third world. The former invariably want to know my first name; for the latter calling me anything but “Father” is unthinkable. In the “Anglo” parishes, I hear maxims like “We believe in shared responsibility” or “We work collaboratively in this parish.” A friend of mine who does neighborhood organizing among Latinos tells me that a first principle in his profession is “If the pastor does not want you organizing in his parish, move on to another parish.” Much of the newly emerging Hispanic theology attempts to articulate theoretical and comprehensive frames of reference for the ecclesiastical world of Hispanic Catholics. Mainline theology in the U.S. often performs a similar function for the “Anglo” church.

30Central Problems in Social Theory, 57.
We do not legitimize our societies in the state of original justice. Many of our legitimations have ideological aspects. (Increasingly, social theorists do not speak of ideologies, but rather of ideological aspects of symbol systems.) The ideological consists of the capacity of hegemonic groups to make their own sectional interests appear to others as universals.\(^{31}\) If the ideological dominates our legitimations generally, we lose the consciousness that our social world has been and is being co-produced by men and women. Objectivation is absolutized while externalization comes to be disregarded. Free choices in this situation are replaced by fictitious necessities such that we no longer assume responsibility for and entertain possibilities of changing societal structures.\(^{32}\)

The ideological can invade our legitimations in at least three forms. First of all sectional interests come to be seen as universal. A few years ago, I reviewed a very good book, *A Democratic Catholic Church*?\(^{33}\) One of the most intriguing features of this collection of essays was that almost all the U.S. and European Catholic contributors viewed democracy as a benign system and urged parishes, dioceses, etc. to adopt many features of governmental democracy while the Latin American essays were profoundly suspicious of democracy, viewing it as a form of government where dominant groups manipulate governmental institutions in their own self-interest. Clearly, these U.S. and European authors had the right to argue that, in many instances, the church ought to be more democratic. But the universalization of their plea was clearly ideological.

Secondly, we can deny or obscure the locus of contradictions discoverable in our societies. The system does not need fixing; its improvement depends on better individual compliance. When we speak of a vocation crisis in regard to priests in the U.S., is the problem that American males lack the generosity to devote their lives to the church? Or is the problem systemic, viz., that the restriction of access to ordination of men willing to live as celibate no longer makes sense?

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\(^{32}\) *The Sacred Canopy*, 85-93.

Finally, we can reify or naturalize the present, preserving the status-
quo by inhibiting recognition of the mutable, historical character of
human society and its practices. Many of the calls for inculturation
in theology involve an awareness that much missionary activity in the
past has reified western European cultural Catholicism as the only le-
gitimate expression of the gospel.

In a splendid book, *Silence*, Shusaku Endo confronts the
inculturation of Christianity in Japan, and its lack thereof. The central
character is a Jesuit priest, Sebastian Rodriguez, who is sent as a mis-
sionary from Portugal to Japan. After a prologue which sets the stage
for the departure of Rodriguez, the first part of the book consists of let-
ters reporting his journey to and his early days in Japan where he mostly
hides in the mountains from the authorities who have outlawed Chris-
tianity. The Christians for whom he has come to minister suffer griev-
ously because the police suspect that they are harboring a priest. The
dominating image of this portion of the novel is a portrait in Portugal
of the triumphant Christ. Sebastian Rodriguez arrives in Japan as a
missionary version of the Conquistador. From a literary perspective, the
letters of Rodriguez back to Europe reveal an omniscient narrator who
writes of not only his own thoughts and feelings, but also of those of
every other character in the story.

In the next section, a narrative in which we are told of Rodriguez’
actions, he descends into the “mudswamp” of Japan and of his own hu-
manity. As he tries to make contact with the Christians and is eventu-
ally arrested, a key passage in his last letter come to be the controlling
image of this section:

Squatting down I stirred the water [of the pool] to dampen my
neck, now bathed in sweat. The clouds disappeared from the wa-
ter and instead there appeared the face of a man—yes, there re-
lected in the water was a tired, hollow face. I don’t know why, but
at that moment I thought of a face of another man. This was the
face of a crucified man . . .

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34 *Central Problems in Social Theory*, 193-195.

nally published in 1969. I am grateful to Annette Moran for the analysis of the literary
aspects of Endo’s authorship.

As the letters give way to the narrative, the core images become bodily: Endo speaks of face, skin, blood, but especially of the various characters’ eyes. His narrator takes a more humble, less judgmental stance, simply describing the actions of the various characters. After his arrest, Rodriguez is interrogated by Inoue, the Lord of Chihugo, and meets his former professor of theology and former Jesuit Provincial of Japan, Christivao Ferreira (an actual historical figure who did indeed apostatize). The divine silence is broken when Rodriguez is invited to do the same deed as Ferreira’s, but which for him is an act of obedience to the Crucified One.

_Silence_ concludes with a diary and a report. The diary is penned by a Dutch trader who calls Ferreira blackhearted and refers to him as Peter. Rodriguez he calls a priest and refers to him as Paul. Like Paul at the ends of _Acts_, Sebastian Rodriguez is under house arrest and is considered an apostolate by his fellow Jesuits (as the apostle Paul presumably was by the first century Jews when he preached the God of Jesus Christ to them and any Gentile who cared to listen). The report comes from a Japanese policeman. He reports that Kichejuro, a young Japanese who interprets for, betrays, and asks forgiveness from Rodriguez, is now firm in the faith. Rodriguez dies in the year of the cock—a Japanese mode of counting the years, but also the transformation of a key image from Christ’s passion (cocks crow several times in the novel).

For Endo the equation of the gospel with European Christianity and the attempts by western missionaries to foist that Christianity on the Japanese is an exercise in domination maintained by the ideological. He asks whether we western Christians are prepared to accept an inculturation of the gospel in Japan that might appear heterodox to our eyes. A key technique in _Silence_ is the fact that Endo acknowledges two groups of Japanese who keep the faith alive in the face of persecution: the martyrs who give their lives for the faith (honored as saints in the western calendar) and those who go on living Christianity in secrecy at home while giving every public appearance of having abandoned their faith (often called “Two-Faced” in the West).

**Internalization**

Via internalization society produces the members who continue that society in existence. The production in question requires that the
members be socialized into the habits and typifications of the community and, then, maintain that community through repetition of typical actions and expectations. Socialization can be either primary or secondary. Primary is undergone in early childhood and renders the child an effective member of society. It also has two moments.

The child’s first social task is to develop a “significant other.” The baby internalizes attitudes, feelings, and basic moves towards itself in an undifferentiated manner on the part of others, especially its parents. Eventually, the toddler sees itself and others as a reflection of these feelings, attitudes, and moves. It also sees the others as distinct from itself. The accomplishment of this first societal task takes roughly the first two years of a child’s life and yields a coherent and plausible identity. This identity is by and large fixed for the rest of life and must be accepted rather than challenged if we are to mature as adults. In acquiring this identity, the child learns to speak and say things such as “My mommy [a particular woman, stocky, with brown hair, etc.] wants me to stay clean.”

The next societal task involves the formation of a “generalized other.” This task requires about five more years (to what is often called in moral theology “the age of reason”) and introduces the youngster to the sum total of the values, norms, and expectations of the group. The groups in contemporary society are various: the family, the ethnic group, the nationality, the church, the media, the neighborhood, including the town or city where the child grows up. At the end of this second period of five years, the child can say, “It is dangerous to cross the street without an adult.”

This latter task of socialization today is complicated by the fact of pluralism. The agencies that socialize the child also compete with one another over what values, norms, and expectations are appropriate to become an effective member of any society. The child confronts agencies that sometimes confirm, and at other times, disconfirm what the

37 Following Erikson, Giddens breaks this task into three stages: (1) the oral-sensory where the infant via the mother learns to trust or mistrust reality; (2) the muscular-anał where, through mastering, holding onto or letting go of things, the child attains autonomy or becomes shame-faced; and (3) the locomotor-genital where the child struggles between agency and guilt. Cf. The Constitution of Society, 51-60.

38 The Social Construction of Reality, 129-137.
parents, for instance, say and desire. As a result, some parental values, norms, and expectations are weakened in relation to others. Finally, there is a special feature of pluralism that affects the churches in particular. In the modern world religious associations have lost the taken-for-granted status they possessed in traditional societies. As a consequence, belonging to a church has become a matter of free choice—even for children!

Secondary socialization also exists. Individuals are inducted into new-to-them sectors of society when, as adults, they take jobs, join fraternal organizations, etc. In these new roles, they need to acquire and master a vocabulary specific to that role and the routine interpretations of the social world expected from someone in that role. The practice of medicine in the U.S. requires that its professionals use a vocabulary often opaque to the patients and adopt routine interpretations of the medical social world that can affect even the doctor’s political outlook.

Socialization is never simply the passive imprinting by society on the individual, even in infancy. The infant is at the very outset of life an active partner in the process, giving a man and a woman new titles “mommy” and “daddy” and re-ordering their lives as they need a babysitter for a night out or find themselves increasingly forced to communicate non-verbally. Socialization involves the mastery of “dialogical” contexts of communication which are not simply a set of competencies stored in the learner. Every parent can tell you a thing or two the child at the earliest of ages has taught them.

Primary and secondary socialization can be and often are intertwined, especially in religious associations. Think of the phrase “born again” uttered by or about an adult. We never stop being socialized. The process runs the whole of the life cycle, including our becoming senior citizens. Anthony Giddens has suggested that socialization might be better termed the succession of generations.

Once human agents have been socialized into a society, they must maintain it. Much societal maintenance is of a routine nature. In

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39 Ib. d., 125 & 167.
42 Central Problems in Social Theory, 129-130.
conversation, groups reproduce their social reality as the cohesive order and particular view of life embedded in their languaging is re-affirmed. These day-after-day conversations develop plausibility structures. Certain practices, these ways in which agents interact, come to have a taken-for-granted character. The practices familiar to all actors become the ways things are said and done. Continuity of a society depends heavily on these conversations. Social actors must continually reproduce the society in a process where established attitudes and cognitive outlooks woven into their linguistic practices are "regrooved". Chaos always lurks at the margin of socially constructed orders and is felt by members as a vague anxiety that all may not be firm and in order.

Sometimes, however, our conversation partners change (we move to another state or a foreign country) or the ones we have withdraw support (usually after we have said or done something that offends the group ethos). Such breaks in the conversational apparatus of our social life call for crisis-maintenance. Our lives have become "de-routinized", and our social reality needs to be newly constructed. Often we have to repudiate the former social world in part or in whole. We find justifications for the new, as well as the sequence by which we moved from the old to the new social world. We might even attempt to retroject aspects of the new into the old.

Social theorists speak of four possible behaviors as social actors engage in crisis-maintenance: assimilation; withdrawal; negotiation; and incorporation. Assimilation involves total surrender to the new social reality. It occurs rarely and only after a radical disruption of group routines has occurred which has a corrosive effect on customary behavior. In the process the anxiety level mounts, behavior of individual agents begins to regress, and members of the group become vulnerable to heightened suggestibility. Then, members of the "de-routinized" group start identifying with the authority figure who disrupted their everyday lives at the start of the process.

44 Central Problems in Social Theory, 128.
46 Cf. the grid of Mary Douglas in her Cultural Bias (London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1978), 5-9 & 19-21.
If the group withdraws, it becomes a sect. The differences between negotiation and incorporation are twofold. In negotiation the group maintains its separate identity, but makes accommodations to get along with the other, usually dominant, group. In incorporation, a minority enters into the social world of the dominant majority, but on terms which allow the incorporating minority to maintain many of its customs and practices. Secondly, negotiation is frequently a step along the way to incorporation.

Changes in the overall routine of any group are normally incremental. Even such changes as the use of inclusive language in American English have taken place against the backdrop of a mostly stable language. Crisis-maintenance becomes a necessity after external influences have intervened in our lives. We've lost a war or a natural disaster has taken place. In modern societies where pluralism reigns supreme, the maintenance of the social world is a fragile process. The divergent interpretation of established norms de-stabilizes the social order. Finally, modernity has disavowed tradition as a legitimate form of legitimation. Thus, social practices are mobilized in pursuit of their own transformation. Since traditions and their associated practices are crucial for the stability of any social reality, modern societies are inherently less stable than their predecessors.\(^{48}\)

The importance of socialization as an induction of the young into any society helps explain why the church has placed so much emphasis on the family and the religious instruction of the young. The early socialization in the family is crucial for later Christian practice. Is the child spoiled rotten? Then, what will calls for generosity or self-sacrifice mean in later life? Is the child made to think that he is the center of the universe? If so, what is the likelihood that this person will embrace the virtue of humility? Or rather has the child been robbed of all self-confidence during her upbringing? Is she a likely candidate to proclaim the good news boldly as an adult? The intuitive grasp on the part of the church that secondary socialization exists explains why religious communities have given such prominent attention to formation of their young, and why seminaries place formation of priestly candidates on the same level as their academic education.

\(^{169}\) See Giddens' commentary, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, 125-126 and *The Constitution of Society*, 60-64.

\(^{48}\) *Central Problems in Social Theory*, 220-221.
The church proclaims that all its members, whether children or adults, are daughters and sons of God. It also preaches that childlikeness is a virtue expected of all. Clearly, the church does commingle primary and secondary socialization, especially in its insistence that ongoing conversion is desirable in all adherents. But, depending on the success of primary socialization, not everyone emerges with a coherent identity, and some people are more convertible than others. Thus, the church may be preaching the impossible, or at least the improbable, to many of its members.

Socialization into the church also confronts pluralism in the broader society and within the church itself. The church’s values, norms, and expectations are less likely to be assimilated if they clash with those of women and men of good will outside the church. In the tug of war between official church teachers and those who dissent, the teaching and the dissent both get relativized. Official church teaching now enters a public arena over which the officials have little control. If a teaching clashes with the givens of the larger society, the teaching may not only be questioned, but is more likely to meet with lip service or some other kind of half-hearted response. Dissenters to this teaching may be eloquent but, given the initiative naturally accorded the magisterium, fellow church members are most likely to regard those who dissent as at least a little bit suspect.

The numerous dialogues that characterize sacramental ritual (especially the call and response patterns) insure that conversation exists at the core of ecclesiastical life (the ritualized nature of the patterns does not make them less conversational). We also converse with each other during parish council meetings, diocesan pastoral councils, and priests’ senates. We do the same less formally in the parking lot after Mass or at church suppers. One notices crisis-maintenance in the biographies of adult converts to the church, especially the phenomenon of retrojection. In arguments over authority, one can note several basic moves by the various parties in the church: surrender, negotiation, incorporation, and withdrawal. The last does occur, but it frequently takes its adherents to the margins of the church if not outside its boundaries.

The modern quest to delegitimize tradition as a valid form of legitimation provides an explanation to the church’s well-known opposition to modernity. While this opposition has often been branded as stodginess, it is important to notice what the stakes are. Traditions carry
any society, but religious groups more so than others. Thus, the church’s hostility to modernity deserves to be judged in some ways as a mark of its practical wisdom.

The U.S. church, as we have already mentioned, is presently composed of two divergent groupings: the mainline Anglo church and the church of the recently immigrated. The recently immigrated often continue to live via a traditional culture. Traditional cultures are organic unities whose members see things holistically. Physical, mental, and spiritual health are inseparable. A stomach ache in the morning is just as likely to be ascribed to an argument with a friend the night before as to the meal eaten. The basic contexts for life are person-to-person, person-to-family, and persons-to-group. Values, meanings, and behavior are determined by the family or the ethnic group; i.e., they are not decisions left to any individual. In traditional societies religion plays a central role, explaining the origins of the group while it cements together and legitimizes the unity of the whole. Latino youngsters in California rebel religiously by joining an evangelical church. Unless the family is altogether assimilated, it is unthinkable to consider not going to church at all.

Order in traditional societies is pre-established and by and large permanent. History is cyclical and static. The past provides legitimacy for the present. Change is not encouraged. Persons are objects, not subjects of history. They need to learn to “put up with it.” Instead of speaking of destiny, people in traditional societies want to know what fate has in store for them. “It is the will of God” constitutes the bedrock where all explanations come to an end.

These societies are arranged hierarchically in a pre-established social order where people know their proper places. Depending on one’s place in the hierarchy, one has a formal title appropriate to one’s station. Politeness and agreeableness are highly prized. Social and gender roles are highly determined. Yet certain terms like my people, brother, sister, etc. are affectively highly charged and give every member a strong identity in terms of the group.

In modern cultures, by contrast, the social world is composed of elements which follow their own dynamics and make their own

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49 Giddens observes that the widespread dissemination of literacy is a key determinant in the transition from traditional to modern societies. Certain elites may know...
universes. Thus, fragmentation, pluralism, and parties are possible and do regularly occur. Religion’s function is limited. It is one of a set of varied world systems which can exist autonomously. Secularized meanings are readily available. A basic context for life in a modern society is person-to-things.

The individual takes primacy over the group which is expected not to interfere with important decision by the individual person. This person strives to be responsible, yet often achieves such responsibility through competition and conflict with one’s fellows. Social, economic, and geographical mobility are highly prized. So is egalitarianism. We moderns call one another by proper names.

Order in a modern culture derives from consent and consensus. A person’s role can be just temporary since process and change lie at the core of this social world. People in modern cultures do have a destiny, often conceived to be of their own making. They act to enact personal ends and purposes. They also need laws to regulate their commerce with one another lest every modern culture become a jungle. The individual social actor is esteemed if she or he is open (informal) and direct (which may mean being impolite or disagreeable). 50

Structure

Our social worlds are highly structured. The way in which our interactive lives are structured enables the social world to perdure over time (as opposed to coming into being only to evanesce immediately). A structure is a virtual order of differences produced and reproduced in social action as its medium and its outcome. The word virtual means that we act according to determinate abilities or habits which exist between pure possibility and action. The preacher retains the ability to preach even during those hours devoted to sleep. Differences focuses on the social fact that one actor’s ability to do x is related to another actor’s ability to do y. Good preachers quickly learn that local assemblies can

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50 Marcello Azevedo, “Inculturation and Modernity,” Notes at Gregorian University (Spring, 1986).
differ profoundly in their responses. "Anglo" congregations show their respect by silence while African Americans show their interest by saying "Amen Brother!"\textsuperscript{51}

It is important to realize that our social world has its building blocks in human practices which are mutually produced. One person does one action while another responds with the appropriate, usually socially standardized, response.\textsuperscript{52} In relationships of equality, like marriage, the two spouses create a social world of marriage in making love, setting table while the other cooks, playing with the baby while the other runs the bath water. In hierarchical relationships where one actor is subordinate to another, these relationships consist of reciprocal practices. One party gives an order while a second carries it out or refuses. If the latter, the first party gives reasons for the order which may or may not lead to compliance. Then, the first actor will either give up on the order or avail herself or himself of the sanctions the particular society has for non-compliance.

Social life is recursive. Social actors produce and reproduce social life where this life exists first as a medium. The practices continue over time as enablement, allowing various actors to know what roles to play in particular situations. Social life also functions as an outcome. Social actors not only repeat what they have been socialized to do, but they enter into the social roles as active agents who can wring subtle, and even decisive, changes in that role.\textsuperscript{53} The white preacher in a black church may be at first unnerved by the "Amen Brother!" but he does get used to it and may even "get off on" the call-and-response pattern, teaching the congregation a new trick or two on their accustomed behavior.

Structures involve memory traces: actors must remember how to play their roles. The social practices involved are organized through the recursive mobilization of knowledge: teaching behavior functions in very definite relationships to expectations of how students will react. If they don't respond as we expect, teachers soon become unnerved. Practices presuppose capabilities: in the standard classroom, it is assumed that teachers and students can see, hear, speak, and write.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51}Central Problems in Social Theory, 3-5.
\textsuperscript{52}The Constitution of Society, 2.
\textsuperscript{53}The Constitution of Society, 19ff.
\textsuperscript{54}Central Problems in Social Theory, 64.
Space

Space is not an empty dimension into which social groups are structured. Rather, space provides the settings for social interaction. It plays a crucial role in enabling institutions to have a certain fixity. Space often is “zoned” so that the routines of social practices can occur. Modern houses allocate space so that the downstairs (living room, family room, halls, kitchen, and dining room) are used during waking hours while the upstairs with its bedrooms and bathrooms functions as a retreat from the cares of our waking hours and for sleep. When zoning changes its character (e.g., the factory replaces the home as the habitat for work), society changes as well.

Because space plays a crucial role in ecclesiastical society, the church builds churches so that its liturgical functions can operate without the necessity of re-invention each time. Churches have zones (the sanctuary with its altar, the pews and chairs below the altar for the assembly, confessionals or reconciliation rooms, sacristies, and so forth). In the middle ages, the great Gothic cathedrals had a capacity far exceeding the population of the town where they were located. They were built for the celebration of great feasts. Modern churches are smaller—built for an assembly located in a particular neighborhood and for Sunday Eucharists. Many newly constructed churches have an additional chapel for daily liturgies and their smaller assemblies.

Summary

By externalization, the social world is produced not only as a collaborative effort of peers, but also as the triumph of the powerful over the weak. This domination by the powerful is a matter of freedom of action, especially the liberty to get others to act, and of access to resources. In analyzing any social world, one needs to ask who controls the land, the democratic processes, the means of production, or the agenda. Does property, money in the bank, the “bully Pulpit” of headship, or ownership of a TV station make some actors “more equal

55 Ibid., 368.
56 Ibid., 118–119.
57 Ibid., 122.
58 Central Problems in Social Theory, 91–93.
than others”? Whose voices are heeded? Whose go unheard?

Through objectivation we possess the rules of speech and behavior that hold society together. Those rules do not merely constitute the plausible (the standardized interpretations of the way things are and ought to be), but are capable of various interpretations. When I as a child, told a false friend that he was guilty of “nigger loving” or one who gave a gift and took it back that he was an “Indian giver”, or someone who bargained hard that he had “jewed me down”, I was producing and reproducing by these phrases a social world that was highly prejudiced against African Americans, Native Americans, and Jewish Americans. As these groups intruded more and more on our everyday lives and grew in power, our languaging changed (in this case the familiar linguistic objectivations and maxims dropped out of our common stock of parlance). These groups objected to how we spoke (or differently interpreted those words and phrases).

Finally, via internalization, we learn to speak a language which conveys meaning (the way things are), but also includes praxis (we enter language as active agents who can critique our practices in terms of the desirable life in common). In language, semantic rules play crucial roles. How we put words together gives a certain style to our lives. A friend from the South tells me that he was corrected as a child for saying “nigger lady”; he should have said “nigger women” since ladies had to be white. In my own lifetime, it has become self-evident that movements for social change have paid special attention to language. The civil rights movement has changed the rules for the ways whites spoke to blacks and vice versa. So has the women’s movement concentrated on linguistic interactions between males and females.

The social worlds we inhabit operate in a dialectic fashion. Knowledge and behavior are inextricably intertwined. We have already mentioned how changes in Eucharistic practice altered how Catholics thought about the church. Individual and social consciousness are

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59Ibid., 106-107.
60While I have been for the most part closely following Anthony Giddens, one aspect of his work cannot be accepted for an adequate analysis of the social construction of the church: his assertion that no teleology is possible in a social system (Central Problems in Social Theory, 7) and that teleology exists only within the conduct of social actors (Ibid 112).
constantly interacting. We care more about what our neighbors say and do than we care to admit. The authoritarian figure depends on lackeys for success. Persons who praise collaboration need fellows who actually collaborate. Theoretical knowledge is always situated within the common sense knowledge of a given society. For instance, in writing this essay, I am presupposing a readership that is thoroughly modern and will permit me to chop the church up into its constitutive elements.\footnote{\textit{T. Howland Sanks}, \textit{Salt, Leaven, \& Light} (New York: Crossroads, 1992), 27-30 \& 35-36.} 

The church is, of course, more than a social construction. It is the body of Christ, the temple of the Holy Spirit, and the people of God.

That story has received a telling elsewhere.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, plus Avery Dulles, \textit{A Church to Believe in} (New York: Crossroad, 1982); \textit{——}, \textit{The Dimensions of the Church} (New York: Newman, 1967); \textit{——}, \textit{Modes of the Church} (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974); \textit{——}, \textit{The Resilient Church} (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977); Hans Kung, \textit{The Church} (New York: Sheed \& Ward, 1967) tr. Ray \& Rosa Leen Ockenden; Karl Rahner, \textit{The Shape of the Church to Come}, tr. Edward Quinn (New York: Seabury, 1974); Juan Luis Segundo, \textit{The Community Called Church} (tr. John Drury (New York: Orbis, 1973); Francis Sullivan, \textit{The Church We Believe In} (New York: Paulist, 1988), and my favorite, Yves Congar, \textit{L'Eglise} (Paris: Cerf. 1970).} The purpose of this essay was to examine rigorously the human face of the church.