Konsepto at Pag-asa ayon kay Ferriols

Abstract

In this paper I discuss Roque J. Ferriols’s understanding of and objection to using concepts for philosophical reflection. I show that Ferriols’s objection to conceptual thinking can be diffused by a turn to Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance. To illustrate the case, the focus is turned on hope, which Ferriols discusses in connection with his translation of Gabriel Marcel’s “Sketch of a Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Hope” from French to Filipino. After giving an exposition of Ferriols’s understanding of concepts and the basis of his objection to conceptual analysis and elaboration on conceptual schemes, I argue that a concept of hope is necessary for understanding and living out the mysterious and fleeting experience that Marcel describes in his essay. Finally, I suggest that adopting a Wittgensteinian understanding of concepts in a philosophical reflection on hope requires it to be informed by psychological, ethnographic, and other related empirical findings about the phenomenon.