

An Epic Vision of Christianity¹

OLIVIER ABEL

FONDS RICŒUR, INSTITUT PROTESTANT DE THÉOLOGIE
PARIS-MONTPELLIER

Abstract

In the late 1950s Paul Ricoeur wrote a programmatic essay on his vision of Christianity. Out of this essay could be gleaned an epic tone that has seemed to turn inaudible. This article seeks to make such epic tone audible. First, it situates the context out of which the epic strand in Ricoeur’s “theology” has emerged and asks why he would even dare to speak of theology as epic. Second, the article dwells on the kind of reader, author, and character the epic genre generates and asks who is capable, not only of reading and heeding the epic, but also of acting and working in an epic way. The final section surfaces the meaning and the limits of the epic.

Key terms *Ricoeur, Hegel, epic, narrative, evil, redemption, imagination*

¹This text for the conference in Manila is a restatement, with modifications concerning some important points, of a paper presented during a Ricœur conference at the University of Strasbourg in 2013 and which appeared in the proceedings of the conference edited by Daniel Frey, *La jeunesse d'une pensée* (Strasbourg: Presses de l'Université de Strasbourg, 2015), 135–44.

The following remarks aim to make audible the epic tone of the “young” Ricoeur, speaking of his vision of Christianity in a text at the end of the 1950s, “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” which appeared in the Protestant and Socialist journal *Christianisme social* in 1960 and reprinted in the second edition of *History and Truth*. What one hears from this text is a confessing word (rather than a believing or confessional one), and one hears from there a *tone* which then seems to become inaudible, and, even for Ricoeur himself, impossible. Here is an excerpt which gives an example of the tone of *that* Ricoeur.

Such is the panoramic fresco that I wished to place before you in order to give tone, measure, and proportion to our reflection. It opens us neither to an active pessimism nor to a tragic optimism—which in the last analysis is the same thing—but rather to an *epical* sense of our personal existence situated again within the perspective of a vaster epic of mankind and creation.²

This text is the last in a series under the heading “Theological Perspectives.” It could be said that what we have here is his “little theology,” in the same way that we have in *Oneself as Another* his “little ethics.” I would first like to sketch in broad strokes the place of the epic in this “theology” and ask why Ricoeur dares to speak here of theology as epic. I would then, in a second part, like to ask what the subject of the epic is, that is to say, what kind of reader, author, and character is generated by the epic (among other major genres). In the third and last part, I will be inquiring about the meaning and the limits of the epic.

² Paul Ricoeur, “The Image of God and the Epic of Man” in *History and Truth*, trans. Charles Kelbley. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 112.

I would immediately have to mention that I encounter two objections: the first, without doubt the more serious, is that the epic, as a grand narrative—I would even say as the narrative of all narratives, insofar as a totalizing narrative—represents without doubt the most dangerous one the twentieth century has seen. One could even make the connection between Paul Ricoeur’s theology of recapitulation and Hegelian thought. We find it quite surprising to read a text so Hegelian, at a time when Ricoeur sought above all to think tragedy and evil; but perhaps it should not so much be surprising since several genres are necessary in order to approach such a theme.

As for the second objection, it is that “epic Christianity” is a contradiction in terms! We have there two kinds of ethics that are antagonistic to each other: Christianity advocates the love of enemies, humility, forgiveness, not taking heed of oneself. The epic, in contrast, recounts wrath, courage, the trials of the self. It was precisely Chateaubriand who had the idea, which certainly seemed to him urgent and indispensable to his time, of attempting to formulate an epic Christianity, one which would gather the two fragments of our civilization. One single author had been able, so he thought, to find this epic tone: John Milton in his *Paradise Lost*, an epic of human freedom, of which, it could rightly be said, Ricoeur gives a summary at the end of his text: “Perhaps it is necessary to believe that God Himself, wishing to be known and loved freely, ran this risk which is named Man.”³

³ Ibid., 149.

“Theological Perspectives”

Some points for context: In 1960 Ricoeur left Strasbourg to join the faculty of the Sorbonne. On a voluntary basis, he gives courses at the Protestant Faculty at boulevard Arago, he heads the Protestant Federation of Teaching; in short, he showed himself to be attached to this old French protestantism, which was committed to the ideals of freedom, the Enlightenment, the Republic, secularism, modernity. In 1960, he did not yet “understand” that he was, in the minds of French intellectuals, stuck in the same bag not only with left-leaning Catholicism, but with a Pétainist brand of Catholicism.

“The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” an article coming from a conference of the *Christianisme social* movement (to which somebody like Michel Rocard also belonged), of which Ricoeur had just been elected president, and was dedicated to his eldest son and daughter-in-law, is, in several respects, a programmatic text. It is the third of a series of three texts.

The first, which appeared in the same journal in 1958, is entitled “The Christian and the Meaning of History” and proposes a tripartite structure (the level of progress, the level of ambiguity, the level of hope) which we will find, differently formulated, in the twofold structure of our text. What is most important in this text is the refusal of the opposition, quite pronounced in Jacques Ellul⁴, between the progress of modernity and Christian eschatology. There is an accumulation of knowledges, works, experiences, techniques: “We had to begin, therefore, by presenting a rather broad view of history as the accumulation of traces and the deposit of human works

⁴ Another influential intellectual of the Reformed Church of France, famous for his critique of the “technological bluff”.

detached from their authors, something analogous to liquid assets.”⁵
 Now this epic idea, that

the whole of humanity—I am reminded of this beautiful expression from Pascal—is like a single man who unceasingly learns and remembers, no longer touches anyone . . . The early Greek Fathers . . . sensed it collectively, a sort of mystical body which would be the image of Christ. This kind of wholesale divinisation, which in many ways is found in the thought of Teilhard de Chardin, this planetary epic of men appears completely fragmented in the particular and even individual projects for well-being.⁶

In “The Christian and the Meaning of History,” however, Ricoeur is more Kantian in his approach to the level of hope: there is to be sure a meaning, but it is hidden, it remains to be imagined and to be interpreted. Ricoeur writes thus: “a civilization does not advance *en masse* nor does it stagnate in every respect. It has several schemata. . . . The tide does not rise at the same time on all the shores of a nation’s life.”⁷ And this is why he will be able, at the end of this text, to put forward the position that

In order to guard against fanaticism, it is helpful not only to multiply explanatory outlooks, but also to maintain, from a practical point of view, the sense of the discontinuity of problems . . . but on the contrary, are we

⁵ Ibid., 84. Moreover, Ricoeur speaks of “this epic of human works without man,” *ibid.*, 85

⁶ « Sens et fonction d’une communauté ecclésiale » (“The Meaning and Function of an Ecclesial Community”), 23–24, unpublished photocopy from 1967, Fonds Ricoeur.

⁷ “Christianity and the Meaning of History,” in *History and Truth*, trans. Charles Kelbley. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 88.

not forced to say that things are much more complicated and confused? The Manichaeism in history is foolish and wicked.⁸

The second of these texts is entitled “The *Socius* and the Neighbor” and dates from 1954. It sets forth a pragmatic reversal of the theme of the neighbor, understood, according to the “Calvinist” reading of the Parable of the good Samaritan, not as a sociological category but as a practice: “to make oneself a neighbor to. . . .” This reversal makes it possible to place the immediate relations (individual) and the mediated relations (institutionalized) in a broader dialectic which blurs their opposition. The social bond is never so close and deep, never so immense and universal; and the love of the neighbor, recast unceasingly through the *incognito* character of the face of Christ (“When were you hungry and we gave you food?”), never ceases to make our relations operate in both directions. Sometimes charity passes through the anonymous institutions of public offices, sometimes it criticizes them, and demands of the rules of justice to better integrate care.

We could intersperse here a number of other texts, which appeared in the journal *Christianisme social* and which were not reprinted in *History and Truth*, but which bear no less witness to this epic strand. I think notably of “The Technological Adventure and its Global Horizon” (1958), “Adventures of the State and the Task of Christians” (1958), and “From Nation to Humanity: Task of Christians” (1965).⁹

⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁹ These three texts have reappeared during their author’s lifetime in *Autres Temps*, n° 76–77, entitled “Paul Ricœur. Histoire et civilisation. Neuf textes jalons pour un Christianisme social” [Paul Ricœur. History and Civilization. Nine Landmark Texts toward a Social Christianity], 2003.

Translator’s note: The last two texts have appeared in English in the collection *Political and Social Essays*, ed. David Stewart and Joseph Bien (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974), 201–16 and 134–59 respectively.

The third of the texts retained in the section “Theological Perspectives” of *History and Truth*, that which interests us here, “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” articulates from the very start its ethical agenda: it is an issue of making space for the breadth and depth of evil, downfall, the irrational, the absurd, but also for the breadth and depth of the good, salvation, grace, the rational, meaning.¹⁰ I would like to add here that the context of its publication in *Revue du christianisme social* shows how much this article targets a certain individualist protestantism where sin is reduced to moral guilt, and where grace is reduced to the “recruitment of the lone chosen ones,” at the expense of the more communal, political, and even cosmic dimensions of ruin and redemption.

Ricoeur is going to explore this across the registers of the three passions described by Kant in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*: the passions of having, power, and worth. In each of these registers, we have the paradox that the advances of rationality are also the advances of irrationality, and that we must think them together. It is therefore necessary for us to get out of a purely moral, in the narrow sense, conception of evil, but as well of a purely theological, spiritual, or rather pious one of salvation. If there is forcefulness in Marx, Machiavelli, and Hegel thinking the economy, politics, and culture, it is because they are not moralizing.

Looking carefully at the table of contents, one can say that the text sets the program of an important section of the second part of *History and Truth*, that which concerns the question of power.

But this text is also programmatic for the whole of his philosophy. One can see a pluralist ontology, an ontology of act and

¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, “Guilt, Ethics, and Religion” in *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 439. Ricoeur will propose to “incorporate evil into the epic of hope.”

of duration, an ontology of originary affirmation capable of understanding and including (*comprendre*) negativity at work there. One also sees the importance of a whole new language—understood as the paradigm of what holds human beings together, of the communal and the individual, of work and the word, of structure and the event—affirmed there. The importance of the narrative and of history as plot is also noticeable there.

Finally, one sees there the central role of imagination, of utopia, and of imaginative creativity. Imagination here heeds the command of existence. I will retain three things from this poetic, prophetic, and prospective function of the imagination. First, one can relate this with what Ricoeur calls elsewhere the “ethical-mythical nucleus” of cultures: it is the idea that there is always already an imaginary core, with images of the good life, with visions of the world, and that only a poetic intervention can agitate and disrupt the orientation of this imaginary. In the second place, one sees that the imaginary here is the element of recognition (the image of the self and the image of the other), and that this mutual recognition is borne by the mediations through which this imaginary is instituted (this word institution comes up again and again all throughout the text, and Ricoeur even says the real meaning of the institution touches this imaginary institution and that it is open to a psychoanalysis of the imagination¹¹). There is, therefore, besides domination by force or economic profit, a specifically cultural alienation of the human image, which affects and mystifies all the way to the recesses of our relations. And there is, besides the political institutions (which set the bounds for the relations of power) and the economic institutions

¹¹ One thinks, of course, of Cornelius Castoriadis, but in 1960, Ricoeur is at the Sorbonne, then a colleague of Bachelard, and one can also liken the development of Ricoeur to that of Bachelard. But the institutional dimension is obviously lacking in Bachelard.

(which set the bounds for the relations of profit), a place for the “traditions of the imaginary” that institute the possibility of mutual recognition. The third thesis which I will retain in the text of Ricoeur, with regard to the imagination, concerns the “utopic function of culture.” This function is borne here by the figure of the scandal and the untimely artist.¹²

But what is more epic in this text seems to me to be a matter of style. When Ricoeur writes at the beginning of the text:

I should like to begin, therefore, with the consideration of the most grandiose interpretation given to it by some of the Greek and Latin fathers . . . Let us think about the scope of the revolution in the history of thought that this text represents in relation to that Neo-Platonism

and when, farther, he adds, “I am proceeding timidly on hazardous pathways, and I would ask you whether it is hope which calls us onward or the seductive influence of the world . . .”¹³, one recognizes the tone which belongs to the epistles of Paul, this combination of interiority, of expressiveness, of tensility.¹⁴ One could say that it is this tone which has disappeared with the years in Ricoeur, even if, at bottom, I believe that this ancient epic core has always been there, up to the very end—which is also what it means for the moral norm to have recourse to the ethical intention.

¹² Who doesn’t know whether one is destroying or building, whether one is master of truthfulness or of seduction, and that is why the restlessness of “false consciousness”—incongruous, delayed/dislodged—is insurmountable.

¹³ “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” in *History and Truth*, 110–111, 126.

¹⁴ In any case, it is understandable that someone who explains himself this way is not a product of the *École normale supérieure* and could not be admitted to the *Collège de France*!

The Epic Subject

What then is the subject of the epic? What is this subject capable of the epic, capable of reading and heeding the epic, but also capable of acting and working in an epic way? We are crossing here from the theological to the anthropological, and recall that 1960 marks precisely the appearance of *Fallible Man*, of which it cannot be said enough that it was for Ricoeur himself one of his favorite books, one of those which in his regard was the most accomplished. What I will be testing here is the possibility of bridging the epic and fragility, and to see in fragility the heart of an epic anthropology, that is to say of an anthropology capable of thinking the possibility of evil but capable as well of thinking the possibility of salvation—the idea would even be that only a theological anthropology, an anthropology exploring the share of inhumanity in the human and of humanity in the inhuman, to be in a position to think the capacity for radical evil and the possibility of reopening the human heart to absolute goodness. This lies in the discrepancy between the finite and the infinite, obviously coming from Descartes, but reinterpreted and radicalized by Kierkegaard: it is not only cognitive error which is the effect of this finite/infinite discrepancy, it is also ethical fault, and finally skeptical disgust. And as Ricoeur writes, “The ‘heart,’ the restless heart would be the fragile moment *par excellence*. All the disproportions . . . would be interiorized in the heart.”¹⁵

The heart, the *thumos*, is really the seat of epic courage, but, precisely, it is quite important for courage not to be dissociated from fragility. Whence the importance of what one could call the odyssey of feeling, which is a matter of the heart:

¹⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 82.

Feeling can be described only paradoxically as the unity of an intention and an affection, of an intention toward the world and an affection of the self. This paradox, however, is only the sign pointing toward the mystery of feeling, namely, the undivided connection of my existence with beings and being through desire and love. . . . The infinitude of feeling emerges clearly from the fact that no organized, historical community, no economy, no politic, no human culture can exhaust this demand for a totalization of persons, of a Kingdom in which, nevertheless, we now are and “in which, alone, we are capable of continuing our existence.”¹⁶

This is why the epic subject remains to the very end conflict, tension, “. . . this disproportion of βίος and λόγος, of living and thinking, of which our ‘heart’ suffers the primordial discord.”¹⁷

Then, the epic subject is a *we*, a subject indivisibly communal and singular, a plural subject. This is so first of all because it sets the stage for human action, in Hannah Arendt’s sense, which makes space for the plurality of actors. Epic timing is that where each of the characters enters the scene one by one and shows what they are capable of before finding themselves in the midst of others, in the chorus of spectators who authorize the newcomers by way of their approval or their complaints.

This plural subject is also a narrative subject, a subject who is narrated and who narrates. But it is not only the plurality of characters which counts here, it is the plurality of narrative points of view which

¹⁶ Ibid., 89 and 103. Ricœur takes up here a Kantian formula.

¹⁷ Ibid., 132.

assures that the plot is always plural and that the narrative is always shattered, broken. In the same way, then, that courage remains fragile, the epic narrative remains plural. At the same time, epic narration condenses, contracts time, and intensifies its conflictual nature. There remains therefore something unconsummated in the narrative. Moreover, the importance of the narrative in Ricoeur should not be overemphasized, as in certain readings of *Time and Narrative*: the narrative remains one genre among others, as one sees it in *Thinking Biblically*, and if there are particularly epic passages in the book of *Exodus*, in the crossing of the Sinai, in the history of a people making their way through the night, scattered and yet unbeknownst to themselves, there are others depending on completely different genres, that of everyday wisdom, or that of interpretation of the law, or that of prophetic imminence—in the same way that for Hegel the epic is, together with tragedy and comedy, an ancient genre among others.

Finally, the epic subject is bound to the anthropology of grand scales. One can speak of an epic when one is capable of magnifying, broadening the point of view, of expanding, of widening. One speaks of an epic when one takes our stories from the point of their general interest and not from their particular aspects, when our lesser stories (*petites histoires*) are set in a broader history (*histoire plus vaste*). One speaks of an epic when there is importance: each word, each singular gesture, then, can touch and attain totality. To act becomes at each moment metaphorical, that is to say, it is what it does in the present, but also what it shows and which is, however, absent. To act somehow signifies that the world is not yet accomplished. This feeling of “kingdomly” importance of words and deeds, has for its basis an epic anthropology of recapitulation. But the Kingdom is also Exile, the feeling of the fleeting in the chance setting which is our unfinished

world. And when it comes to what is important, we don't always know where to find it. An insignificant thing can turn out to be quite important, and the enormity of something imposing itself on everything can end up being nothing but a bluff. It is the theme of the *incognito* that we encountered a while back: "It seems to me that the eschatological Judgment means that we 'shall be judged' on what we have done to persons, even without knowing it.... For we do not know when we influence persons."¹⁸ What is important, therefore, is there, but we don't always know where, it remains to be imagined.

Meaning and Limits of the Epic

The great epic rhythm is ternary, in the sense that it narrates a descent and an ascent, a negativity and a recovery. As with Hegel, the narrative trajectory contributes to history as a whole the morphology of the grand narrative, with its narrative functions, its turning points, the variations of its profiles, these ordeals, and this drama of recognition of which characters like Ulysses and Joseph are the heroes. We find ourselves in an extensive and extended time, in the sway of great durations. We are here in the most classic theology of salvation: creation, fall, redemption. To the horrifying breadth of evil responds the epic scale of redemption.

Before getting to the danger that this vision might contain, it is worth taking time on the agenda of this Hegelian theodicy: Hegel is an anti-gnostic; for him, the world is not bad, it is not condemned to be thrown and to disappear. The rational is at work in the world, the world is intelligible and history has meaning. I would even be willing to say that what interests Hegel is not what overcomes, but what gives

¹⁸ Paul Ricoeur, "The *Socius* and the Neighbor," in *History and Truth*, translated by Charles Kelbley (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 109.

meaning to what is overcome, replaced, and taken up—it is here where one finds his “Christic” interpretation of life and history, along the same lines of the mystics of the Rhine. However, this grand narrative is very dangerous. On one hand, Hegel obviously serves as the template for the great nationalist narratives which rose to power up to the Great War. One looks to him again for a template, hardly secularized, for the great narrative of colonial and “liberator”. And it is still he who pursues the discourse of progress and development which, for better or for worse, manages the world today.

Philosophically, and on the other hand, we have long been detached from this: we don’t believe that there would be a master plot or a narrative so powerful as to integrate everything, to explain everything, to justify everything. We no longer believe in a language that would claim to say everything. In short, as Ricoeur declared in the third volume of *Time and Narrative*, it was necessary for us to “renounce Hegel” and to accept that narrative identity encounters its limit in encountering the non-narrative elements of identity: “the notion of narrative identity encounters its limit and has to link up with the non-narrative components in the formation of an acting subject.”¹⁹

And yet Ricoeur in a way already says all of this in our text. Precisely, the diverse downfalls of having, power, and worth do not form a system: there is no ruin of ruins, no ruin absolutely radical. In the same way, there is no eminent redemption which could sum up everything: the plurality of the spheres of human existence is insurmountable. Working during the same time on Kant, we see in

¹⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative. Volume 3. Narrated Time*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1988), 249. The section entitled “Should We Renounce Hegel?” is found on pp. 193–206.

the margins of Ricoeur's copy of the *Critique of Pure Reason* this handwritten annotation: "to limit is to commit."²⁰ He will write soon:

True evil, the evil of evil, is not the violation of an interdict, the subversion of the law, disobedience, but fraudulency in the work of totalization. . . . if the evil of evil is born on the way of totalization, it would appear only in a pathology of hope, as the inherent perversion in the problematic of fulfillment and of totalization. To put it in a few words, the true malice of man appears only in the state and in the church, as institutions of gathering together, of recapitulation, of totalization.²¹

For all these reasons, it seems to me that the epic proposed in "The Image of God and Epic of Man" is a broken epic, an archipelagic epic, an epic permanently in the state of desire. I would willingly say an epic de-totalized, in the sense of Moses dying without reaching the promised land. Or, to use another image, I will speak of a labyrinthine epic, of which none can have a synoptic point of view. If there remains an epic word to retain, a word which comes up again and again from the pen of Ricoeur, it is the word "amongst".

Concluding Remarks

What would happen if the epic, the epic genre, were to be eliminated? We could moreover ask the question with regard to all major genres: comedy, law, prophecy, hymn, wisdom. The epic would

²⁰ Translator's note: "*limiter, c'est militer*". There is a word play here that is impossible to capture in English. Suffice it to say that, apart from the anagram, "*militer*" in French does not have the exclusively negative connotation (acting *against*) that it has in English. Indeed, one could even say that here it has the positive connotations of engaging *in*, committing *to*, campaigning *for* On p. 2, the author of the paper uses the same verb in reference to Ricoeur's particular brand of Protestantism.

²¹ Paul Ricoeur, "Freedom in the Light of Hope", in *The Conflict of Interpretations*, ed. Don Ihde. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 423.

probably make a fierce comeback through the window (from behind, *par la fenêtre*), in wild and dangerous forms. In any case, the epic subject which we sought to describe would disappear with it: the subject of fragile courage, the subject of plural narration, the subject of anonymous importance. Moreover, only an epic discourse can bear and support for long a critical discourse, which would have the critical scope necessary for our time.

Hegel believed that each people has its own epic, its own bible, its founding book. As for Ricoeur, he evokes in “Universal Civilization and National Cultures” the ethical-mythical nucleus of each civilization.²² It seems to me that the epic points to this nucleus, that is to say to this language in an inchoate state, in a state of fusion before the separation of the spheres of language and human activities.²³ As he wrote in the third volume of *Time and Narrative*:

By fusing in this way with history, fiction carries history back to their common origin in the epic. More precisely, what the epic did in the sphere of the admirable, the story of the victims does in the sphere of the horrible. This almost negative epic preserves the memory of the suffering, on the scale of peoples, as epics and history in their beginnings transformed the ephemeral glory of heroes into lasting fame.²⁴

If the epic has something to do with the admirable, it is because friendship understood in an epic sense pushes each of us in turn to give our best, to give without counting the cost, go beyond oneself in

²² Paul Ricoeur, “Universal Civilization and National Cultures,” in *History and Truth*, trans. Charles Kelbley (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 280.

²³ In that sense, it can be said that the epic has a lot to do with “theology”, with what seeks to name this core.

²⁴ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3: *Narrated Time*, 188–89.

excellence. We are here at the heart of age-old morality. But contrary to the objection raised at the start, the spirit of Christianity is not opposed to the spirit of the epic; according to Simone Weil, it is the ultimate flowering of it: “The Gospels are the last marvelous expression of the Greek genius, as the *Iliad* is the first”²⁵ In fact, the epic spirit is the capacity to love one’s enemies, that is to say the minimal capacity of understanding through which we put ourselves in the place of our enemies’ friends, but also the capacity to withdraw oneself from the reign of force in order to regard one’s enemy humanely, with goodness, as in the scene where Achilles lifts Priam begging him for Hector’s body. Ricoeur, in his final years, read this text much; indeed, it is in his name that I propose to meditate on this last sentence of Simone Weil: “Perhaps they will yet rediscover the epic genius, when they learn that there is no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy, nor to scorn the unfortunate.”²⁶

Bibliography

- Frey, Daniel, ed. *La jeunesse d’une pensée*. Strasbourg: Presses de l’Université de Strasbourg, 2015.
- Ricoeur, Paul. “Christianity and the Meaning of History.” In *History and Truth*, translated by Charles Kelbley, 81–97. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965.

²⁵ Simone Weil, “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force,” *Chicago Review* 18, no. 2 (1965): 27.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

- . *Fallible Man*. Translated by Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- . “Freedom in the Light of Hope.” In *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, edited by Don Ihde, 402–24. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- . “Guilt, Ethics and Religion.” In *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, edited by Don Ihde, 425–39. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- . «Histoire et civilisation. Neuf textes jalons pour un Christianisme social» [Paul Ricoeur. History and Civilization. Nine Landmark Texts toward a Social Christianity]. *Autres Temps*, nos. 76–77 (2003).
- . “The Image of God and the Epic of Man.” In *History and Truth*, translated by Charles Kelbley, 110–28. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965.
- . *Political and Social Essays*. Edited by David Stewart and Joseph Bien. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974.
- . “The Socius and the Neighbor.” In *History and Truth*, translated by Charles Kelbley, 98–109. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965.
- . *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3: *Narrated Time*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago, IL: The Chicago University Press, 1988.
- . “Universal Civilization and National Cultures.” In *History and Truth*, translated by Charles Kelbley, 271–84. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965.
- Weil, Simone. “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force.” *Chicago Review* 18, no. 2 (1965): 5–30.