

# Public Reason and a Pedagogy for Reasonableness

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## **Abstract and Introduction**

John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas have undertaken a conversation on the meaning and significance of ‘public reason.’ This paper seeks out the main features of this conversation, and contends that the idea of the ‘community of inquiry’ in Philosophy for Children can respond to some of the concerns raised, as part of deliberative practice. Finally, it argues that for public reason to be created it is imperative that there be a pedagogy for reasonableness, following Matthew Lipman.

**Key words:** *Rawls, Habermas, Reasonableness, Pedagogy, Community of Inquiry*

## I. Rawls on public reason

John Rawls puts value to ‘public reason’ as a venue for citizens to justify to one another the proposals they have regarding what will be for the collective welfare. Public reason, in this sense, is the reason that each proposes to each other, which is acceptable on the basis of grounds that are covered by what Rawls calls the ‘overlapping consensus.’ Regardless of the comprehensive doctrines (regarding what is good and what is right) that each one believes in or adheres to, it should be possible to find some common ground with others based on principles that each comprehensive doctrine can endorse.

The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood.<sup>1</sup>

Rawls presupposes that it is possible for there to be reasons “that might be shared by all citizens as free and equal”<sup>2</sup> that do not constitute the best reasons according to religious or secular comprehensive doctrines and yet can be considered ‘public reason.’ When citizens deliberate and exchange views, their supporting reasons concerning public political questions must be reasons that are not dependent on any comprehensive doctrine but are in that sense ‘public’ because they are shared and part of the political culture.

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<sup>1</sup> John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 132.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 138.

The citizens' reasoning in public reason concerns constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.<sup>3</sup> Thus, Rawls also recognizes that the definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself. The three essential elements of deliberative democracy that Rawls recognizes are: (a) an idea of public reason, (b) a framework of constitutional democratic institutions that specifies the setting of deliberative legislative bodies, and (c) the general knowledge and desire on the part of citizens to follow public reason and to realize its ideal in their political conduct.<sup>4</sup> Hence citizens can follow and actualize public reason in their own conduct. In addition to this, "deliberative democracy limits the reasons citizens may give in supporting their political opinions to reasons consistent with their seeing other citizens as equals."<sup>5</sup> The reasons they provide must at least be communicable to one another.

To support a public basis of justification, guidelines for public inquiry and agreement on the criteria for the type of information and knowledge relevant in discussing political questions, are necessary. Agreement on the principles of political justice for what Rawls calls 'the basic structure' together with "an agreement on the principles of reasoning and the rules of evidence by which citizens are to decide whether the principles of justice apply, when and how they are satisfied, and which laws and policies best fulfill them in existing social conditions"<sup>6</sup> are also required. "If we are to speak

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 139.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 89.

of public, the knowledge and ways of reasoning—the plain truths now common and available to citizens generally—that ground the parties’ selection of the principles of justice must be accessible to citizens’ common reason.”<sup>7</sup> Public information and knowledge is possible and available.

Public reason therefore is composed of/seen through/constituted by deliberations during which citizens justify to one another their political opinions and views concerning matters of collective concern and debate with each other based on reasons that can be understood separately from the secular or religious comprehensive doctrines that citizens may have. While Rawls limits public reason to constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice, this does not stop him from invoking the values of public reason that fall under guidelines for public inquiry to ensure that that inquiry is free and public, informed and reasonable.<sup>8</sup> Reasoning has common elements, namely, principles of inference and rules of evidence, along with standards of correctness and criteria of truth. “The capacity to learn and to apply those concepts and principles is part of our common human reason.”<sup>9</sup>

Rawls recognizes the need for citizens to be capable of engaging in public discussions. “Deliberative democracy also recognizes that without widespread education in the basic aspects of constitutional democratic government for all citizens, and without a public informed about pressing problems, crucial political and social decisions simply cannot be made.”<sup>10</sup> Citizens must therefore be

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>10</sup> *Law of Peoples, op. cit.* 139.

competent in deliberative politics and engage each other—not coming from their private reason (the comprehensive secular or religious doctrine they adhere to) but from reasoning that is accessible to all. Public reason thus delineates political values, and implies discussions that can be meaningfully participated in by free and equal citizens.

Public reasoning thus aims for public justification using ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view to reach conclusions about what we consider to be the most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public justification is not simply valid reasoning but an argument addressed to fellow citizens correctly continuing from premises we, as fellow citizens, accept and consider others to also reasonably accept. Public reason can be said to articulate not only what one person thinks and values, but what others could also reasonably understand and accept for as long as these refer to political institutions, and the ways in which citizens relate with one another.

Rawls himself recognizes three objections to this idea of public reason: (a) the idea of public reason limits the topics and considerations available for political argument and debate, and therefore should have an open view with no constraints; (b) public reason is too restrictive because it may lead to a stand-off and fail to bring about decisions on disputed issues; and (c) the idea of public reason is unnecessary and serves no purpose in a well-established constitutional democracy. Rawls' riposte to the last one is that, "harmony and concord depend on the vitality of the public political culture and on citizens' being devoted to and realizing the ideal of public reason. Citizens could easily fall into bitterness and resentment, once they no longer see the point of affirming an ideal

of public reason and come to ignore it.”<sup>11</sup> Democratic deliberations perform a crucial role in keeping citizens involved and engaged in political matters.

Rawls does not sufficiently show how differences or even conflicts in deliberations within his narrowly circumscribed idea of public reason can be addressed. When citizens argue and discuss with one another regarding constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice, how can their differences be resolved? Is there a criterion for what kind of argumentation predominates? Is it possible for the deliberative practices to also influence the procedures in what he calls ‘the background culture’—the wider social arena within which political and social influences also matter? Can deliberative practices, for example, institutionalize harmony and conviviality, apart from valuing the role of reasoning? Even within the circumscribed limits that Rawls proposes, there are remaining gaps.

Joshua Cohen writes, “our concern is not merely with the substantive implications of fairness or reason-giving generally understood, but with the substantive implications of consensus on a specifically democratic procedure of conflict resolution.”<sup>12</sup> The context in which we undertake these democratic deliberations, or the deliberative practices themselves already contain certain values per se. Cohen says, “think, then, of the democratic process as one kind of institutionalized process of reason giving. What distinguishes it is the requirement of openness, of universal and fair access to political institutions: a strong condition of inclusion,

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

<sup>12</sup> Joshua Cohen, “Pluralism and Proceduralism.” *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 69, no. 589( 1993-1994): 609–610.

which makes political access independent of social power or natural endowment.”<sup>13</sup> Democratic deliberations must already embody ways for citizens to look at each other for the dialogue to proceed and continue.

## II. Habermas on Rawls and the Public Use of Reason

Jürgen Habermas thinks that Rawls imposes a common perspective on the parties in the Original Position (in *A Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism*) through informational constraints and thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of particular interpretive perspectives from the outset. Habermasian discourse ethics, by contrast, views the moral point of view as embodied in an intersubjective practice of argumentation “which enjoin those involved to an idealizing **enlargement** of their interpretive perspectives.”<sup>14</sup>

For Habermas, the Rawlsian conception of comprehensive doctrines need not remain fixed or even constant through time because the deliberations themselves, under conditions of reasoning and mutual openness, can lead to possible modifications and revisions. The public use of reason provides opportunities for shared constructions, and articulations.

Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discussion among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understanding and self and world of all others;

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 610.

<sup>14</sup> Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’ *Political Liberalism*.” *The Journal of Philosophy*, XLII, no. 3 (March 1995): 117.

from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally-extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the language in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted.<sup>15</sup>

Attaining a we-perspective is an achievement of the public use of reason. In the deliberative practice of ‘the community of inquiry’ the attainment of a collective and shared perspective is a goal. The core of generalizable interests, based on this public use of reason, can then emerge step by step.

The Rawlsian **Original Position** imposes difficult constraints on how the participants deliberate—they do not know what their natural endowments are, what are their historical backgrounds, what gender and sexuality they have, etc., which presumably will make them less ‘particular’ and reflect more ‘universally.’ What is thus preferred is a more open procedure of an argumentative practice that goes on under the demanding presuppositions of ‘the public use of reason’ and does not bracket the pluralism of convictions and worldliness from outset. This is a key tension between Habermas and Rawls.

For Habermas, the moral point of view is already implicit in the socio-ontological constitution of the public practice of argumentation, comprising the complex of relations of mutual recognition that participants in rational discourse ‘must’ accept (in the sense of weak transcendental necessity). In free and open

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.



dialogue, recognition and acceptance of the other is already present. Parenthetically, the Philosophy for Children ‘community of inquiry’ (which encourages free and open, inclusive and accepting, dialogue) is an example of such a moral practice and institution.

For Habermas, what are the communicative presuppositions and the procedure of a discursive process of opinion and will-formation in which the public use of reason is manifested? (This is elaborated further in his *Between Facts and Norms*.<sup>16</sup>) The procedural aspects of the public use of reason derives the system of rights from the idea of legal institutionalization. It also leaves more open the understanding of the system of rights because it entrusts that understanding to the **process** of rational opinion and will-formation. Habermas proposes that philosophy limits itself to the moral point of view and the procedure of democratic legitimation to the analysis of the conditions of rational discourses and negotiations.

Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ is a reconstruction of Immanuel Kant’s idea of practical reason with communicative reason.<sup>17</sup> It involves a procedural reformulation of the Categorical Imperative. Rather than ascribing to others as valid those maxims I can will to be universal laws, I must submit them to others for purposes of discursively testing their claims to universal validity. “The emphasis shifts from what **each** can will without contradiction to what **all**

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<sup>16</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996).

<sup>17</sup> Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstruction: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,” *Ethics* 105 (October 1994): 44–63.

can agree to in rational discourse.”<sup>18</sup> The focus is thus on what all can agree to based on their rational discernment.

Validity is tied to communicative processes in which claims are tested argumentatively by weighing reasons pro and con. “The aim of his [Habermas] discursive ethics is solely to reconstruct the moral point of view from which questions of right can be fairly and impartially adjudicated.”<sup>19</sup> The moral point of view is collectively attained.

The frame of reference is shifted from Kant’s solitary, reflecting moral consciousness to the community of moral subjects in dialogue and replaces the Categorical Imperative with a procedure of practical argumentation aimed at reaching reasoned agreement among those subject to the norms in question. By requiring that perspective taking be general and reciprocal, discourse ethics builds a moment of empathy or ‘ideal role-taking’—the representation of the ideal procedure for arriving at reasoned agreement. By being able to aim for and achieve this standpoint, one also will have realized, with others, collectively, what the full public use of reason means. Habermas focuses on this shared understanding building on empathy, and role-taking.

A deliberative decentering of political powers, the multiple and multiform arenas for detecting, defining, and discussing society’s problems, and the culturally and politically mobilized publics who use them, serve as the basis for democratic self-government and thus for political autonomy.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

The public use of reason, for Habermas, is **open** and **reflexive**. Our understanding of the principles of justice must remain so as well, hence they cannot already be definitive at the outset. They are always open to deliberations, reconceptualizations, and further understanding and are never fixed conclusively. For this reason, Habermas limits himself to reconstructing the conditions and presuppositions of democratic deliberations, and leaves all substantial questions to the public use of reason itself.

Habermas' account of deliberative democracy understands political autonomy as self-legislation through the public use of reason by free and equal citizens. The legitimacy of legal norms is tied to what all could agree to in rational public deliberation that considers the needs and interests of each. The result of deliberation is an interweaving of different types of discourse—moral, ethical, pragmatic—with fairly regulated bargaining processes. The 'rationally motivated consensus' which provisionally certifies a norm, policy, program or even arrangement, should comprise agreement in all these dimensions.

### **III. The dimensions of public reason**

From the preceding discussion it is possible to affirm the following:

1. The definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself. Fixed opinions may be revised through discussions with others;
2. There are guidelines for public inquiry, as well as agreement on criteria regarding what is relevant information and knowledge to arrive at shared judgments. Public information and knowledge are available;

3. Reasoning can be made transparent and public. Citizens have to be capable of engaging in public discussions: thus a pedagogy for public engagement is necessary in deliberative democracy;
4. The issue of whether primarily procedural concerns are sufficient and substantive issues can be dealt with provided the procedures for deliberation are clear and functional, is resolved in terms that say deliberative practices themselves already contain values. Harmony and conviviality can be institutionalized through deliberative practices;
5. Deliberations allow for the enlargement of interpretive perspectives, listening to and engaging the other enlarges my understanding even of my own perspective. Hence I need others to be able to understand better even my own perspective;
6. One meaning of the public use of reason is being able to take the perspective of everyone else, an ideally extended we-perspective that is a collective attainment because of the deliberations undertaken. We are *able* to access this we-perspective collectively.

The main tension between Rawls and Habermas consists in the restrictions that Rawls puts on public reason, and Habermas' insistence that the exchanges or deliberations themselves allow for the possibility of shared understanding as a result of the interactions themselves. Rawls acknowledges this possibility but does not seem to fully appreciate that quality interactions themselves create collective realizations that come about *because* of the interactions. The deliberations themselves and the quality of exchanges build collective awareness and collective knowledge.

Social epistemology, what we will have constituted as social facts, is at work here.<sup>21</sup>

#### **IV. The community of inquiry and public reason**

The community of inquiry complements the construction of public reason. It is built on reasonableness and provides conditions for social learning which are institutionalized as social epistemological acquisitions. It is not enough that public reason brings political norms into prominence for reasonableness as an overarching social value is the goal. The community of inquiry is the pedagogy that promotes reasonableness.

The ‘community of inquiry’ is the methodology used in Philosophy for Children developed by Matthew Lipman and others. The classroom is turned into a community of inquiry when the students are exposed together to a ‘text’ (which can be a philosophical novel, a picture, a poem, even a field trip, etc.) and are asked the questions they have regarding the stimulus. The learning agenda is then dictated by what questions the students have with the primary role of the teacher as the facilitator for the classroom philosophical discussion. The teacher focuses on the clarification of concepts, asking for reasons (or supporting arguments, proofs or evidence), connecting the ideas of the students for further interrogation or elaboration, and hopefully a deeper understanding of the ideas presented, as well as generating collective thinking or a developing consensus (if there is any). What students are able to experience, under optimal conditions,

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<sup>21</sup> “Social Epistemology,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed: November 5, 2015. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social>.

include, among others, clarifying their own thinking, understanding perspectives other than their own, thinking together, challenging each other's thinking, having an appreciation of the implications and consequences of these discussions. As the community of inquiry matures, its members can achieve a shared and collective perspective from which it is then possible to consider the particular points of view.

Given a conception of public reason as the constitutive outcome of democratic deliberations by the working through of differences, for example, one realizes that it is the actual process of deliberations that develops insights and collective thinking that is based on how the inquiry goes on. Since the members come with different assumptions and perspectives, when one is truly listening to the insights of others, one can access other ways of thinking besides one's own. The dialectics and syntheses build shared realizations when competently handled by the facilitator of the philosophical discussion within the community of inquiry. Various reasons and perspectives are allowed to interact with each other. As a reflection on the various reasons presented, the community of inquiry is invited to make judgments regarding what can now be our collective thinking about the issues confronting us. As a community, how do we consider where the dialogue has taken us. Those involved in the continuing dialogue are transformed in their thinking because of the resulting interactions when the collective judgments are enunciated and realized. The social epistemological dimensions involve insights about the *process* of the deliberations, as well as the *results* of this collective process.

Matthew Lipman conceived of the Philosophy for Children program because he felt that students were not being taught how

to reason well. The educational system was not focused on enabling students with efficient thinking and independent judgment. Students need to be competent in “independent thinking, careful attention to one’s doubts, the importance of question-raising, the phases of the preliminaries of inquiry.”<sup>22</sup>

Lipman felt that schools do not provide opportunities for students to think about thinking. In society there is no forum that enables the child to hone her thinking skills in such a manner that she will be able to deal intelligently and reflexively about social issues. No deliberative practice exists that enable young people, and later on citizens, to come together and use their collective intellectual or rational powers. No social forum exists that is also “mindful” of itself.

Focusing on the ‘mind,’ thinking about thinking, principles of thought, and practicing reflexivity of this sort, brings about rationality in the social order. The community of inquiry, the main component of Philosophy for Children, can be the laboratory for realizing and improving competence in providing better reasons, including generating criteria for evaluating reasons. A pedagogy for reasonableness, building on the praxis of the community of inquiry, aims for certain criteria that can be affirmed as well as continuously examined: clarity, precision, relevance, appropriateness, etc. These criteria enable the collectivity to realize for itself a greater approximation of what can be called ‘reasonable.’

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<sup>22</sup> Lipman, “Philosophy for Children” Typescript document, US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institute of Education, 1973, 6.

Approximations are needed, and we have to develop a sense of the appropriate rather than expect our thought and the shape of things to correspond exactly. We must be content to reach an equitable solution, not necessarily one that is right in all details. We must be satisfied with a sensible or reasonable outcome even if it is not strictly a rational one. This is particularly true in ethical disputes . . . the contested issues cannot be rationally resolved and we make compromises and employ trade-offs that allow each of the parties to save face and retain self-respect. Education can be seen as the great laboratory for rationality, but it is more realistic to see it as context in which young people learn to be responsible so they can grow up to be reasonable citizens, reasonable companions, and reasonable parents.<sup>23</sup>

The community of inquiry concretizes what understanding rational deliberations means, hence actualizes what deliberative democracy is. A child participating in a community of inquiry:

accepts corrections by peers willingly, able to listen to others attentively, able to revise one's views in light of reason from others, able to take one another's ideas seriously, able to build upon one another's ideas, able to develop their own ideas without fear of rebuff or humiliation from peers, open to new ideas, shows concern for the rights of others to express their view,

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<sup>23</sup> Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in Education* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 16.



capable of detecting underlying assumptions, shows concern for consistency when arguing a point of view, asks relevant questions, verbalizes relationships between ends and means, shows respect for person in the community, shows sensitivity to context when discussing moral conduct, asks for reasons from one's peers, discusses issues with impartiality, asks for criteria.<sup>24</sup>

If children are trained early to reason well, and reason together, they can later on think further together. Procedural principles can help them move toward objectivity, an impartial and shared view of issues, and the world. People speaking to one another, already brings into existence an intersubjective, or shared world, brought on by the possible limits of what enables communication between them. While a community of inquiry is difficult to form (there are important imperatives to follow, and the facilitator-teacher has to be competent and skilled) it actualizes important values: (a) the value of open-ended inquiry (following the inquiry where it will lead); (b) the value of openness to the perspectives of others (which means active listening); (c) the reality of the engagement and commitment to dialogue (viewing what the other is saying in her own terms); (d) the possibility of harmony and conviviality (as well as discord and disagreement) in the shared pursuit of understanding; and (e) realizing the best possible reasons for certain shared beliefs, especially in terms of how we justify to each other our collective social and political institutions—these can be realized.

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<sup>24</sup> Ann Margaret Sharp, "What is a 'Community of Inquiry'?", *Journal of Moral Education* 16, no. 1 (January 1987): 38–39.

Difficulties exist in the actual practice of the community of inquiry—egocentric participation being a big obstacle to authentic dialogue.<sup>25</sup> The community of inquiry has epistemological assumptions that can be questioned.<sup>26</sup> These difficulties however are not insurmountable.

The procedure of the community of inquiry, handled by a competent facilitator, realizes a synthetic dimension. Different points of view are allowed expression concerning a particular question, and the meaningfulness and value of different perspectives, even if they are not always readily comprehensible or even mainstream, are acknowledged. A need for ‘translation’ from one perspective to another sometimes arises, and a measure of commensurability articulated. The facilitator can respond to the ideas in such a manner that they can be paraphrased in terms that are loyal to the expression but also provide a way of making it accessible to the rest of the group. For as long as the articulation is comprehensible to the speaker, others will also be able to comprehend what is being said.

Public reason is generated through democratic deliberations like those of the community of inquiry. The procedure of the community of inquiry ingrains in individuals from an early age the capability and competence to engage and grapple with substantive and contentious issues, not so much necessarily to resolve them, but to allow for further articulation and deliberation such that the *awareness* itself of the variety and nuances of positions and

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<sup>25</sup> A.T. Lardner, “The Real Behavioral Demands of a Community of Inquiry,” *Analytic Teaching* 14, no. 1: 45–50.

<sup>26</sup> Maughn Rollins, “Epistemological Considerations for the Community of Inquiry.” *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* 12, no 2: 31–40.

perspectives can be appreciated. When decisions do have to be made for crucial issues (or laws designed and promulgated), these public pronouncements will have benefited from a richer source of deliberations and perspectives.

Regardless of the differences in their comprehensive doctrines, the relationships among citizens will be characterized by conviviality because they will have been habituated to a collegial and communal manner of considering social questions. Citizens can assure each other that there are deliberative practices they can engage in to discuss their various positions and ways of thinking.

In Rawls' discussion, as well as in Habermas', the crucial function of the 'connector' (or in the practice of the community of inquiry, the facilitator) is not mentioned. The facilitator in the community of inquiry links the ideas articulated in philosophical discussions, establishing possible connections made between the views presented. The various points of view are made to engage each other such that a possible commensurability is established or constituted. Multiculturalism is cultivated, especially when there is danger of airing certain more acceptable views, and brushing aside the so-called dissident perspectives. The synthetic function of the 'connector' has implications for the possibility of 'collective' thinking—realizations that could only have been possible because of the shared experience of thinking together on a particular issue. The deliberative practice of the community of inquiry becomes the actualization of public reason among fellow citizens.

Democratic deliberations enhance the possibility of understanding that leads to better judgments because of the diversity and plurality of perspectives articulated and become the available lenses from which to view a certain question. From the diversity and plurality, a choice or decision based on the best

possible reasons, is attainable. “In a democratic society there is a maximum premium on the cultivation of reasonableness. The goal of education should therefore be the development of reasonable individuals.”<sup>27</sup>

When Charles Sanders Peirce conceived of the original ‘community of inquiry’ he was emphatic on the recognition of ‘error’—an important feature of optimal learning is self-correction.<sup>28</sup> The criteria for recognizing error are socially constituted and can also be reflexive, such that social learning becomes possible. A reflexive or self-referential statement or summary made during the deliberations, and recognized as a true statement regarding where a community is at, at that moment (as the state of agreements or disagreements) provides a “mirror” for the group, and can be a point for consensus. These instances of truth-telling regarding self-referential states of affairs are affirmation that experiences of consensus are real and actual and can be built upon. It is not always the case that there have to be perpetual disagreements.

The community of inquiry is not a panacea for all the difficulties of deliberative communities, but it is a significant practice. When communities of inquiry function well, there is authentic *thinking with* the other—putting myself in the place of the other. Being able

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<sup>27</sup> Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 64.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 121. When Charles Sander Peirce conceived of the ‘community of inquiry’ he primarily thought of the work natural scientists were engaged in, scientific inquiry in that circumscribed sense. Matthew Lipman enlarged this notion of the ‘community of inquiry’ to include as well, not only the investigations of natural scientists, but all those involved in inquiry, specifically philosophical inquiry. Philosophical inquiry meant, among others, concept-clarification—what ideas were embedded in concepts, including presuppositions and assumptions, which need to be probed into as well. Lipman thus broadened the notion of the ‘community of inquiry’ to include philosophical inquiry. Natural scientists do not, as a regular part of their investigations, probe into the meaning of concepts, philosophers do.

to arrive at a shared perspective, constructed through dialogue, making it possible to view the individual and particular perspectives for what they are, that will be one instance in which a collective viewpoint will have been achieved by the community of inquiry, and at that moment, public reason is realized.