Corruption, Greed, and the Public Good in the Mariana Islands, 1700–1720

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This article discusses the disintegrating factors generated by Spanish colonial rule in the Marianas in the early eighteenth century—corruption by colonial officials, ineffective defense against other European powers, precipitous decline in the native population—in a context in which the archipelago’s future as a Spanish outpost was debated in religious and political circles in Manila and Madrid. The article focuses on the governorship of Juan Antonio Pimentel, whose immorality as well as oppression of the Chamorros were denounced by the Jesuits. The punishment for Pimentel’s corruption and greed was meant to reassert Spain’s authority and appreciation for the Marianas as a strategic possession.

**KEYWORDS: MARIANAS • JESUITS • CHAMORROS • CORRUPTION • GALLEON TRADE**
Since the late sixteenth century, the economic base of the Philippine imperium was constituted upon contraband and New Spain’s annual subsidy, the royal situado. In the early seventeenth century European conflicts forced the Spanish authorities to protect the Manila galleon’s trading route from Acapulco to the Philippines. The loss or capture of a galleon could jeopardize Spanish control of its Asian possessions. The colonial powers had to adapt to new imperial circumstances (the growing power and competition of the Dutch and the English vis-à-vis the Spanish empire), and also to what Josep María Delgado (2007; 2008, 178–79) has defined as intra-imperial dynamics: the dissociative forces generated within the empires themselves (corruption of the colonial bureaucracies, extensive depopulation in the colonies, revolts, and so on) that often have been described as a drain upon the Spanish treasury.

The Philippine governors began to consider the Mariana Islands as a cumbersome and expensive burden. Since the arrival of the first Jesuit missionaries in Guam in 1668, its perceived isolation in relation to Manila, its poverty, and its lack of mineral resources meant that the Marianas had to be subsidized by the empire (Coello 2011, 714). The Acapulco galleons had to stop regularly in the archipelago with the royal situado, the subsidy funds from the viceregal treasury of Mexico, to pay the soldiers’ and officers’ wages, as well as the missionaries’ stipends. Some merchants and many among the Manila authorities argued that this practice had a detrimental impact on the regular traffic of the Acapulco trade route, and went as far as “recommending” that the galleons go on their way and leave the Marianas’ Chamorros to their own devices. This was the view of Gov. Diego de Salcedo (1663–1668), who, according to Fr. Luis de Morales, SJ (1700, f. 112), “had secretly ordered the captains of the ships that went from New Spain to the Philippines not to touch the island of Guåhan [Guam], so that the missionaries in them, left without assistance and at the mercy of the barbarians, die or are forced to abandon the islands.”

However, Philip V (1700–1746) could not simply abandon the Chamorros (and the natives of the adjacent islands) to their fate, as this would forfeit the duties of evangelization contracted by his predecessor by virtue of the Spanish Regio Patronato (Bustillo 1700). Moreover, the Crown was also concerned about their material well-being, so that it ordered the annual dispatch of a patache from Cavite to the Marianas with supplies and provisions, all of which was paid for by the Philippine government (Lévesque 1997b, 420).

Focusing on the first two decades of the 1700s, this article analyzes the general disintegrating factors generated by Spanish colonial rule in the Marianas—corruption of colonial bureaucracies, decadence vis-à-vis other European empires, native depopulation—in a context in which the future of the outlying mission was debated in religious and political fields in Manila and in Spain. Certainly there was little of interest in the Mariana archipelago, especially since there was practically no possibility of increasing its Spanish population or its population establishing commercial relations with China or Southeast Asia. The Marianas were not the Spice Islands: the former had a low potential for agricultural development, and it lacked mineral resources unlike the latter. Nonetheless, as the eighteenth century progressed and Spain’s enemies, especially the British, continued to threaten the Philippines, the strategic location of the Marianas, underlined by the metropolitan authorities, prevailed over the inconveniences—or “peculiarities,” as Josep María Fradera (1999) calls them. This article also wants to demonstrate that the Jesuits were not simply agents of Spanish colonialism, but a religious corporation with a universal project that clashed on many occasions with the civil authorities at the local level.

“Bad Greed”

In the Iberian Far East, frontier spaces constituted peripheral societies in which the degrees of corruption and crime were practically proportional to the distance from their governing center. There was no doubt that Manila was in the periphery of the Spanish empire, but in relation to the islands to the south—Mindanao, Mindoro—and Micronesia, especially the Caroline Islands, the Marianas, and Palau, Manila constituted the political, economic, and intellectual center of Spanish Asia. It somehow served as a moral outpost to ensure the viability of those “external frontiers,” such as the Mariana Islands, in a period of widespread corruption.

But even though the Mariana Islands were not isolated and self-contained units but were interrupted by a more or less constant exchange of persons, merchandise, and information, the Marianas governors had great leeway and autonomy vis-à-vis the authorities in Manila and New Spain. They and their favored subalterns were de facto lords who did as they pleased with their “private fiefdoms.”
The low salaries received by Spanish colonial officials were complemented by what, according to Pietschmann (1982, 13), was a traditional mindset that justified using a government post for personal benefit. This was evident in the commercial relations that the governors and captains general of the Philippines established through the annual galleons. The practice of profiting from a government post encouraged, and was also encouraged by, the patronymic character of corporate power groups and local elites, with their extensive family connections, which were perennially involved in disputes over the control of political power. In his Monarquía Hispánica (1600–1604), Tomasso Campanella (1568–1639) had already warned the king about the dangers of privatizing the post of governor. According to this Calabrian Dominican friar, “there are high officials who sell small posts to those they later steal from; and so, in small territories the common right is not observed, for while officials pretend to propagate the King’s jurisdiction, they encourage hatred by ruining the poor subjects” (Campanella 1982, 77).

In the Marianas, the defining characteristics of sergeants and governors— their habitus, as Bourdieu (1972) would say—was the indiscriminate exploitation of the Chamorro population through a network of majordomos, alcaldes mayores (provincial governors), and relatives in discretionary positions, as well as through profitable involvement in the “endemic evil” of the Spanish empire, contraband. In addition, Jesuits accused these sergeants and governors of neglecting to further the conquest; Jesuits sent procurators to denounce them in court, but the visits, inspections, and ordinary juicios de residencia (judicial review of an official’s conduct in office at the end of his term) failed to curtail the greed of the colonial officer. Far from being exceptional, illicit trade, bribery, favoritism, and the like became habitual practices of colonial officials, who also established important transoceanic trading networks centered on their diverse business interests.¹

There is ample consensus on the existence of corruption as a generalized practice in the spaces of power between colonial societies, the administrative bureaucracies, and the Spanish Crown (Pietschmann 1982, 11–37; Andrien 1984, 1–20). However, Josep María Delgado (2007, 2008) reminds us that the politics of flexibility was one of the basic principles behind the organization and functioning of the imperial administrative structure. The well-known proposition, obedézcase pero no se cumpla (obedience without compliance), was authorized by the Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias (1841, Law 24, Tit. 1, Book II). It allowed the defense of the (private) benefits of

local administrators to the detriment of the (public) metropolitan interests, which seldom coincided, while respecting the political authority of the monarch and his representatives (the Audiencia or royal court and council of state, viceroy, governors, and captains general) (Corpuz 1957, 60; Delgado 2008, 179–80).

In practice, the two principles—authority and flexibility—depended on a difficult balance between traditional (or patronymic) powers and legal-bureaucratic powers. This fact can best be appreciated in the differences among the men who occupied government posts in colonial societies. The common characteristic of these personages was their having served the king. The Crown directly adjudicated some rewards, posts, and emoluments of all kinds to “friends” or “clients,” but only some received offices by virtue of their capacity or expertise (Peralta 2006). While the first set of practices was considered averse to “distributive justice,”¹ the latter constituted professional bodies whose loyalty diminished in respect to their distance to the centers of government, so that the Crown did not exercise a vertical relation over the local jurisdictions. Power was therefore fragmented. In other words, a perversion in the political body favored improper conduct and deviations in the exercise of power: what José de la Puente (2006) refers to as “bad greed” (mala codicia).¹ We shall see “bad greed” rear its ugly head in the history of the Mariana Islands, with dire consequences for the indigenous inhabitants.

**Retain or Abandon the Marianas?**

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the political climate of the Marianas was fraught with rigidity and intransigence. The repression exercised against the natives had decreased their numbers alarmingly, while the political and religious control of the islands was being consolidated in Spanish hands. Appointed officials and alcaldes mayores placed greater labor demands on the surviving natives as their numbers dwindled, which led to even higher levels of violence and exploitation.

Francisco Medrano y Asain (1700–1704), sergeant major, general captain, and interim governor of the Marianas, was the first to suggest that the archipelago be abandoned entirely. This suggestion profoundly disappointed the former missionary (1668–1671), Philippine procurator (1684–1689), and later on provincial (1699–1703) Fr. Luis de Morales. In 1701 Medrano wrote a Parecer or report to the king recommending the transfer of the 2,600
surviving Chamorros to the Philippines. Medrano (1701) argued that the small population did not justify the maintenance of a presidio (military outpost) and Jesuit schools and houses. The demographic situation of the Marianas would remain a central issue for later governors. Between 1706 and 1709 Manuel de Argüelles served as interim governor and captain general of the Marianas, replacing Sgt. Maj. Antonio de Villamor (1704–1706). Upon his arrival in the Marianas, Argüelles established Hagåtña as his capital and completed a census that revealed a total of 5,332 Chamorros on the islands of Guåhan, Saipan, and Rota (Driver 2005, 18).

Moreover, the epidemics of 1709 and 1710 as well as the extortions by Spanish functionaries took their toll (Hezel 1989, 32). According to the letter that Gov. Juan Antonio Pimentel addressed to King Philip V on 24 November 1709, there were only 5,000 Indian subjects in the main islands of Guåhan, Rota, and Saipan. The “said number includes boys, women and the old, when before there were 24,000 when the [Jesuit] missionaries began their conversion, to which those who died in their uprisings must be added.” In his Annual Letter of 1715, Rev. Superior Felipe María Muscati (1689–1739) described the grueling diseases that the natives suffered, “sores, abscesses, and other such illnesses . . . not for days, but for long years.” Such pains were the price they had to pay for their many sins, and the priest recommended that they endure with resignation and steadfastness the work and burdens with which they were saddled, “as if they were sent by God” (Muscati 1715).

For the Jesuits, however, one of the main arguments for continued Spanish sovereignty over the Marianas was the monarchy’s commitment to evangelization. For example, Bustillo (1702a) argued that, if they were abandoned, the souls of the Chamorros would be irredeemably condemned. According to Governor Medrano, the native population of the Marianas had diminished drastically, but according to Bustillo the population decrease was not as large as it seemed. For this reason, Bustillo (1702b) emphasized, the governor of the Philippines, Domingo de Zubálburu (1700–1709), promised that “as long as he governed the Philippines he would order that all the ships come by here [Marianas] and anchor without exception.” Zubálburu also ordered the new governor of the Marianas, Antonio de Villamor y Vadillo (1704–1706), to collect the natives’ tribute and conduct a comprehensive census to determine the demography of the people under and outside the reducción (subjugated settlements), as well as the resources of the islands. But at the end of his term Governor Villamor counseled against the imposition of any tribute because the population was “extremely poor.” As Father Morales put it, the necessity and abandonment in those islands were greater than that of the rest of the Indies, because of the lack of natural resources (Lévesque 1997b, 420). Nonetheless, the government had to keep in mind not only the Chamorros of the present, but also the future generations that would be born for as long as the Mariana Islands were populated. The Jesuits not only wanted to keep the islands, but also wanted to use them as a stepping-stone for taking their missionary activities to other, more promising, archipelagos to the south.

As a reputed geographer and engineer, Francisco de Seijas y Lobera (1650–1705) was of the opinion that Spain should hold on to the Marianas. For this cosmographer and seafarer, the Spanish Crown should involve itself in the “conservation and expansion” of the Marianas as a way to secure and protect the Philippine islands. His recommendations to Philip V regarding the need to populate the islands were motivated not only by economic but also by political factors. He believed that the Jesuits’ interests went beyond the religious. Accusing them of being a threat to the royal treasury, he argued that

como cada una de aquellas islas es corta y los padres de la Compañía de Jesús van adelantándose con sus doctrinas y en pocos años serán solamente ellos los dueños de los mejor de aquellas islas, como lo son en muchas partes de las Indias y en tal caso no tenga el Rey patrimonio en ellas, por lo cual se debe mandar que no tengan posesiones de tierras propias, ni ni más que un corto colegio de que se formen las doctrinas, porque si los padres usando sus políticas y mónitas se van apoderando de las tierras de las islas, no tendrán los vasallos en que poblaríase, y en que beneficiar diversidad de frutos. (Seijas y Lobera 1986, 480)

since each of those islands is small and the Fathers of the Society of Jesus are advancing with their doctrines and in a few years they will be the sole owners of the best of those islands, like they are in many parts of the Indies, and in that case the King will not have any patrimony in them, which is why it should be ordered that they not have land of their own beyond a small school where they can
form their doctrines, because if using their politics and mánitos the Fathers take over the lands of these islands, vassals will have no land to populate or to derive a diversity of fruit.

For Seijas the real wealth of the empire resided in the control of trade, agriculture, and industry. Neither royal officials (governors and alcaldes mayores) nor men of the cloth should control the economy; rather, it should be the civil and political authorities (alcaldes ordinarios) of the archipelago. He suggested that the residents who had been living in possession of the same property for twenty-five years pay a tax of one peso, which was worth eight silver reales, for every twenty caballerías of land (about 800 hectares) that they occupied. This fixed contribution paid by all adult males would be used to finance the defense of the islands (ibid.). From a clearly royalist position, Seijas’s plans of protecting the Crown’s rights as well as reducing the prominence of the Jesuits took a different, albeit predictable, turn. Local taxes were not introduced, and the government of Argüelles maintained excellent relations with the Jesuits, as seen in the completion and renovation of their churches (Annual Letter 1709; cf. Driver 1984, 16; 2005, 17–18).

Between 1706 and 1709 there were nine active Jesuit priests in the Marianas—Frs. Tomás Cardeñoso, Diego Zarzosa, Lorenzo Bustillo, Johann Tilpe, Miguel Aparicio, Johann Schirmeisen, Jacobo or Jaime Chavarri, Felipe Muscati, and Gerard Bouwens, with the latter serving as the mission’s vice-provincial—and two coadjutor brothers, Nicolás Montero and Luis García (Hezel 1989, 26). They formed a considerable number, relative to the constant decline in the number of parishioners. Eighteen years had gone by since the last missionaries arrived from Europe, but this did not prevent provincials and procurators of the order from betting on their continued presence in the Marianas (Serrano 1706). According to Horacio de la Costa, SJ (1961, 554), “there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the Marianas mission among some of the younger Fathers, and a certain amount of maneuvering went on to avoid being sent there.” The number of Jesuits in the Philippine archipelago had gone down in the same period. As a result, the missionaries destined for the Marianas did not come from the Philippines but from the viceroyalty of New Spain.

On 2 February 1707 Fr. Joseph Astudillo, SJ, wrote a letter to procurator Antonio Jaramillo, telling him that he would accompany an expedition of four missionaries—Frs. Ignacio de Ibarguen, Peter Cruydolf, Joseph Bloast, and José Grimaltos—that was getting ready to depart from Mexico for the Marianas. He confessed, “I have intensely desired to be one of them, but it hasn’t been possible, because Father Borja insisted that I take charge of the mission [in New Spain]. I will see if I can perform some trick and stay” (Astudillo 1707). He added: “Your Reverence shall not forget to look after these poor men, for you know the miseries that they suffer” (ibid.).

The Jesuits would become the target of the repressive governor Juan Antonio Pimentel. As a result they would write a “Memorial” in which they requested that the governors of the Mariana Islands be designated by the governor of the Philippines along with the archbishop of Manila, and not by the authorities in Madrid (Pimentel 1684). However, in the following years this request remained unheeded.

**Governor Pimentel (1709–1720) and the English Corsairs**

Venality of office as the judgment of an official’s residencia did not discourage the use of one’s office to profit by illegal means. This was the case of Gov. Juan Antonio Pimentel, a Creole, whose great pride and haughtiness made him one of the most corrupt officials in the eighteenth century. On 22 October 1671 he left New Spain for the Philippines in the patache San Diego. Not long after that, on 15 November, he was made captain of the Spanish infantry. Between 1672 and 1676, the governor and captain general of the Philippines, Manuel de León, named him alcalde of the Camarines province. In 1679 Pimentel was serving as licensed captain in the company of the governor until he was named alcalde and captain of the Ilocos province (1680–1682) (Pimentel 1684). On 15 July 1686 he was designated lieutenant general of artillery of the Philippine islands. His economic situation was quite comfortable, thanks to the patron-client relations that operated in the bosom of a patrimonial government system. A few years later, the royal decree of 2 June 1701 confirmed the encomiendas that Pimentel held in the provinces of Ilocos and Tondo.

Not until 10 July 1704 did Philip V name Pimentel as governor and captain general of the Mariana Islands. The sale of public offices—so-called employment benefits or beneficios de empleos—allowed for an office to be resold and even included in the dowry of a marrying daughter (Pietschmann 1982, 25). Pimentel did precisely this when his daughter, María Rosa Pimentel, married Manuel de Argüelles y Valdés, making Manuel not just
his son-in-law and political ally but also the future governor of the Marianas (Yanci 1721, cited in Audiencia de Manila 1721, f. 280r).18

Like his predecessor, fellow Peruvian Damián de Esplana, Pimentel was a wolf for the Jesuits’ lambs. His government could not have been more one-sided, to say the least. He arrived in the Marianas on board the patache Santo Domingo de Guzmán in August 1709, and took office within a month. Like Esplana had done before him, Pimentel moved out of the presidio and set up his permanent residence in the palace of the villa of Humátac, from where he managed his trading business, which depended on the arrival of the galleons and pataches from Manila (Driver 1987, 34). He did not disdain engaging in any commercial activity that could be established with any ship that happened to come close to the Marianas.

On 22 March 1710 four English ships, the Duke, Duchess, Marquis, and Batchelor, appeared on the coast of Págå waving white flags.20 One of them, the Batchelor, was in fact the Philippine galleon Nuestra Señora de la Encarnación y Desengaño, captured with all its cargo by Capt. Woodes Rogers and Edward Cooke in Cape San Lucas, off the coast of Puerto Segura in New Spain, in January 1710.

Upon their arrival at the port of Humátac, Captain Rogers and his officers, in the name of Queen Anne Stuart of England, entreated the Spaniards to provide them food, refreshments, and all the supplies that they considered necessary, lest they raze the island to the ground along with its inhabitants. Sgt. Maj. Joseph de Quiroga set up a war council constituted by the reformed officers, who debated the possibility of confronting the English. But instead of meeting with the council, Governor Pimentel wrote the foreign assailants a letter inviting them to peacefully stock up with whatever they needed.21 Not only did he engage in contraband trading with the hostile captain but he also entertained them with gifts and an invitation to dine at the palace of Hagåtña. For this he would later spend many years in prison in Manila (Cunningham 1919, 127).

That he failed to fulfill his duty as soldier and caudillo was the most serious charge brought against Pimentel in the inquest that was opened in the Philippine capital on 23 January 1712.22 Capt. Joseph Ruiz López was the designated inspector (veedor or juez pesquisidor) in the investigation of Pimentel, who was by then 76 years old. The Audiencia of Manila also initiated a series of inquests against Governor Pimentel on 8 July 1712, for having established trade relations with the English corsair Woodes Rogers in 1710 (Audiencia de Manila 1712, ff. 62r–72r). Notwithstanding the aged governor’s alleged ignorance of an existing war between Spain and England, on 24 July 1714 he was sentenced to prison, and the tribunal ordered that his juicio de residencia should be undertaken. As Cunningham (1919, 128) pointed out, “Pimentel had not only to stand investigation for the particular act which had brought about his removal, but he was also subjected to a residencia covering his entire career as governor.”24

**Further Decay of the Marianas**

Owing to the death of Philippine Governor Lizárraga and the state of misgovernment during the administration of the Audiencia’s decano, José Torralba, who stepped in as governor (1715–1717), Pimentel left Manila and returned to Guåhan. From the beginning, Pimentel’s relations with the Jesuits had been difficult, but they got worse toward 1715 owing to his “excesses” with the natives and his own behavior, which the Jesuits considered licentious and unnatural. In his Annual Letter of 1715, Father Muscati still praised the governor, who had begun making renovations in the house and church of the Society, describing how the “said governor not only goes as overseer of the work, but as if he were a peon carrying the building materials with great pleasure and no lesser edification for those who see him perform these humble acts.” However, sympathy would soon turn into hostility after the arrival of Fr. Juan Antonio Cantova, SJ (1718), who was openly critical about the scandalous activities of the governor, particularly those borne out of his lust and greed.25
In a letter written on 19 July 1718 from Capul by the Spanish missionary Fr. Marcelo de Valdivieso, SJ, to Fr. Juan Marín, SJ, the general’s assistant for the Spanish provinces, the Jesuit priest accused Pimentel of being directly responsible for the decrease in the Chamorro population (Shell 1992, 21). According to Father Valdivieso (1718),

No hay freno con que moderar sus agravios e injusticias con aquellos pobres recién convertidos, y así aquello se va atrasando notablemente. Y los indios aburridos por verse en una tan pesada esclavitud, hacen cosas indignas de la fe que profesan. Los pobres Padres, si quieren poner remedio e irle a la mano o son despreciados, o no oídos, o son amenazados con destierros, y así se ven hoy obligados a padecer más de lo que padecían al principio en la conquista de aquellas islas, que entonces con una lanzada acababan sus trabajos, y hoy el martirio con tantas pesadumbres y penas, les dura muchos años.

There is no stopping or moderating the injustices and damages [committed by the governor] against those poor recent converts, and so that is notably retreating. And the Indians, frustrated at seeing themselves laden with such heavy slavery, do things that are unworthy of the faith they profess. If the poor Fathers want to remedy this by recurring to [striking them with] the hand, they are scorned or ignored, or they are threatened with banishment, and so they are forced to suffer more than they did at the beginning of the conquest of those islands, for then with a lance their travails were ended, and today with so much grief and hardships their martyrdom lasts many years.

Sergeant Major Quiroga expounded on the reasons for the moral and material decadence of the Marianas in a letter to Philip V on 26 May 1720 (Quiroga 1720a, cited in Driver 1992, 98–106). At first the obstinate adherence of the Chamorros to their pagan rites had provoked the wrath of God, manifested in epidemics, typhoons, and storms. However, the intervention of the Jesuit Fathers in the last few years had been providential, so that most of the population had become resigned to their presence. In fact, Quiroga and Valdivieso agreed in their analysis of what caused the islands’ deleterious situation. For both men, spiritual poverty had less to do with the conduct of the natives and more to do with the immorality and corruption of the Spanish and the Philippine natives, who, in the words of Father Valdivieso (1718), “blind with greed, enslave the Indians and the soldiers, and they even want to hold the ministers of God subject to their will, with the very grave consequences that arise from this.”

First of all, Quiroga accused the elderly governor of being a libertine and keeping girls and women in his own palace, a scandalous behavior that was talked about in Manila. Pimentel, “being a man of age and with no wife,” was notorious for keeping these young women as concubines and offering them as wives to the soldiers in the presidio in exchange for their loyalty. Some of them, however, continued to live in what became known as the “Great Turk’s seraglio” even after they married (Driver 1984, 18; Quiroga 1720a, cited in Driver 1992, 105). The governor acted as a de facto feudal lord who demanded sexual favors from “his women” and forced them to commit adultery, raping and abducting those he wanted. According to Quiroga, the soldiers who opposed such practices saw their opportunities for rising to the position of captains or lieutenants (alféreces) nullified; some even lost their posts, others their lives (Quiroga 1720a, cited in Driver 1992, 105). Pimentel similarly coerced the Chamorros, whom he accused of informing the Jesuit priests about these “scandals.” Apparently Quiroga was not entirely wrong. So as not to cross or offend Pimentel, many stopped sending their children to the San Juan de Leetrán school and some stopped going to church altogether (Valdés 1736, cited in Priore 1986, 35–36). Indignant, the priests denounced Pimentel’s faults from the pulpit, which angered the governor (Quiroga 1720a, cited in Driver 1992, 105).

Lastly Quiroga accused Pimentel and his retinue of indiscriminately exploiting the few surviving Chamorros, making them work for months in their private lucrative businesses in exchange for a few tobacco leaves a day (ibid., 102). The effective exploitation of the islands’ resources was never among the priorities of the Spanish monarchy. The Crown did not demand tribute from the native inhabitants of the Marianas because it considered them too poor to pay. They were also spared the repartimientos de mercancías (forced sale of goods), which the Spanish successfully imposed in the Philippines and elsewhere in the empire as an extrajudicial form of tribute collection (Alonso 2000, 170–216). But the Marianas governors, alcaldes, and infantry captains—especially Pimentel’s grandchildren, Joseph Bonifacio de Argüelles and Juan de Argüelles Valdés, both of whom occupied these offices
in consideration of the integrity and zeal of their royal service”—used their positions to benefit illegally from the work of those same men and women too poor to contribute to the royal treasury, extracting “contributions” for their private coffers (Quiroga 1720a, cited in Driver 1992, 102).

Chamorros were forced to produce rice, corn, melons, beans, coconuts, and the like, as well as the highly prized capers and aguardiente (firewater), which Pimentel and his acolytes sold at exorbitant prices in the markets of Manila, but also in a store (tienda abierta) located at Guåhan, often to the very natives who produced them as well as to the soldiers in the presidio (ibid., 101–2). In addition, Philippine soldiers and natives were responsible for introducing lambanog, an alcoholic beverage made from coconut and locally known as tuba, aguyayente, or aguardiente. The Spanish authorities forced the Chamorro people to produce lambanog, which caused them to be addicted and become unwilling to work so much so that the Spanish ended up banning the production of lambanog.

As mentioned earlier, the turn of the century saw an alarming decrease in the native population. On 8 March 1717 Pimentel responded to this situation by deciding to rearrange the population in the archipelago, hoping to reverse the downward trend. He named his grandson and deputy, Capt. Joseph Bonifacio Argüelles, visitador (inspector) of all the partidos (towns) of Guåhan,29 but nothing came of this. In May 1719 soon after arriving in the Marianas, Italian Fr. Joseph Bonani confirmed the disheartening scenario. There had been 8,000 or so natives in 1669 on the main island; now there were only 800. Of the 4,000 Chamorros who had populated Rota in its better days, there were now only 344. Together, the population of these islands plus that of Saipan did not add up to more than 5,000 Chamorros, who moreover subsisted in a general state of misery.30 Despite this decline in population, Governor Pimentel did not consider transferring them to the Philippines, as Medrano (1700–1704) had suggested. What Pimentel did was exploit even more intensely the remaining natives for his own benefit.

The political authorities in the archipelago justified Chamorro enslavement based on their physique as well as their natural environment: Chamorros were robust and lived in climates warmer than that of Europe. For Sergeant Major Quiroga, the demographic catastrophe was caused by the extreme greed of the islands’ governors, who behaved as if they were corregidores (chief magistrates), preying upon the Indians and drinking their blood. It was not surprising then that he recommended that the 130 soldiers of the presidio be reduced to fifty or sixty. He believed that the defensive role played by soldiers had been exhausted, and now soldiers simply languished in the ports, victims of the corruption, lasciviousness, and poverty that reigned in the archipelago (Quiroga 1720a, cited in Lévesque 1999b, 161–67).

Quiroga undoubtedly knew what he was talking about. He was sergeant major for more than thirty years, and he had suppressed many a Chamorro revolt. But he had also struggled against the uprisings of Spaniards under his command. The soldiers in the presidio were usually young amnestied convicts or former convicts as well as vagabonds who had run away from New Spain, and who upon arrival at the Marianas engaged in all sorts of disorders, “returning the islands to their previous state of sin and moral misery, extorting and abusing their inhabitants” (Quiroga 1720a, cited in Driver 1992, 103–4). Quiroga (1720b) argued that those “bad Spaniards” were subverting the labor of “God’s angels”—which was how he referred to the Jesuits—and transforming the islands into Satan’s domain again.

Hoping that the king as “sovereign judge” could remedy this situation, the Jesuits wrote a Memorial (1722) to Philip V, asking him to put an end to the grievances that the native inhabitants of the Marianas and the missions of Mindanao suffered at the hands of their greedy governors. As a consequence of war and epidemics, the Chamorros had significantly diminished, and with them the labor that could have generated wealth or returns of any sort. The Philippine authorities, along with the Jesuit superiors, began considering the reduction of the number of soldiers in the presidio. This would save annually a considerable sum of money that could be diverted to other presidios, such as the one in Zamboanga, which was reestablished in 1718 for the protection of the Jesuit fathers stationed at the new missions of Jolo and Tamontaca. Using the presidio at Zamboanga as their home base, the Jesuits longed to convert the Muslim populations in the interiors. However, not enough missionaries were available, so that in the following years some prominent procurators, such as Fr. José Calvo, suggested the gradual abandonment of the Mariana Islands because of its scarce population, proposing instead that a relocation of Guam’s Jesuits would benefit the spiritual conquest of the new “frontier of Christendom” located down south.31 However, graft and corruption in the Marianas were not so different from those in Mindanao and Jolo.32

The Jesuits complained that, if a priest protested in favor of the natives, he would be scorned or threatened with deportation. In the Marianas Father Ibarguen, vice-provincial and commissar of the Holy Office, and Father
Cantova, rector of the boys’ school, suffered the consequences of Governor Pimentel’s greed, for they were exiled to Humátac in 1715, from where they could no longer denounce him in their sermons (Quiroga 1720b, cited in Hezel 1989, 49). The Memorial (1722) also denounced Pimentel as taking over the Indians’ lands and forcing them to work daily in his private enterprises, exacerbating the population collapse and the ruin of Christendom. Finally, they asked the king to grant the Fathers of the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán a plot of land for their crops and cattle, because some administrators, like Pimentel himself, had taken land from them.  

**Final Verdict on Pimentel’s Residencia**

Although on 25 June 1717 Luis Antonio Sánchez de Tagle had been appointed new governor and captain general of the Marianas, as well as judge of Pimentel’s residencia, the judicial decisions were not implemented until 1720 (Lévesque 1999b, 219–25). As Corpuz (1957, 48) pointed out of any official in this situation, “the proceedings of the residencia could be very vexatious, for he was accountable for almost everything that took place during the administration, and he was therefore vulnerable on innumerable accounts.”

In his declaration, taken on 7 December 1720, Pimentel argued that it was not the first time that governors in the Marianas had supplied foreign privateers, and he cited the case of Damián de la Esplana, who in 1686 had done the same with two English ships that had stopped in the Hågat inlet. Moreover, the ships that had come in 1710 were sailing under the French flag and manned by expert men of arms who had recently sacked the city of Guayaquil, peopled by more than 500 residents (Royal Provision 1712). In contrast, the presidio was manned by inexperienced young men between the ages of 14 and 17, who were untried in military conflicts and were former convicts, as well as other men sent mostly from New Spain to redeem their sentences, who were forced to serve. Pimentel argued that there were neither convicts, as well as other men sent mostly from New Spain to redeem their sentences, who were forced to serve. Pimentel argued that there were neither enough men, nor men who were trained or experienced enough to face the English corsairs. Not only were many of them (fifteen) weakened by disease, and lacking in arms, equipment and munitions, but others were also in the northern islands carrying supplies. Moreover, Pimentel pointed out that the many inlets in Guåhan could be used by an enemy to carry out an invasion of the rest of the islands, since these lacked forts, citadels, or castles for defense (Pimentel 1720b, in Audiencia de Manila 1721, f. 253r). These arguments were contradicted by other witnesses, such as captains Domingo Guzmán and Felipe de Santiago, who stated that Quiroga had gathered more than a hundred men with and without posts, Creoles, Spaniards, and Filipino natives, and “said sergeant armed them and provided ammunition, and so it stands to reason that the witness was not so lacking in gunpowder and people to be able to do something to resist said Englishmen” (Pimentel 1720a, in Audiencia de Manila 1721, ff. 238r–239r.; cf. Lévesque 1999b, 279–82).

Pimentel underscored that, despite these limitations, he had freed seventeen artillerymen, sailors, and cabin boys from the galleon Nuestra Señora de la Encarnación, including the captain and shipmaster, Antonio Gutiérrez. Bound for England, these prisoners were liberated without any casualties among them, in exchange for the supplies and provisions demanded by the corsairs (Junta de Guerra 1710, in Audiencia de Manila 1721, f. 249r–251v). Pimentel explained that he rejected the offer made by the indios principales, Alonso de Soón, maestre de campo (master of camp), and Antonio Ayo, sergeant major of the Indian militias, who committed to gathering 2,000 men from the partidos of Hågat, Humátac, Malesso’, and Inalåhan to launch an assault against the English ships, precisely so as not to endanger the prisoners. What really worried him, according to his own declarations and those of other witnesses, was the possibility of a military alliance between the pirates—“heretics of our enemy, England”—and the “inconstant and treacherous” Chamorros, an alliance that could endanger Spain’s sovereignty over the islands. But this argument was as weak as the few natives who survived the Chamorro wars at the end of the seventeenth century, survivors who did not seem eager to engage in a new series of military campaigns (Nani 1721 in Audiencia de Manila 1721, ff. 264r–264v).  

In his declarations (1720–1721) during the juicio de residencia, Pimentel alleged that the English forces were far superior to his own: given their threats to raze the islands, he decided not to confront the English. However, although he was not expected to be a hero, engaging in commercial dealings with the enemy and honoring and welcoming the enemy as Pimentel did in March 1710 were too much for the Audiencia of Manila. Thus he was arrested on 13 July 1721 and sent to the Royal Prison of Manila in chains to answer to a formal juicio de residencia for aiding the fleet of Captain Rogers (Audiencia de Manila 1721). On 26 June 1722 he was condemned to a year of incarceration in one of the presidios of the
Philipines and forced to pay for the costs of the trial (Yepes 1722). An aged 
Pimentel was also charged with giving false testimony regarding infantry 
Capt. Joseph Mainat Paniagua, whom he accused of taking two ships 
sent from Saipan with the supplies of the royal storehouses, which were 
necessary for the islands’ defense.\textsuperscript{49} However, because he was a nobleman,\textsuperscript{40} 
he was absolved on 30 June 1722 by the judges of the Audiencia of Manila.\textsuperscript{41} 
Freed from the charges of treason, his trial continued until 16 October 
1724, when he was condemned for the corrupt use of the royal tariff, for 
practicing usury in a public store, and for his relations with six girls whom 
he kept “as orphans” in his palace.\textsuperscript{42}

Conclusion

Gov. Juan Antonio Pimentel was probably right. Defending the Marianas 
with a handful of inexperienced and ill-equipped young Philippine and 
Mexican soldiers who rarely received their pay was futile. But other than 
this drawback, his government was not a model of legitimacy or legality. He 
had the privileges of a nobleman and as such had the obligation to serve as 
a model for the plebe.\textsuperscript{43} Noblemen were thought to have superior \textit{virtus} that 
legitimated their occupation of government offices and their representation of 
the king overseas. Pimentel, according to the Jesuits, was far from possessing 
these qualities: he was a corrupt libertine whose only objective was to get 
rich in as little time as possible. The inventory of his goods ordered by Judge 
Joseph Ruiz confirmed that he possessed \textit{appetitus divitiarum infinitus} (an 
insatiable appetite for wealth) (Van Klaveren 1993, 27). Not only did he extort 
from the natives, forcing them to work for him, but he also subjected soldiers 
and even missionaries to his usurious practices, appropriating or retaining 
their salaries and selling to them all kinds of products—wine, aguardiente, 
and even clothing and foodstuffs—at exorbitant prices in the infamous “store 
of the governor” (Hezel 1989, 37–39). He engaged in contraband and 
encouraged acts of corruption and bribery, violating community interests for 
his own benefit.\textsuperscript{44} In 1718 the notoriety of Pimentel’s outrages had obligated 
the president of the Audiencia of Manila to order the governor to limit his 
excessive greed in the Marianas.\textsuperscript{45}

The Dominican friar Tomasso Campanella (1991, 46) had written that 
the power of the Spanish Crown as a “universal monarchy” could weaken 
because of the injustices committed by its officers and the penuries suffered 
and reproduced by undisciplined soldiers and captains. The desire for 
wealth, higher offices, and favors were not reprehensible in themselves, but 
they were when they led to disproportionate ambition—what Pietschmann 
(1982, 18) has described as “plunder capitalism.” Pimentel’s case is merely 
one example that corruption among government officials and representatives 
was not an isolated phenomenon, but that it was practiced even by those in 
the highest circles of power (ibid., 27). In the face of these problems, 
procurators of the Society of Jesus, such as Frs. Agustín Soler and José Verdís, 
had warned higher authorities of the importance of selecting “honorable 
and very Christian men” as governors and corporals of the Mariana Islands, 
men who set a good example for the soldiers at the presidio (Lévesque 
1999b, 574–85). They believed that, if the governor and captain general of 
the Philippines made this designation, appropriate men would be selected, 
for they lamented that “Christianity has suffered great detriment . . . because 
of the deeds of corporals and soldiers” (ibid.).\textsuperscript{46}

Pimentel represented an obstacle in the institutionalization of the new 
patriotic code of the first Bourbon king, who sought to reconcile the “general 
interest of the nation” with “the interests of the individuals” and commanded 
love to the monarch as father of his Catholic vassals (Fernández 2007, 210– 
15). The “tyrannical” ways of his representatives in the Marianas weakened 
the symbolic link between the monarch and the political community, 
undermining the possibility of constituting a “common society or patria.” 
The colony’s distance from the metropole posed another major obstacle to 
that objective. That is why the authors of the Memorial\textsuperscript{47} begged Philip V 
to have the governor of the Marianas named, by the Philippine governor in 
conjunction with the archbishop of Manila, and not designated among the 
king’s courtiers, “for this will prevent the arrival of disparate men” whose 
greed knew no moral or Christian limits.\textsuperscript{48}

Interestingly, Pimentel’s crimes against the royal treasury or his abuse 
of power did not precipitate his legal problems, but rather his revelation 
of one of the major weaknesses of the Spanish empire: the incapacity of 
the galleons of Manila to repel the attacks of English and Dutch corsairs 
and squadrons that had infested the coasts of the Pacific since the early 
eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{49} In the context of global confrontations between 
the great powers for the succession of the Spanish throne (1702–1713), Pimentel 
questioned the capacity of the Spanish empire to repel an organized English 
invasion, thus exposing the weaknesses of the Spanish defenses in frontier 
territories, not only in the Marianas but in the Philippines as well. This was

In 1722 the Jesuits in the Marianas were preparing for the celebration of the first centenary of the canonization of their patron saints: Ignacio de Loyola and Francisco Javier. They hoped that these festivities would cause the saints to protect the people in the face of diseases and other calamities. The first years of the eighteenth century were a period of crisis, with the isolation and depopulation of the Mariana Islands prompting the governors to suggest the “administrative abandonment” of the archipelago. This suggestion, however, met the resistance not only of the Jesuits stationed at the islands, but also of the Spanish Crown. If in the seventeenth century the islands represented a significant space for what Manfred Kossok (1991, 34) termed a “missionary frontier,” in the eighteenth century the Bourbon monarchy contemplated the island of Guåhan and appreciated its strategic value—“a useful landfall,” as Rogers (1995, 1) put it—in the Manila–Acapulco galleon route. Not surprisingly, the Bourbon monarchy did not hesitate to punish some of the greediest governors, such as Pimentel, and thereby assert its royal authority.

The second half of the eighteenth century brought a consolidation of Bourbon authority over the islands, as Rogers (1995, 1) put it—in the Manila–Acapulco galleon route. Not surprisingly, the Bourbon monarchy did not hesitate to punish some of the greediest governors, such as Pimentel, and thereby assert its royal authority in the poor, yet strategic, Marianas.

List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGI</td>
<td>Archivo General de Indias, Seville</td>
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<td>AGN</td>
<td>Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico, DF</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHGJC</td>
<td>Arxiu Històric de la Companiya de Jesús de Catalunya, Barcelona</td>
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<td>AHCJPT</td>
<td>Archivo Històric de la Compañía de Jesús de la Provincia de Toledo</td>
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<td>AHN</td>
<td>Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid</td>
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<td>ANT</td>
<td>Archivo de la Nobleza de Toledo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARSI</td>
<td>Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNM</td>
<td>Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIC</td>
<td>Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas</td>
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<tr>
<td>exp</td>
<td>expediente (record)</td>
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<td>ff.</td>
<td>folio page numbers</td>
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<td>leg.</td>
<td>legajo (box file)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARC</td>
<td>Micronesian Area Research Center</td>
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<td>RAH</td>
<td>Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid</td>
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Notes

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1 Given the dire lack of provisions suffered by the Jesuit missionaries in the Marianas, the procurator of the Society of Jesus, Fr. Alonso Pantoja (1668), asked the Council of the Indies to order the Philippine governor to have the Manila galleons stop at the Marianas and provide them with the necessary supplies and foodstuffs required by the missionaries.

2 These “peculiarities” were fundamentally the limited Spanish presence in the Philippine Islands and the cost that they represented to the public treasury (Fradera 1999).

3 As Luis Alonso (2000, 183–84) argues, “corruption was not an exception, but a norm, a fundamental and constitutive aspect of the institutions established by the Spanish in the islands and without which economic activity could hardly have developed at all.”

4 As Högpl (2004, 284–85) points out, “‘distributive’ justice” means the “allocation of burdens and punishments, as well as rewards, offices, and emoluments of all kinds;” while “communicative justice” has to do with “relationships and conduct involving mutual obligations and/or rights, especially contractual or quasicontractual relations.”

5 On the notion of mala codicia and its harmful effects on the working of colonial bureaucracies, see Puente 2006, 133–48.

6 Noticias de Filipinas de julio de 1706. Cortes 567, leg. 9/2670/30, f. 1v. RAH. Don Manuel de Argüelles was the son of Francisco de Argüelles y Valdés and María Valdés, and in 1687 had traveled to the Philippines as manservant of Alonso de Fuertes Serra y Abella, oidor (judge) of the Audiencia of Manila (AGI, Contratación, 5540A, Libro 3, f. 128, Manila, 10 Mar. 1687).

7 In the letter that he wrote to Fr. Giacomo Pettinati (or Pettnati) on 27 May 1719, Fr. Joseph Bonani (1719) pointed to the avarice and corruption of the Spanish officials as the main cause of the Chamorro population’s decline.


9 According to Father Bustillo (1702a), it cost exactly P200,000 a year to maintain the faith in the Philippines, “without His Majesty receiving any other fruit but the salvation of souls.”


12 The generalship of Tirso González de Santalla (1687–1705) had been characterized by the push for apostolic work in new missions for infidels as well as the intensification of existing ones. The missions in China as well as those in Muslim countries were especially encouraged by this general, who was born in the Spanish province of Léon (O’Neill and Domínguez 2001, 2:1649–50).
13 Mónitas refers to the Mónita privata Societatis Jesu (The secret counsels or instructions of the Society of Jesus), a text first published in 1612, which advised Jesuits on how to obtain power and riches, and which has been widely used by the enemies of the religious order to discredit it. The Jesuit authorship of this text as well as the existence of such “secret instructions” is generally believed to be apocryphal. On these issues of Jesuit writing and suppression, see Morales 2012, 43–45.

14 See also FILPAS, no. 78, 1721, f. 279v. AHCJC.

15 Filipinas 3, 157, AGI; Filipinas 118, no. 9, AGI.

16 Filipinas 341, Libro B, fl. 176v–179v. AGI.

17 Filipinas 349, Book 7, fl. 67v–68r. AGI; Filipinas 18, Exp. 9. AGI.

18 The couple had a son, Manuel Joseph Bonifacio de Argüelles, who on 15 Dec. 1720 wrote a “Relación de Méritos” requesting the office of governor of the Marianas (Argüelles 1720).

19 During Pimentel’s administration, there were two royal houses or “palaces”: one in Humástan, built using masonry during the governorship of Damián de Esplana, and another called “the royal palace” or palacio, presumably in Hagåtña (Fr. Diego de Zarzosa’s letter to procurator Antonio Jaramillo, Págú, 5 May 1691, available in Lévesque 1997c, 446). Driver (1984, 18) points out that “[p]alacio would seem to imply a larger, more substantial, or a more important building, pointing to Hagåtña.”


22 In 1710 Pimentel had asked Philip V to order the construction of a fort with its respective defense batteries in the bay of Humástan (Delgadillo et al. 1879, 40). See also Governor Pimentel’s letter to Philip V on 13 April 1710, from Hagåtña, cited in Lévesque 1999a, 11:137. At that time, the island’s only heavy artillery consisted of some six cannons below the royal palace. Two bronze four-pounders, one iron four-pounder, and three two-pounders made up the lot (Driver 2005, 10, 18–21).

23 To confront future attacks, the king dictated a royal provision on 24 July 1712, which ordered the dispatch of armed units to the Philippines and Marianas.

24 As Cunningham (1919, 128) pointed out, “there were two kinds of investigations of official conduct, one taken at the completion of the regular term of office and the other at any time when the needs of the service required it.”

25 At that time there were nine priests in the Marianas: Fr. Felipe María Muscati, vice-provincial and minister in the partido of Inalåhan; Miguel de Aparicio, rector of the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán and minister in Hagåtña; Lorenzo Bustilio, in the partido of Humástan; Diego de Zarzosa in the partido of Hágat; Juan Schrimeisen in the partido of Malesso; Ignacio de Ibarguen, minister of Indians; Pedro Crudolof and Joseph Blaaot; and three coadjutor brothers: Jaime Chavarrí, doctor and apothecary; Nicolás Montero, domestic assistant in the residence, and Luis García, assistant in the children’s school (Annual Letter of 1715, “Algunos puntos para la Annua de esta Misión Mariana,” Inarahan, 15 May 1715 in ARSI, Philipp. 14, f. 104r).

26 In 1711 a deadly epidemic spread throughout the islands, and it was harsher on the Spanish population (Pimentel 1720a).


28 Father Valdivieso (1718) leveled these same accusations against the excesses of and bad example set by Governor Pimentel.

29 The rise of Joseph Bonifacio de Argüelles through the ranks of officialdom was meteoric, reflecting the prevalence of favoritism and nepotism in Pimentel’s administration. On 18 Nov. 1715 Argüelles was named alférez (lieutenant) of the Spanish infantry under the command of Juan Félix Pimentel (the other unit was commanded by Joseph Bonifacio’s brother, Capt. Juan de Argüelles Valdés). On 5 Dec. 1715 he was named captain of the said company, and so remained until 6 June 1716 when he became secretary of war and government. On 31 Dec. 1715 Pimentel named him his deputy lieutenant, which carried a salary of P30 a month. On 8 Mar. 1717 he was named visitor of the partidos of Guam, and on 26 Aug. 1717 he was made sergeant major of the patache Santa Domingo de Guzmán, which that year had brought the sitioado from the Philippines to the Marianas (Argüelles 1720).

30 Joseph Bonani’s letter of 27 May 1719 was to Fr. Giacomo Pettinatti (or Pethnati), rector of the Jesuit school in Agrum (Zagreb), Croatia.

31 In his two Memorials dated in November 1745, Fr. José Calvo, SJ (1745a, 1745b, transcribed by Lévesque 2000, 587–98), procurator of the Society of Jesus, strongly recommended the urgent reform of the presidio of Marianas. Likewise, he stressed the need to establish a permanent Jesuit and Spanish presence in the Muslim sultanes of Maguindanao and Jolo (RAH, Cortes 567, Legajo 9/2674; cf. Calvo 1745a, 1745b).

32 In 1721 the archbishop of Manila (1701–1722) and governor-general of the Philippines, Fr. Francisco de la Cuesta (1719–1721), wrote to Philip V recommending an increase in the salary of the governor of Zamboanga to P1,000 as a way of preventing maladministration (Cuesta 1721). In the 1740s, Father Calvo was of the same opinion (Filpas, no. 092, f. 52r; AHCJC; cf. Lévesque 2000, 590).

33 Memorial 1722. This Memorial reached the King on 30 Mar. 1722, who then dispatched a copy to the archbishop of Manila (AGI, Filipinas, 333, Book CC 12, fl. 252v–254r).

34 Father Valdivieso’s (1718) letter to Father Marín stated, “a plot should also be destined for the School of the Fathers so that they tend their crops and raise some cattle for their livelihood, for even this the governor has taken from him, even though the Fathers brought with them some animals from Mexico of the kind that abound in those lands” (“Real Cédula sobre lo representado por los indios de Marianas y Mindanao que incluye la copia adjunta del Memorial de dichos indios,” AGI, Filipinas 528, fl. 1v–2r).

35 A few years later he would also engage in trading with another pirate ship, the Tigre or Tiger (Petición 1720, in Audiencia de Manila 1721, fl. 254v–254v). Cf. Lévesque 1999a, 542.

36 Junta de Guerra, Hágat, 22 Mar. 1710, in Audiencia de Manila 1721, f. 249r; Lévesque 1998, 284–86. The permanent garrison of the presidio had sixty Spanish infantrymen who were each paid P315 a year, plus various soldiers without posts and the Pampanga infantry, for a total of 165 men. The governor’s salary was P1,650, and the sitioado was a yearly P20,550 (Ultramar 1999a, 612–13). However, Sergeant Mayor Quiroga (1721) said that there were ninety Spanish military posts (Filpas, no. 78, 1721, fl. 227v–310r, AHCJC), which would be more compatible with the salary of P32,691 found on record by Lévesque (1999a, 612) in the AGN for this period. In any case, the salary was received irregularly, which...
meant that not only was there not enough money to acquire sufficient guns and ammunition, but also that soldiers were forced to buy their own clothing at inflated prices, placing them in debt to the government store (Castillo 1717). As a result, many of them became indebted for life to the governor, who controlled and distributed the real situado with the help of his relatives. The royal situado that arrived at the Marianas from 1710 to 1715 amounted to P29,914, 7 tomines, and 3 granos (Lévesque 1999a, 155).

37 Some witnesses, like Antonio Nani (1721), principal of Humátac, declared that they did not know if Alonso Soón and Antonio Ayo had offered to help Pimentel/expel the English. But they stated that the number of natives who were actually gathered did not exceed 200 men. Others, like Fr. Ignacio de Ibarguen, who was in charge of evangelizing the Spanish and natives living in Hagåtña, declared that the number of natives in this partido who were capable of handling guns was less than 500 men (Fr. Muscati’s reply, Hagåtña, 30 Dec. 1720, transcribed in Lévesque 1999a, 11:260). Moreover, Ibarguen said that in 1710 the principales Sooon and Ayo were ill and therefore incapable of organizing a military action (Muscati 1720). There is a copy of these declarations (“Declaración del gobernador Pimentel, diciembre de 1720”) in AGI, Ultramar 561, transcribed in Lévesque 1999a, 257–58.

38 This is why he had the Jesuits take the chalices, statues, ornaments, and other adornments of the churches, and hide them in the mountainous interior, so as to prevent them from falling into enemy hands (“Testimonio del capitán don Fernando Vélez de Arce”, Aguña, 1721, in “Carta de la Audiencia de Manila a su Magestad acompañada de la causa seguida contra el gobernador de las Marianas don Juan Antonio de Pimentel,” 23 Mar. 1721, FILPAS, no. 78, 1721, f. 271v, AHCJC).

39 According to the declaration of Baltasar de Espinosa (1721), resident of Hagåtña and soldier in the presidio of Guam, “while sergeant major don Antonio de Villamor y Badillo (1704–1706) was governor, two boats from Saipan loaded with supplies from the royal storehouses arrived, bringing two guatajes (sailing equipment), and having gone to the beach to where the said boats were, captain don Joseph Mainat Paniagua took one of the guatajes from them, and when the said sergeant major found out he sent for the captain and having brought him he took his captain’s guinaeta and gave it to captain Juan Núñez; this witness knows this because he saw when said guataje was brought from the house of captain Paniagua to the Palace and he was also present as guard when his plaza was taken from him as well.”

40 Let us not forget that he was the illegitimate son of the Marquis of Mancera, Viceroy of New Spain. On account of his background of nobility, he spent only one year in prison (Audiencia de Manila, letter to Philip V, Manila, 30 June 1722, cited in Lévesque 1999b, 289–91).


42 “Traslado auténtico de lo actuado en los juicios de la residencia que dio el teniente general don Juan Antonio de Pimentel del tiempo que gobernó las islas Marianas,” Manila, 16 Oct. 1724 (Escribanía Cámara, Leg. 329a, ff. 1–11r, AGI).

43 Pimentel was not of noble birth, but because of the offices that he had held he was recognized as such. This recognition was the reason why he requested judge Joseph Ruiz not to embargo his “white and colored clothing, this being a privilege of the nobility,” as well as his weapons, his horse, and his statues of the Virgin, Saint John, and Saint Anthony of Padua, his patron saints and defenders. The request was granted on 10 May 1721 (Ruiz 1721).

44 During the trial carried out in Hagåtña on 1721, it was discovered that the year before he had tried to shirk 8,000 gold pesos from the inventory of his goods by ordering his majordomo, Sgt. Maj. Roque de los Reyes, to hide them in the patache that was about to depart for the Philippines (Ruiz 1721).

45 “Testimonio del expediente promovido en virtud de la Real Cédula del 17 de agosto de 1718 sobre que se ponga remedio a los excesos que se han tenido noticia de cometer en las islas Marianas” (Philippine National Archives, Marianas [1718–1822], vol. 1, exp. 1, ff. 1–11). In 1724 the Jesuits of the Marianas, as protectors of the natives, sued the Audiencia of Manila for P23,430 for the unpaid labor of various illicit trabajos personales (personal works) that Governor Pimentel had extorted from the natives and another P30,000 for the aids and situados that he had fraudulently held from the presidio soldiers (Audiencia de Manila, letter to Philip V, Manila, 30 June 1724, cited in Lévesque 1999b, 563–64).

46 Cortes, 567, 9-2676, Doc. 1, f. 1r–1v, RAH. See also the letter written by Fr. Marcelo Valdivieso to Fr. Juan Marín, Capul, 19 July 1718, in which he pointed out that “unless the governor were elected by the provincial Father of the Philippines nothing will be accomplished because today the greed among the corporals is a great obstacle to the conversion of all these gentiles” (AHCJC, FIL HIS–061, E.I, c.–c05/4/5 [1768], “Diversa sobre islas Marianas y Carolinas / P. Sanvitores,” ff. 3r–3v).

47 Lévesque (1999b, 415) points out that the Memorial’s authors were the Jesuits in Manila, who wrote it after Father Valdivieso visited the Marianas (1718) and saw the state of the mission.

48 The topics addressed in this Memorial (1722) coincided entirely with the letter sent by Fr. Marcelo Valdivieso, SJ (1718) (Dozal 1725, transcribed in Lévesque 1999b, 535).

49 In a letter he wrote from Mexico on 1 Dec. 1701, Francisco de Borja y Aragón, general procurator of the Jesuit Philippine missions, wrote to Pascual Francisco Borja Centelles Ponce de León, X, duke of Gandia, that “here we are at peace, but organizing militias in case the enemy decides to come to these coasts.”

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